


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THE  
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MAY, 1934

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PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS



# THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Vol. 19

MAY, 1934

No. 1

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Right Echelon with VF-10M Squadron

Entered as second-class matter, March 27, 1929, at the Post Office, Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized November 23, 1918.

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## THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

MAJOR J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C., *Editor*

Published Quarterly By

## THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

Room 3020—Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.

Printed at 1918 Harford Avenue, Baltimore, Md.

Authors are responsible for all statements contained in articles published in this magazine.

# THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Vol. 19

MAY, 1934

No. 1

## NAVAL AVIATION'S ROLE IN FULFILMENT OF NAVAL POLICY

A fine article upon an ever  
cogent topic

■ The fundamental naval policy of the United States is to maintain our Navy at sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce, and to guard the Continental and overseas possessions of the United States.

To fulfill the conditions of this fundamental policy, the fleet building and maintenance policy, as far as it concerns Naval Aviation, is to build and maintain aircraft carriers in the maximum effective tonnage that accords with Treaty provisions, and to develop Naval Aviation primarily for operation with the fleet.

In the heavier-than-air department of Naval Aviation, the policy is to build and maintain airplanes to the full complements authorized for aircraft carriers, aircraft tenders, battleships, cruisers, and Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces; and to determine and develop the types of airplanes and appliances that are best suited for increased effectiveness of naval vessels, attacks on all classes of naval objectives and for scouting and patrolling.

In the lighter-than-air department of Naval Aviation, the policy is to maintain as necessary the rigid airships now built and building in order to determine their usefulness for naval and other governmental purposes and their commercial value, and to build only such nonrigid airships as may be necessary for training purposes.

It is a well known fact that our Navy, although perhaps considered by some persons of sufficient strength to fulfill the country's fundamental naval policy, is not up to the maximum as allowed by Treaty provisions, neither in submarines, surface vessels, nor aircraft. However, it is not the purpose of this article to bring out the facts of our under Treaty-strength Navy, nor is it to dwell on any plans for the future. Rather, it is to tell how Naval Aviation endeavors to fulfill the

fundamental naval policy at the present time, and to give an insight on how this partial fulfillment has taken place in the past.

The Navy first took active participation in aviation in 1911 when three planes were purchased. At that time the value of aircraft to the Navy was extremely doubtful, but a few farseeing and thoughtful enthusiasts believed in the future of aeronautics, and devoted their time almost exclusively to the development of this science.

With the advent of the World War, aviation received a tremendous impetus, and Naval Aviation profited greatly thereby. After the war Naval Aviation continued to expand, being greatly aided by Congress, which in 1926 authorized a Five-Year Aircraft Building Program. After the end of the five-year period, 1931, our Naval Aviation had grown to a force of 1,000 "useful" planes, with a personnel complement sufficient to man and maintain them satisfactorily.

The Navy's air activities today demonstrate beyond any doubt that our aeronautical pioneers were correct in their assumption that aviation would become an important adjunct to the fleet. That it is an important attending element is proved by the fact that Naval Aviation is now developed and maintained primarily for operations with the fleet. It has not only become an integral and component part of the fleet, but it is today one of the most essential factors in fleet operations.

Since naval air effort is one of the important elements that make up the whole Naval force, it must conform to the same fundamental requirements of all naval forces; viz., that it is justified only to the extent that it exerts an important influence on the control of sea areas, and that it must be capable of operating effectively in any part of the oceans of the world, as does the fleet.

Experience has demonstrated that airplanes up to the present time are incapable of operating unsupported on the vast areas of the sea. Therefore the naval force can not avail itself of the advantages inherent in air operations unless it provides in the fleet itself means for carrying, maintaining, and efficiently operating aircraft in whatever area it becomes necessary to exert sea power, and unless through constant training there are developed methods for harmonious cooperation between air, surface, and sub-surface activities. Through



constant training and indoctrination, the methods of cooperation have now reached the point where aircraft in fleet activities are accepted as a commonplace part of the day's work, air and surface operations working in the closest harmony, each supporting and complementing the efforts of the other.

A means for carrying, maintaining, and efficiently operating aircraft on the backs of the fleet has been accomplished. Each battleship, each cruiser, and each aircraft carrier carries her complement of planes. Since the aircraft carriers carry by far the greatest number of planes in our sea going forces, it might be well to take them up first.

Airplane carriers are neither more nor less than armed, floating, mobile, flying fields. They are completely equipped with machine shops, repair facilities, and hangar space. Protected by the big guns of the battleships and cruisers, they bring their complements of fighting and observation planes to within operating distance of the enemy, the range of its bombing planes being at least ten times that of the great guns of the dreadnaughts. The carriers remain outside of gun range of the enemy, and launch their flying squadrons to attack the opposing ships. It is generally believed, under most conditions, that the operating planes from one of our larger carriers would be more than a match for any two or three enemy cruisers.

The *Langley*, our first aircraft carrier, was commissioned in 1922, being the first electrically driven ship in our Navy. She was originally the collier *Jupiter*, and was converted into an experimental carrier, the structure above her decks incident to her coaling whips readily lending itself to the installation of the present flight deck. The *Langley*, an experimental project, has in the past proved of inestimable value, and taught us many lessons for future carrier building and operation.

The *Langley's* complement of planes, consisting of fighting, scouting, and observation types, has generally approximated 34, although at one time, about five years ago, 42 airplanes were successfully operated from her deck during a Hawaiian cruise.

The rest of our aircraft carrier force in commission at present consists of the *Saratoga* and *Lexington*. These two ships were originally laid down as battle cruisers, but after the Disarmament Conference, instead of being scrapped, they were converted into aircraft carriers. They were commissioned during the latter part of 1927, and took their long needed place in the fleet early in 1928. Each ship has an authorized complement of 78 planes, consisting of fighting, scouting, bombing, and torpedo planes, and a small utility unit of observation planes. All of the above planes based on the carriers are of the land type, except those of the utility units, which are amphibians.

During past maneuvers, our carriers have operated with full plane complements on board, and have performed the duties assigned to them most efficiently and satisfactorily. Bombing and torpedo attacks were made, scouting problems were carried out, and, in general, the squadrons operated much as they would have had they been based ashore.

The *Ranger*, a vessel of 13,800 tons, just recently launched, is now being completed, and it is expected that she will take her place in the fleet about May, 1934. Since this is the first ship to be built and designed primarily as an aircraft carrier, she will undoubtedly become the most efficient ship in the carrier

category. The present day interests of economy will curtail the *Ranger's* complement of planes to approximately the same number and types being used as now employed on the *Saratoga* and *Lexington*.

With the perfection of the catapult, the operation of planes from our battleships and cruisers has become as efficient and commonplace as the operation of planes from a carrier.

The first catapult was designed at the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D. C., in 1912. On October 12th of the same year the first successful catapult launching was accomplished. The first turntable catapult was constructed and installed on the *Maryland* in 1921. Three additional catapults of this type were ordered after the *Maryland* tests, and before these were completed, an order for twenty more was placed. As a result, each battleship and cruiser in the Navy today carries its complement of seaplanes, always ready to be launched from its modern, efficient catapults. The planes are catapulted from the ships, and at the end of the flight land in the water and are recovered by the ships which stop and hoist them aboard.

Catapult operation has been marked with a superlative degree of success. To date there has been no aircraft fatality due to mal-functioning of the catapults.

The primary mission of aircraft attached to the battleships and cruisers is that of observing and reporting corrections of gunfire, and also that, in the case of cruisers, of scouting in order to locate the enemy.

The observation plane acts as a highly mobile observation post from which the fall of shot is noted and corrections, over or under, left or right, are immediately radioed to the firing ship.

Ranges of guns on capital ships have been increased to a point where it is no longer possible to observe the splashes with any accuracy from the ship itself. In action, therefore, it is imperative that this duty be performed from aircraft, since an accurate view unobstructed by smoke of battle may be obtained, and splashes corrected to hits with the minimum of delay.

The scouting plane, fired from a catapult and flying well over one hundred miles an hour, can considerably precede the scout cruiser, locate the enemy, and return the information by radio, thereby greatly increasing the effectiveness of the cruisers assigned to this important scouting duty.

The planes attached to the capital ships justify their existence to such a marked degree that they are now regarded as the eyes of the fleet, and it is needless to state that for this reason every effort is expended to keep them functioning one hundred per cent.

The seaplanes assigned to the battleships are of the observation type, the chief function of which is the spotting of gun fire during battle.

Observation-scouting planes are carried on heavy cruisers. When the location of the enemy has not been definitely established, the planes are catapulted, and a search over certain prescribed areas is made. In case the enemy's position is approximately known and he is in the proximity of our own forces, planes are dispatched on a scouting mission to determine the enemy's disposition. When the enemy has been definitely contacted, the scouting planes return to their cruisers, refuel, if necessary, and stand by to be catapulted again, this time to carry out the observation mission of spotting gun fire.



In the case of light cruisers, two observation-scouting planes are carried on each cruiser. These planes function as scouts similar to those of the heavy cruisers. After contact with the enemy, they do not, however, take up the role of spotting the light cruiser gun fire, since the range of the light cruiser six-inch guns is so short that the shot fall can be accurately corrected from the fighting tops of the cruisers themselves. Instead, the planes assemble and carry out any missions prescribed by higher authority.

With the aircraft of the three carriers and the planes carried on the battleships and cruisers, the fleet now has an effective air strength of modern airplanes of all types, and a carefully trained and efficient aviation personnel, ready for effective action in any part of the seas of the world.

Since the more or less recent decommissioning of the *Jason*, the *Wright* is our only large aircraft tender at this time. This vessel is used primarily as its designation signifies—a mother ship for aircraft, similar to the *Holland's* function of being a tender for submarines, and the *Altair's* and *Melville's* function of being tenders for destroyers. The *Wright's* present complement of planes consists of patrol, transport, and utility planes, most of the latter of which are amphibians. This tender is fully equipped with shops and maintenance facilities, and, minus a flight deck and catapults, handles all of her planes by cranes, raising and lowering them to and from her deck as repairs are required. In the event of hostilities, the plane units would fly to the tactical point desired, either preceded or followed by the *Wright* to maintain them there. In other words, the tender is merely a floating supply and maintenance base operating for the upkeep benefit of her brood of aircraft.

An important function of the Navy is the control of coastal sea lanes, and the protection of coastwise shipping routes. This control and protection is not only in conformity with our naval policy, but its area of application is expanded to take in the overseas possessions of the United States. Our Continental and overseas possessions, as well as our coast lines, are protected and controlled primarily by our fleet, and the readiness and dispatch with which it is able to arrive at any possible scene of action. In addition to the threat of the fleet, however, we have at certain strategic points self-maintaining air bases to act independently or supplement the fleet in times of emergency.

At Coco Solo, Panama Canal Zone, is a Fleet Air Base having a complement of patrol planes in addition to spares and a utility unit of several planes of various types. At Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, is another Fleet Air Base whose complement consists of patrol planes plus spares and the usual utility unit. The planes based at Coco Solo, Pearl Harbor, and on the *Wright* are assigned to the Fleet Base Force.

Patrol planes are the long distance scouts of the air. They have a metal boat type of hull, a cruising radius of a thousand miles or more, and are capable of remaining afloat indefinitely in ordinary seas. Equipped with radio, they are able to scout out the enemy at distant range and report his disposition long before he can make an attack on any of our bases or surface vessels. Hence the patrol planes make for preparedness and prevent surprise against our forces.

On the Asiatic Station is the Asiatic Fleet, with its complement of aircraft. Since the withdrawal of the *Jason* from the Far East, the number of aircraft in

those waters has become pitifully small. There are planes attached to the flagship, the *Augusta*, and to the *Heron*, which is the minesweeper assigned to tender duty with aircraft of the Asiatic Fleet. The Navy Yard, Cavite, P. I., is the normal overhaul and repair base for all aircraft of the Asiatic Fleet.

During the World War a total of twenty-two aviation bases were established abroad, and several others were under construction at the end of hostilities. Twelve of these were in operation in France, seven in the British Isles, and three in Italy. In addition a Marine Corps air base was established the latter part of 1917 at Ponta Delgada, Azores, where submarine patrols were flown until the end of the war.

Since the war, Marine aviation has seen duty at various times in Santo Domingo, Guano, China, Nicaragua, and Haiti, the latter being the only foreign country in which is still maintained a Marine Corps aviation base.

Within the continental limits, air stations are maintained at strategical and convenient points. On the West Coast is one at San Diego, which consists of the air station proper with its complement of planes, where the fleet aircraft are based during the intermissions of fleet maneuvers and cruises. The other West Coast station is at Sunnyvale, California, a new station, primarily established for the operation and maintenance of lighter-than-aircraft.

On the Gulf Coast is the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, Florida, primarily a training school for naval aviators. It is here that personnel are inducted into the flight operation of aircraft.

On the East Coast are air stations at Norfolk, Anacostia (Washington), and Lakehurst. Norfolk maintains a regular complement of planes, and in addition has overhaul and repair facilities. It contributes a great deal towards the test and experimental work of aircraft and their accessories. Until the Scouting Force was shifted from the East Coast to join the Battle Force on the West Coast, Norfolk also was used as a base for the Scouting Force aircraft, which base functioned similar to that at San Diego. The air station at Anacostia functions primarily for the flight test of new and experimental planes, and furnishes the aircraft for the aviators attached to the Bureau of Aeronautics in the Navy Department. The station at Lakehurst is operated principally for lighter-than-aircraft.

In addition to the air stations mentioned above, Naval Aviation maintains certain other air organizations, all of which play very important roles. The Naval Aircraft Factory at Philadelphia experiments and investigates almost every conceivable sort of aeronautical material and appliance, manufactures certain airplane parts, and has, in the past, built complete planes. The aviation unit at Newport, Rhode Island, functions in connection with the Torpedo School. The naval air detail at Dahlgren, Virginia, assists the Naval Proving Ground at that place in the test and development of aviation ordnance. The air unit at Annapolis exists for indoctrinal flight training of midshipmen.

The Marine Corps air arm of Naval Aviation maintains air squadrons at Quantico and San Diego. These squadrons are fully equipped and manned, and are at all times ready to proceed instantly on expeditionary duty. As stated previously, the Marine Corps has only one foreign aviation base at this time, which consists of one squadron of planes at Port au Prince, Haiti.

In addition to the above regular air stations and bases,

Naval Reserve Aviation today maintains ten bases in or near the following large cities: Boston, New York, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, St. Louis, San Pedro, Oakland, and Seattle. In addition they maintain three reserve aviation detachments at the following regular bases: Philadelphia, Anacostia, and Norfolk.

Naval and Marine Aviation Reserve has reached the point where it has become an efficient and dependable organization, and is now ready for mobilization duties. It is an important nucleus ready for healthy expansion in the event of war.

In order to carry out the Navy's policy to determine and develop the types of airplanes and appliances best suited for the Navy's needs, many forces are constantly at work. The Navy Department in general, and the Bureau of Aeronautics in particular, has this thought always uppermost, and its many experts are continuously bending their efforts along these lines. The hearty co-operation of other governmental agencies, such as the Army, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Bureau of Standards, the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce, and many others, as well as the assistance given by many commercial firms and contractors, all go to make Naval Aviation what it is today.

The Navy purchased its first lighter-than-aircraft, a non-rigid airship, in 1915. It was completed and delivered two years later, but when tested it was found to be too heavy, and so was dismantled. A new design was then drawn up for a patrol type of airship, and by the middle of 1918, the Navy had sixteen of them in operation. They were used for the training of airship personnel and for coastal patrol, and flew approximately 400,000 miles on this duty. In close succession were built many more types of non-rigids, each type being an improvement on its predecessor. The last of the Navy's non-rigids were designated the "J" and "K" ships, two of which are at present in use, the "J" ship being attached to the Sunnyvale Naval Air Station, and the "K" ship being based at Lakehurst for the present.

With the adoption of rigid construction for large airships, the *Shenandoah* was constructed at the Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, assembled at the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, and went into commission in October, 1923. Before she was destroyed in a severe electrical storm over Ohio in September, 1925, she made many notable flights, and proved that dirigibles would be of vast importance to our naval forces.

In connection with the Reparations Program at the end of the war, it was agreed that Germany should build a large rigid airship for the United States. So at the Zeppelin plant in Friedrichshafen was built the LZ-126, and in October, 1924, manned by a German crew, she was flown to Lakehurst in eighty hours, a distance of 5,000 miles. Shortly thereafter she was christened the U. S. S. *Los Angeles*.

The *Los Angeles* further proved the value of airships to our Navy, and made many noteworthy flights, one of the most important ones being her landing on the deck of the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*, thereby demonstrating the feasibility of the refueling of dirigibles at sea.

No funds were carried in the 1933 Appropriation Act for the operation and maintenance of the *Los Angeles*, so, complying with the expressed wish of Congress, this airship was decommissioned on June 30, 1932. Although it was in operation for eight years in most valuable experimental and training work, it is still capable of

being made airworthy and put in good condition, and is being preserved at Lakehurst in such condition that it can be recommissioned on short notice at some future date, if desired.

The *Akron*, the Navy's next large airship, was commissioned at Lakehurst on October 27, 1931. She was the first fleet airship and aerial airplane carrier, and was equipped with specially designed, high-performance, fighting airplanes, with provisions for their launching, hooking-on, and housing while the airship was in flight. The *Akron* was the world's largest and most up-to-date airship, and it was indeed a great naval catastrophe when she was destroyed and practically all of her notable personnel were lost in a severe storm off the Jersey coast on April 4, 1933.

The *Macon*, sister ship of the *Akron* and identical in general design even though embodying some few modifications, has recently been turned over to the Navy, and is now attached to the base at Sunnyvale and assigned to the Fleet. It is expected that she will demonstrate definite proof of the naval value of this type of aircraft in fleet operations.

It is hoped that the public will outgrow the prevalent attitude that airships are extremely unsafe, and will remember the great feats of the dirigibles rather than only what happened to the *Shenandoah* and the *Akron*. Certainly it would have been disastrous for progress if the first few airplane crashes had stopped the development and operation of the heavier-than-air machine. This country has not advanced through timidity, and advancement of Naval Aviation towards continuous fulfillment of naval policy requires advancement in lighter-than-air aeronautics.

That airships are required to effectively carry out our naval policy is a well recognized fact among those cognizant of the situation. Large airships have demonstrated their usefulness to the Navy. Due to their cruising radius of over seven thousand miles, they are excellently fitted for long distance scouting and patrolling. They can observe vast areas of the sea and immediately report by radio enemy activity to the high naval authorities concerned. Such craft may also be used for emergency transportation of personnel, the *Macon* being capable of carrying five hundred men completely equipped with rifles, ammunition, emergency rations, and the other articles needed by a foot soldier entering the field against an enemy. With this load, the *Macon* can cruise from the West Coast to Hawaii in thirty hours, disembark her emergency troops, and still have sufficient fuel aboard to operate another twenty hours.

The operation of large airships has pointed to commercial interests the vast possibilities and value of this type of craft. That they have already proved their commercial worth is typified by the seventeen successful round trips made by the *Graf Zeppelin* between Friedrichshafen, Germany, and Pernambuco, Brazil, previous to November of 1932. On all of these trips the *Graf* carried passengers, mail, express, and a moderate amount of freight; and each trip was made at a profit to the company. Furthermore, the *Graf* has continued to make these voyages up to the present, and will continue to do so, very much the same as a regular steamship line runs its scheduled sailings and arrivals.

The continued operation of dirigibles as planned by the Navy will further determine their usefulness for naval and other governmental purposes, as well as their commercial value. As Naval Aviation's heavier-than-air



program has helped to keep the airplane industry alive during the early period of aeronautics and demonstrated the many uses to which airplanes could be put commercially, so will the Navy's operation of airships point the way to commercial interests and assist the lighter-than-air industry.

In addition to the two large rigid airships *Macon* and *Los Angeles*, the Navy's lighter-than-air force on hand now consists of free balloons, kite balloons, non-rigid airships, and a metal clad airship, all used for experimental and training purposes. No lighter-than-aircraft are at present being built for the Navy.

From the above it can be seen in just what manner Naval Aviation contributes towards the fulfillment of our country's fundamental naval policy. Early in the article it was mentioned that Naval Aviation *endeavors* to fulfill naval policy, and that it would be told how this *partial* fulfillment has been accomplished. The words "endeavors" and "partial" are used advisedly, for Naval Aviation does not completely satisfy naval policy any

more than the sub-surface and surface vessels of our naval forces completely satisfy their contribution to naval policy. This short-coming is due to the fact that our Navy is not at present built up to Treaty strength, and in no way is it any reflection on the Navy Department. The inadequacy of our Navy is due to the past National policy of not maintaining the Navy to Treaty limits.

Naval Aviation, as well as the other branches of the Navy, has fulfilled naval policy to the maximum limit allowable with the tools placed in its hands. It has proved beyond any doubt that it is indispensable to the Navy and to the country in assisting in the plans for National Defense. In the matter of material and training of personnel, it is not surpassed by any nation. Although this branch is still in its infancy, comparatively speaking, the air arm of the Navy is ready to take its place in the defense of our country, and much more may be expected of it in the future than has been accomplished in the past.

## Officers and Enlisted Men of The U. S. Marine Corps Who Have Been Awarded Decorations For Aviation Duty

### MEDAL OF HONOR

#### OFFICERS

Schilt, Christian F., 1st Lieut.  
Talbot, Ralph J., 2d Lieut. (deceased).

#### ENLISTED MEN

Robinson, Robert G., Gy. Sgt.

### DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

#### OFFICERS

Rowell, Ross E., Lt-Col.  
Mulcahy, F. P., Capt.  
Lytle, Robert S., Capt.  
Nelms, Frank, 2d Lt.

#### ENLISTED MEN

Wiman, Amil, Gy. Sgt.

### DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

#### OFFICERS

Turner, Thos. C., Col. (deceased).  
Rowell, Ross E., Lt-Col.  
Mitchell, Ralph J., Major.  
Bourne, Louis M., Major.  
Page, Arthur H., Capt. (deceased).  
Johnson, Byron F., Capt.  
Parker, Alton N., Capt. (MCR).  
Boyden, Haynes D., 1st Lieut.  
Sanderson, Lawson H. M., 1st Lieut.  
Bradley, Basil, 1st Lieut. (retired).  
Becker, Herbert P., 1st Lieut.  
Lamson-Scribner, Frank H., 1st Lieut.  
Wier, Frank D., 1st Lieut.  
Fike, Chas. L., 1st Lieut.

Hart, John N., 1st Lieut.  
Young, John S. E., 1st Lieut.  
Rutledge, Raymond P., 2d Lieut.  
Wodarczyk, Michael, Ch. Mar. Gun.

#### ENLISTED MEN

Munsch, Albert S., M.T. Sgt.  
Rucker, Chas. W., Gy. Sgt.  
Heritage, Gordon W., St. Sgt.  
Torner, Hilmar N., Sgt.

### NAVY CROSS

#### OFFICERS

Geiger, Roy S., Major.  
McIlvain, William M., Major (MCR).  
Roben, Douglas B., Major (deceased).  
Williams, Robert E., Capt. (retired).  
Day, Karl S., Capt. (Temp'y).  
Whiting, Donald M., 1st Lieut. (MCR).  
Whitside, John R., 1st Lieut. (MCR).  
Wright, Arthur H., 1st Lieut. (Reserve).  
Petersen, Herman A., 1st Lieut. (Prov.).  
Olsen, Eynar F., 1st Lieut. (Prov.).  
McLaughlin, Geo. McC., 3d, 1st Lieut. (MCR).  
Humphreys, Albert E., 1st Lieut. (MCR).  
Brewer, Everett R., 1st Lieut. (MCR).  
Bates, Clyde M., 1st Lieut. (Prov.).  
Robillard, Fred S., 1st Lieut.  
Weaver, John H., 2d Lieut. (Prov.).  
Taylor, Caleb W., 2d Lieut. (MCR).  
Norman, Harvey C., 2d Lieut. (Prov.).  
Jones, Harold A., 2d Lieut. (MCR).

#### ENLISTED MEN

McGraw, Jno. K., 1st Sgt.  
Wershiner, H. B., Gy. Sgt.  
McCullough, T. L., Sgt.

## NAVAL AIR STATION, SUNNYVALE, CALIFORNIA

### Some Interesting Lines About the Navy's New West Coast Air Station

#### 1. LOCATION

■ The "home port" of the U. S. S. *Macon* (dirigible), sister ship of the ill fated U. S. S. *Akron*, is at the U. S. Naval Air Station Sunnyvale, Mountain View, California (post office address). As an integral part of this station, there is a heavier-than-air landing field known as "Moffett Field," named after the late Admiral Moffett, Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics who was a firm proponent of the value of lighter-than-air craft. The Sunnyvale base is located on the "peninsular," 40 miles

south of San Francisco. Nearby are the peninsular towns of San Jose (14 miles south). Sunnyvale (4 miles south), Mountain View (3 miles west), Palo Alto (9 miles north), and San Mateo and Burlingame (25 miles north). All of these towns are situated along a four lane boulevard, known as the Bay Shore Highway, and also on the 101 State Highway. Bridges joining the peninsular and the other side of San Francisco bay permit easy contact with Mare Island, Oakland and Berkeley.

#### 2. DESCRIPTION OF

The air station is on the site of an old ranch, and comprises 1,000 acres of ground. This piece of property was purchased by popular local subscription and then presented to and accepted by the U. S. Government for use as a naval air station in connection with the U. S. S. *Macon*, and was formally placed in commission as such on 3 April, 1933. The accompanying photo shows



NAVAL AIR STATION, SUNNYVALE, CALIFORNIA



the principal buildings on the station. The personnel of the station consists of three groups, the crew of the U. S. S. *Macon* (18 officers and 98 enlisted), the naval officers and enlisted men of the station (29 officers and 164 enlisted), and the Marines (6 officers and 121 enlisted).

The building marked 4, is known as the Station Barracks. It is a two-story building with two "wings," in the south wing of which are the Marines, and in the north wing, the bluejackets of the station. The mess hall and galley are on the first floor between the wings, with the dormitory for the enlisted men of the U. S. S. *Macon* (when in port) above. The ship's service store, tailor, barber, laundry clerk, Chaplain's office, library, pool and billiard room, reading rooms, auditorium (church services, movies, etc.), bowling alleys and the .22 caliber rifle range are located in the building marked 3 (recreation building). There is no Marine Corps post exchange at this station. The building marked 5 (bachelor officers quarters) contains suites and rooms to accommodate 31 officers. New arrivals, with their families are accommodated in this building for quarters and meals, until such time as private quarters can be secured in the neighboring towns. There are nine sets of government quarters (as shown in the photo); quarters I (eye) being designated as the quarters for the Commanding officer of Marines. These houses, extremely well built, and comfortable, consist of basement, garage, servants' quarters (outside alongside of garage), reception hall, living room, dining room, study, pantry and kitchen located on the first floor, with four bedrooms and two baths located on the second floor. All cooking and heating is done by natural gas. An electric refrigerator is also installed in the kitchen. Large clothes closets are an added attraction of these houses. A small open air porch is at the corner of the house. At present a lawn sprinkling system and shrubbery are being installed throughout the grounds. The quarters are excellently furnished, including rugs and mattresses.

### 3. MARINE BARRACKS AND COMMAND

The present authorized complement for the Marine command consists of 1 Major, 4 Captains, 3 1st Lieutenants, 1 2nd Lieutenant, 1 Sgt. Major, 1 QM Sergeant, 1 PM Sergeant, 1 1st Sergeant, 1 Gy Sergeant, 8 Sergeants, 13 Corporals, 2 Trumpeters, and 94 Privates 1st Class and Privates.

The Marine offices are located in the barracks in a large room on the second floor, and contain the Commanding Officers' office (separate room), Sgt. Major's office, pay dept., QM dept. and the company office. The command is divided into two platoons, each platoon occupying a large "squad" room on the respective floors. Also on the 2nd floor is the guard room and the sergeant's room. On the 1st floor, in addition to the platoon quarters, are the Officer of the Day's office, wardroom

for officers, and a large recreation and study room with library, and the Quartermaster's issue storeroom. There is a large Quartermaster's storeroom, washroom for clothes, and the brig, in the basement. The personnel, organized as a company of two platoons, is officered by a Captain and two Lieutenants, with a 1st Sergeant and two Gy Sergeants as assistants. At the request of the Naval Commanding Officer, one Marine Officer acts as Ship's Service Officer, and one as legal aid and traffic officer. One Captain is an acting assistant Quartermaster and is designated the Post Quartermaster. Guard duty and handling the mooring lines of the U. S. S. *Macon* are the Naval requirements for the Marines. A total of about 70 Marines are detailed to assist in mooring and unmooring the U. S. S. *Macon*. During these operations, other Marines are used to control the auto traffic and visitors who come in hundreds to view the arrival or departure of the airship. Daily drills and parade formations are held except during the operations of the *Macon*. For obvious reasons, Marines and bluejackets are messed in one general mess; the Marine command providing its quota of cooks and messmen. Marine are also used to man the fire and crash apparatus the telephone switchboard, ship's service store, commissary, ambulance driver, orderlies, etc. Officers and men not quartered on the station find very comfortable small homes in either Sunnyvale, Mountain View or Palo Alto. Rentals range from about \$35.00 to \$80.00 per month unfurnished, in any of these towns, depending on the number of bedrooms and the type and location of the house. Furnished houses are also obtainable within these prices. Commissary bills for two persons should not exceed \$60.00 a month. In many instances the houses do not have cooking stoves or ice boxes (either electric or otherwise) and these must be installed by the lessee under some financial arrangement with the owner. Shopping can be accomplished either in San Jose, Palo Alto or San Francisco (the latter only about one hour's drive by auto). Public and private schools are available nearby as are the Santa Clara and Stanford Universities. The climate is typical of California and the station is far south enough from San Francisco to escape the usual fog. Khaki and white uniforms are never worn here; the field green and blue uniforms being the rule throughout the year. Civilian clothing of the Palm Beach type is only occasionally worn and that rarely. Clubs to which officers belong are the Menlo Park Country Club (golf, tennis, swimming, dining, etc.) located just above Menlo Park (about 20 minutes' auto drive) and the Los Altos country club (golf only, dining, etc.) located just outside of Mountain View (about 10 minutes' auto drive). A number of Italian and French restaurants are nearby (available on the cook's day off!).

This station undoubtedly will be one of the most beautiful and enjoyable places at which one may do duty; it is only in its formative stage at present.

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"What we have done is a matter of record. What we expect to do is a matter of preparation."

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# ADVANTAGES OF COMBINING THE SECOND AND THIRD STAFF SECTIONS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS

## A Plea for Reduction in Staff Personnel Overhead and Accelerated Staff Functioning

■ It has always been a mystery to the writer that we continue to blindly follow the old custom and practice of having four staff sections in our smaller units. No matter what sized organization is formed, immediately four executive staff sections are set up and frequently in order to do it, some of the combat units are robbed of officers in order that it may be done. Is this practice or custom of such long continued use or of such vital importance that we are afraid to break away from it? Or is it really necessary to have four sections? I believe not. Do most of you remember when we sent out expeditionary units with a good adjutant and a good sergeant-major for a staff? If the unit attained the size of a regiment, perhaps a quartermaster was added.

Of course things have changed since those days. The addition of many new weapons, transportation and the consequent additional and necessary supplies, would perhaps require more staff supervision than was the case with our old expeditionary units. Likewise where a situation calls for military occupation and government by our forces, some excuse would exist for a larger staff. In recent years I believe our expeditionary staff has been too large.

The most important questions to be answered in connection with a departure from the established custom of having four staff sections, would seem to be:

1. Could less than four sections relieve the commander of all the burdensome details and enable him to exercise adequate control over his forces?

2. Will the multiplicity of details incident to combining the sections in question, be too much for one officer to coordinate and supervise?

It will not be contended that one officer could or should attempt to coordinate and supervise the many details in the executive staff sections of a unit as large as a division. It might even be challenged that one officer could handle the sections in some of the smaller units. It will, however, be pointed out that it has been done and that with the proper assistance, an officer with the proper training and qualifications can do it.

It is now my purpose to speak about this section, a

super tactical section if you please, and one designed to handle all tactical matters in subordinate units. Someone of course will want to pin me down as to the maximum sized unit in mind and in order to provide a basis for discussion, (for I surely expect some and will be disappointed if this does not bring forth some arguments) I propose to go even as high as our Force, and by that you may assume a reinforced brigade.

Keep in mind that the officer who is going to coordinate and supervise the activities of this tactical section, does not command (except his own section in small units); however, he must be fully able to comprehend all the *functions* of command. These functions in different sized units do not differ, except as stated above and then only in scope and detail.

The exercise of command is functionally classified as follows:

1. Personnel,
2. Intelligence,
3. Operations and Training (Plans and Training) and
4. Supply.

Is there in all units, regardless of size, any particular reason for such classification? Perhaps for the classification, yes, and theoretically a staff should be organized so as to accomplish a certain degree of decentralization, but is there any reason for the accomplishment of decentralization to such a degree? The primary consideration in application to the principle of organization is one that fits in with the plans and based on probable actual conditions, but the "actual conditions" are difficult to foresee. The classification may remain but is it not true that the functions of the second and third sections might be considered similar? Decentralization is a desirable procedure and often advantageous in large commands. In fact it is necessary in very large commands and where different functions obtain.

But the smaller the unit the more closely related are the functions of the second and third sections.

Why not, then, have a staff composed of three sections as follows:

1. Personnel,
2. Tactical and
3. Supply.

It is my idea that this so-called tactical section would necessarily have two sub-sections in it and that the closest collaboration and cooperation would be necessary. But I will try to point out later that one directing head for tactics would be better than two.

Would you as a commander of a small unit desire



to have one section charged with all tactical matters? Would you as the executive officer of a small unit find it more desirable to deal with one officer in discussing tactical recommendations? Would the combination result in better team work? Is team work one of the desirable attributes of a military machine? It would be easier to coordinate the work of three sections than four. In smaller units it is never necessary to keep more than one situation map for tactical purposes. Could the "enemy situation" and "our own troops" be kept on the same map?

The intelligence officer's estimate of the situation and any recommendations from him form the basis for the tactical employment which the operations officer recommends to the executive officer or to the commanding officer. Would it not be better for the officer evaluating the information to also make the recommendation for the tactical employment? It might be pointed out by some, here, that the intelligence officer does not ordinarily make recommendations. He may, however, be, and frequently is, called upon to do so or to state his opinions. The officer who has the completed picture should be the one best suited to make recommendations for operations.

The combination would also facilitate the employment of the different services and lead to a more judicious and economical use of them. I am thinking now particularly about the employment of services which might come under both tactical sections and specifically of the employment of aviation in our Force.

Is the change discussed, one which will work? It has been tried before and I believe it worked satisfactorily. In Nicaragua at different times, one officer directed the activities of both sections and I believe it worked out very satisfactorily.

If we combine these two sections, what number or name shall we affix to it? Call it a tactical section and let it go at that. It does not need a number and neither does any other section.

Would it place too much responsibility on the shoulders of one officer? I think not for the functional division of duties may be permitted to remain undisturbed by having an assistant in charge of each section. There could be no objection to such a procedure for such conditions obtain now except in small units.

Custom and experience indicate the desirability of having four separate staff sections. The principles upon which such staff ground work and organization have been founded have not and may not change, but it is submitted, especially for Marine Corps Expeditionary units, that a combination of sections or even dispensing with an unessential service, should not be construed as a violation of such principles.

In conclusion I believe that there is no clear indication that our present policies in reference to staff organization, are unsuitable or unsound. It must not necessarily be construed that I am an advocate of the changes suggested, but I believe there are material reasons for a re-consideration of such policies.

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## Fleet Marine Force Aviators from Quantico



# THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION

## Some Interesting Ideas Upon a Pertinent Subject

■ Since the value of planes as a military weapon first became apparent during the World War, there has been a constantly increasing improvement in planes and their military characteristics. From discharging pistols and shotguns at each other, pilots have come to possess one or more machine guns for combat use, and these guns have been found to be highly effective against troops on the ground as well as against hostile planes. The hit or miss method of dropping crudely made bombs or grenades has given way to the deadly accurate dropping of bombs after aiming with accurate and dependable bomb sights. Aviation construction both as to planes and engines has made enormous strides so that speed, maneuverability, and dependability have been increased to a scale scarcely thought possible at the close of the World War. Developments of radio and the various instruments used for blind flying has made the airplane as usable by night as by day.

Now let us size up what these modern planes can do to us on the ground. First, let us consider strafing, that useful work of the German. Strafing to most of us includes both the machine gun attack and the dropping of light fragmentation bombs in dive bombing attacks. By proper utilization of clouds, sun, and accidents of the terrain, it can be seen that such a strafing attack will be sudden and swiftly over, exploiting to the fullest the advantage of surprise. Such an attack is highly destructive to massed troops and transport, and is also quite effective against deployed troops.

Next comes bombing which we may classify as dropping large bombs from high altitudes. This form of attack is very effective against troop concentrations within small, well defined limits, supply and ammunition dumps, cantonments, wharves and docks, railheads and like targets of an immobile and concentrated nature.

Another development which is an outgrowth of the World War is the use of the plane in projecting chemical agents either as a spray from low flying planes, or by large bombs dropped from planes at a high altitude. Closely allied with projecting gas, is the phase of screening by use of smoke producing agents. Such screening being used either to mask friendly movement or hamper hostile movement.

Therefore it can be seen that we on the ground can

be attacked by machine guns, bombed, gassed, and hampered by smoke clouds of hostile planes unless we have an adequate defense against them. The further use of planes for reconnaissance and artillery fire control, as well as mapping, is a further added danger to troops on the ground as it renders hostile forces better able to operate against them.

It will be generally impossible to have an absolutely impermeable defense against aircraft because of their speed and ability to move at night; but there are certain steps which can be taken that will reduce danger from them to a minimum.

As has often been truly said, "The best defense against the airplane is the airplane." But it will not be possible at all times to have an overwhelming aerial superiority, so that other means must be utilized. Proper use of camouflage and natural concealment will render great protection against planes, for what cannot be seen cannot be attacked.

Protection of cantonments, supply and ammunition dumps, railheads, docks and wharves, and like concentrated targets, can be had by the strategic distribution of air fields to cover them and by means of anti-aircraft batteries and lights to provide a final protection. Thus by use of concealment, either natural or artificial, air fields, and anti-aircraft batteries, small, fixed areas can be quite effectively protected.

Troops in march and in the field cannot be so well protected by the foregoing means, however, due to the relative immobility of these defenses. An aerial escort and large numbers of anti-aircraft batteries along the route of march might be some protection but the congestion on the ground and the activity in the air would without doubt cause loss of the element of surprise and draw some very nasty attention from hostile artillery.

Steps have been taken experimentally, as demonstrated by the Army Tentative Drill Regulations, to have troops provide their own protection by sections forming two concentric rings off the roadway, thus cutting possibility of casualties by lessening troop density and providing their own fire defense with rifle fire. Some further preliminary work has been done in anti-aircraft marksmanship, whereby the fire power of the rifle is utilized as protection against aircraft. This form of protection appears to have good possibilities, is easily taught, is economical, but not wholly adequate.

The machine gun seems to offer the best solution of an adequate defense against aircraft, particularly against strafing and smoke projecting planes. Machine guns have great fire power, have the flexibility necessary to follow a rapidly moving target, and can be gotten into action almost instantly when an attack develops. Fire control is simple and easy, particularly with the new developments which are giving us a good tracer bullet.

With proper equipment and training anti-aircraft



machine gun units can provide an essential and highly mobile defense against aircraft for infantry units in march and in the field.

Let us examine the Marine Corps organization and see where such an anti-aircraft machine gun unit would fit. Due to importance of defense against aircraft it would appear desirable to have one platoon for each battalion. Without materially altering the organization or efficiency of the battalion this platoon could be attached as an extra platoon in the machine gun company. This platoon should be provided with special mounts for the guns so that the guns could be utilized either on the march or as actual accompanying weapons in the field, either in attack or defense.

The addition of this platoon to the machine gun company would, other than for the mounts, require no new equipment or material, and still more important the ammunition supply would be simplified for the whole company. Spare parts and ammunition would be interchangeable in *all* platoons. Such a platoon would with little additional cost in men provide adequate defense and would be of inestimable value to the morale of the whole battalion.

The detached howitzer platoon could be effectively attached to the Battalion Headquarters Company. This platoon is primarily a battalion weapon and such attachment would facilitate rather than hamper the

tactical use of this weapon, by more direct control by the battalion commander.

A further anti-aircraft machine gun unit armed with the .50 caliber machine gun properly mounted would also be of great value. Such a company would be a valuable and proper addition to the Regiment. Protection of reserves, ammunition dumps, command posts, and similar vital points would be provided. And in instances where these guns were not needed for defense against aircraft they would furnish a very valuable anti-tank weapon.

It is believed that the addition of these anti-aircraft machine gun units to our forces would effectively control losses from aerial attack, and when and if our machine gun units can be motorized similarly to the British Carden-Loyd machine gun carriers we will have a mobile field air defense second to none.

In connection with the foregoing it is believed that the establishment of a school in conjunction with our present Infantry Weapons Schools to instruct in rifle and machine gun anti-aircraft work would be of the greatest value. Cooperation with the Navy in training .50 caliber machine gunners would undoubtedly prove of great value to both organizations.

When funds and sufficiency of personnel again exist the 3" anti-aircraft batteries, with lights, in motorized units such as the Army now has should be included in Marine forces.



## NOTICE

■ The following table shows the *percentage* of the different ranks of officers in the Corps who are subscribers to the GAZETTE:

Generals .....	83
Colonels .....	78
Lieutenant Colonels.....	64
Majors .....	65
Captains .....	60
First Lieutenants.....	64

Second Lieutenants.....	33
Warrant Officers.....	36
Reserve Officers (all ranks).....	25
Retired Officers (all ranks).....	12

From the above it would appear that the more experienced officers have learned to appreciate the value of the GAZETTE. Why not profit by their experience and subscribe to the GAZETTE? It will help you professionally. In case you are not receiving your copy regularly do not hesitate to notify the Secretary and Treasurer.  
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# LEGISLATION

## PERSONNEL AND PAY



**HON. COLGATE W. DARDEN**  
Retired Officer

*In soothing tones he lulled his colleagues into a sympathetic mood over the critical state of our officer personnel—they had confidence in the Gentleman from Virginia and responded cheerfully.*



**HON. CLARK W. THOMPSON**  
Reserve Officer

*With urbanity, persistency and thoroughness he moulded with alacrity the minds of some of his colleagues who required taming—until they yielded to the Gentleman from Texas.*

### PERSONNEL

#### PREFACE

Taking up this topic from where the February number of the GAZETTE left it, the following developments have occurred up to the time of its becoming a law.

In the House of Representatives Chairman Vinson, of the Naval Affairs Committee, appointed the following Sub-Committee to hold hearings on the Bill:

Congressman Boland, of Pennsylvania,  
Congressman Zioncheck, of Washington,

Congressman Darden, of Virginia,  
Congressman Britten, of Illinois, and  
Congressman Burnham, of California.

After passing the House, and reaching the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, the Bill was handled by the whole Committee, of which Senator Walsh of Massachusetts was Acting Chairman because of the absence of Senator Trammell of Florida.

The following are quotations from the *Congressional Record* of both the House and Senate. They are believed to be the best method of conveying the story of

this important measure to the members of the Association, as they represent what actually transpired.

**DISTRIBUTION, PROMOTION, RETIREMENT, AND DISCHARGE OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS**

**HOUSE**

Mr. BANKHEAD. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 348.

The clerk read as follows:

House Resolution 348

*Resolved*, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of H.R. 6803, a bill to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes. That after general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed 2 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 1, line 8, strike out "2 hours" and insert "1 hour."

Mr. BANKHEAD. Mr. Speaker, I desire to make a brief statement. I have had no request for time. This bill is identical in nature with the bill that we just passed. This bill is for the Marine Corps. Unless there is some request for time, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The resolution as amended was agreed to.

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6803) to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, with Mr. BOYLAN in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with and that it be printed in the *Record*.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The bill is as follows:

*Be it enacted, etc.*, That hereafter commissioned officers of the Marine Corps shall be distributed in grades, promoted, retired, and discharged in like manner and with the same relative conditions in all respects as are provided for commissioned officers of the line of the Navy, by existing law, or by laws hereafter enacted, except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the Marine Corps, or as herein otherwise provided.

SEC. 2. That of the authorized number of commissioned officers above the grade of colonel, one shall be the Major General Commandant, one half shall be brigadier generals, and the remainder shall be major generals.

SEC. 3. That the heads of staff departments shall be general officers while so serving, in addition to the number of general officers otherwise herein provided, one with the rank, pay, and allowances of a major general, and the remainder with the rank, pay, allowances of a brigadier general. They shall be carried in the grades or ranks from which appointed.

SEC. 4. That promotion to major general of the line shall be by seniority from brigadier generals of the line.

SEC. 5. That in computing the number of colonels to be recommended for promotion or to be designated for retention on the active list the general officers of the line shall be considered as constituting the grade next above that of colonel.

SEC. 6. That commissioned service of officers for the purpose of this act shall consist of all commissioned service on the active list of the Marine Corps, whether under a temporary or permanent appointment, and all commissioned service on active duty in the Marine Corps Reserve.

SEC. 7. That selection boards shall consist of officers on the active list of the Marine Corps, the composition and procedure of the boards to be determined by the Secretary of the Navy.

SEC. 8. That administrative staff duty performed by any officer under appointment or detail, and duty in aviation, or in any technical specialty, shall be given weight by the selection board in determining his fitness for promotion equal to that given to line duty equally well performed.

SEC. 9. That section 1493, Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 34, sec. 665), is so far amended in its application to the Marine Corps as to require that no officer shall be promoted to a higher grade, excepting in the case provided in section 1494, Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 34, sec. 566), until he has been examined by a board of naval medical officers and pronounced physically fit to perform all his duties at sea and in the field.

SEC. 10. That the requirement of sea service in grade shall not apply to promotion of officers of the Marine Corps, and officers in the upper four sevenths of the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, respectively, as established by the first section of this act, shall be eligible for consideration by selection boards and for promotion without regard to length of service in grade.

SEC. 11. That an officer whose name is placed on an eligible list for appointment as head of a staff department shall not be again considered for that office by any subsequent selection board, except as otherwise provided in this section, and shall, in respect to involuntary retirement, be in the same status as if on a promotion list: *Provided*, That the Secretary of the Navy may, in his discretion, with the approval of the President, remove his name from such list and submit it to the next ensuing selection board for consideration and recommendation. If recommended for appointment by said board and approved by the President, the name of such officer shall be replaced on the eligible list from which removed without prejudice by reason of its having been temporarily removed therefrom. If not recommended by said board, such officer shall be subject to involuntary retirement under the same conditions as provided for in the case of an officer whose name is not on a promotion list.

SEC. 12. That for the purposes of distribution and promotion in the Marine Corps grade and rank shall be considered as meaning the same.

SEC. 13. That the Major General Commandant shall be appointed as now provided by law.

SEC. 14. That the selection board recommending colonels for promotion shall recommend the number of officers of the rank of colonel directed by the Secretary of the Navy for appointment as head of each staff department, and the names of officers so recommended, approved by the President, shall be placed on an eligible list for such appointment, one list for each department. As vacancies occur hereafter, heads of staff departments shall be appointed for 4 years from officers, whose names appear on the eligible lists for the respective departments.

SEC. 15. That section 7 of the act of March 4, 1925 (43 Stat. L. 1272; U.S.C., title 34, secs. 624, 630, 663, 669, and 684), and all other laws and parts of laws, insofar as the same are inconsistent with or in conflict with the provisions of this act, are, except as they apply to officers heretofore retired thereunder, hereby repealed.

SEC. 16. That officers of the Marine Corps in the ranks or grades of lieutenant colonel and major shall not be retired because of not being on a promotion list or on an eligible list for appointment as head of a staff department, and shall be eligible for consideration for promotion by promotion boards without regard to completion of 28 and 21 years' service, respectively. Upon promotion or advancement after the approval of this act, with the exception of the Major General Commandant, heads of staff departments with the rank of brigadier general, an officer of the Marine Corps who may be appointed as Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and commissioned warrant officers, which officers shall receive the pay and allowances provided by law for their rank, commissioned officers of the Marine Corps shall receive the pay and allowances of the grade or rank from which promoted or advanced: *Provided*, That officers in the grades or ranks in which serving upon at-



taining the number on the lineal lists of such grades or ranks, as follows: Major general, 2 (excluding the Major General Commandant); brigadier general, 4; colonel, 35 (common list); lieutenant colonel, 38 (common list); major, 80; captain, 254; first lieutenant, 220.

With the following committee amendments:

Page 2, line 13, after the word "be", strike out the words "by seniority."

Page 2, line 24, after the word "of", insert "not less than six."

Page 3, line 2, after the word "Navy", strike out the period, insert a colon, and the following: "Provided, That no officer shall be recommended for advancement unless he shall have received the recommendation of not less than two thirds of the members of the board."

Page 3, line 16, strike out the figures "566" and insert "666."

Page 3, line 20, strike out the word "Corp" and insert "Corps;"

Page 3, line 22, strike out "of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, respectively" and insert "below brigadier general, subject to selection."

Page 4, line 1, after the word "grade", strike out the period, insert a colon, and the following: "Provided, That no officer of the Marine Corps shall be ineligible for consideration for promotion by reason of completion of length of commissioned service until he shall have been once considered by a selection board."

Page 5, line 23, after the word "by", strike out the word "promotion" and insert the word "selection."

Page 5, line 25, after the word "years," insert the word "commissioned."

Page 6, line 17, strike out "54" and insert "56."

Page 6, line 18, strike out "20" and insert "24."

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. DARDEN]. (By unanimous consent, Mr. DARDEN was granted leave to extend his remarks in the *Record*.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I trust the gentlemen will give me their attention. I promise I shall not trespass long upon the time of the House in the consideration of this matter. I regret that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BOLAND] is unable to be here today. He was chairman of the subcommittee that heard this bill. He is so well acquainted with it that it is with hesitation that I attempt to take his place and present it to the committee.

You heard the argument dealing with the Navy. This bill not only seeks to do for the Marine Corps what the previous bill did for the Navy, but it goes a step beyond that. Never in its history has selection been applied to the Marine Corps, except in the selection of its highest officers. Heretofore practically all promotion has been by seniority. The Navy abandoned this system almost 18 years ago. The system as applied to the Navy has worked excellently, and it is for that reason that we are anxious to apply it to the Marine Corps, not only because it has been a good system, but because the Marine Corps is an integral part of the naval service and should be governed by personnel laws applicable to the Navy. The Marine Corps is a small organization. There are only 1,024 officers in the corps, and on the 1st of July next there will be 16,000 enlisted men. There are now slightly under that number of enlisted personnel.

The Marine Corps finds itself subject to the most dangerous disease that can affect any military organization, and that is that its officers are well over age. The officers now comprise 1 Major General Commandant, 2 major generals of the line, 6 brigadier generals of the line, 3 brigadier generals of the staff, 44 lieutenant colonels and 34 colonels, 124 majors, 329 captains, 275 first lieutenants, and 206 second lieutenants. There is in the Marine Corps no separate line. All the officers are on one lineal list. It has no staff, as has the Navy.

This bill, if passed, will apply to all the officers of the Marine Corps and affect them alike.

I want to leave the bill now for a short time and tell you why we feel it is so necessary that this legislation be enacted and be enacted promptly. The Marine Corps, being a small organization, has to be ready for service with the fleet at any time to be effective. Its duties, by nature, are very arduous. They require not only young men in the enlisted personnel but they require young men in the officer personnel, young men who are ready and willing at all times to enter the most difficult field service in connection with operations with the fleet. Unless the Marine Corps is in this condition, there is no use having it at all. Unless it is prepared for instant service, and unless it is well prepared and officered by young men who are capable and able to stand the rigors of a difficult campaign, we might as well abolish it, because it is neither ready nor is it efficient.

It has had a glorious history. Many of you know that probably as well as I. It is older than the Constitution itself. It has never been found wanting in case of emergency and it has always acquitted itself with honor. It has reflected credit on the United States, and it will do so in the future if we are prepared to give it the legislation it needs and that it deserves, in order to correct the present situation.

I want to read very briefly what General Pershing had to say about the question of young officer personnel. He gave it close attention. Immediately upon his arrival in Europe he was faced with this particular problem, and in July, 1917, he cabled the War Department in reference to the situation. I shall now read a part of that cable:

My observation of the British and French Armies and most exacting, arduous service at the front, fully convinces me that only officers in full mental and physical vigor should be sent here. Contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service and possible later humiliation of officers concerned. General officers must undergo extreme effort in personal supervision of operations in trenches. Very few British or French division commanders are over 45 or brigadiers over 40. We have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects. Strongly recommend condition be fully considered in making high appointments, and suggest that no officer of whatever rank be sent here for active service who is not strong and robust in every particular. Officers selected for appointment general officer of line should be those with experience in actively commanding troops. Officers not fulfilling above conditions can be usefully employed at home training troops.

General Pershing never altered his opinion as to this vital problem. In a letter to the Secretary of War in October, 1917, he again emphasizes it by saying:

Both the British and French higher officers emphasize in the strongest terms the necessity of assigning younger and more impressionable men to command brigades and divisions. We would commit a grave error if we fail to profit by their experience. A division commander must get down into the trenches with his men and is at all times subject to severe hardships. \* \* \* The French Army was filled with dead timber at the beginning of the war, and many French failures are due to this fact. General officers must be fitted physically and mentally, must have experience, and must have go and initiative if they are to fill positions fraught with such momentous consequences to the Nation and which involve the lives of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of our men.

Then, after the great conflict had passed and he had had an opportunity to view the matter more comprehensively, General Pershing had this to say in his book:

After visits to units that had lately joined, further attention was given to qualifications necessary in our higher officers. The



British and French both had commented unfavorably upon the evident inactivity of many of them and even upon the infirmities of some of the division commanders who had been sent over during the preceding months to observe and study conditions at the front. It had been proved over and over again by the Allies that only the strongest could stand the continuous and nerve-racking strain of battle. \*\*\*

Now, gentlemen, that is what is required in an effective fighting organization. That is what we have always intended and expected the Marine Corps to be, and, unless we are prepared to enable it to meet that test now, we are doing it a great injustice.

I have quoted from General Pershing because, as you know, his words are entitled to great respect. He commanded the American forces in the greatest struggle civilization has ever seen. If you will glance back over the pages of history, you will find he was justified in making these statements.

Julius Caesar was consul at 41, and during the next 10 years was governor of the western provinces of Rome, the scene of his brilliant military successes. He returned to Rome a little after 50, and, of course, as you know, was assassinated several years later.

Alexander the Great was a young man when he overran Europe and Asia, dying at 33, complaining that no more worlds were left to conquer.

Hannibal was 25 when he took command of the Army and Province of Spain. He was 29 when he crossed the Pyrenees and crushed the Roman legions at the Trebia, and at the age of 31 he won the greatest victory of his career at Cannae.

But let us turn from these ancient figures to those leaders of more recent times. Out of the terror and horror of the French Revolution stepped Napoleon, a boy of 26, who gathered around himself the tattered remnants of the armies of France and started on that career which was within a few years to make him master of Europe.

At 27 he commanded the French armies in Italy against Austria and by a series of brilliant campaigns defeated the Austrians who had regarded him as but an accidental leader of an ineffective mob. Officered by old men, they were no match for that genius of 27, who surrounded himself with officers who were young, energetic, and capable.

Genghis Kahn, of course, was a general much younger than that, but was a general also much older than that. It is a remarkable thing that he, starting from the plateau of Asia, a commander of a large body of troops in his very early twenties, he knocked at the gateway of Europe with cavalry, which has never been excelled and which was commanded by men under 30. Later he carried on his operations from his headquarters in Asia, 2,000 miles away, by pony express.

We come down to late times and we find that the leaders in our Civil War were comparatively young men. Lee was somewhat an exception. Lee left the service of the United States at 54 to take command of the armies of Virginia and the armies of the South, but Jackson was in command at 37. Mosby and Stuart were both under 30 at the outbreak of the war. Sheridan was 30. McClellan was 35 and Grant 37 at the outbreak of hostilities. All of these young men, within the time of 4 years, became great leaders in the field.

I want to read a few lines from General Hunter Liggett's book with reference to young men in command in the A.E.F. General Liggett said:

Some of the finest officers we had went to pieces under the emotional strain of command, fearful at the best, intensified here by the knowledge that they were leading troops only partially trained against the best organized and most skillful man-killing machine ever set going. \*\*\* They were much more frequent among older officers of higher rank than among lieutenants, captains, and majors who had physical discomfort added to responsibility.

It is entirely reasonable for us to suppose that the future is going to be even more difficult than the past. Our armies are rapidly becoming mechanized. Not only must they be commanded by young men with an agile, young body, but they must be commanded by men with young minds.

I want to read you what Major General Russell, who presented this case for the Marine Corps at the time he appeared before the Naval Affairs subcommittee which had this bill under consideration, said. He is a man of illustrious service. He is now head of the Marine Corps. I do not know of any person in the United States more entitled or better qualified to speak in its behalf than is General Russell. He said:

Because of the active nature of its peace-time service and the necessity for its immediate readiness to support the fleet in the event of war, the Marine Corps must have a vigorous officer personnel. It has not a great overhead establishment or other duties in which to absorb officers not up to the physical standard of active field duty. At present the colonels range in age from 52 to 62, the lieutenant colonels from 49 to 57, the majors from 38 to 56. Seventy per cent of the captains are over 40 years of age and 37 per cent of the first lieutenants are over 35 years of age. There are 43 captains over 50 and 18 first lieutenants over 40.

These latter officers are the combat leaders and must be physically equal or better than the men they lead or the full advantage of the physical quality of the troops cannot be obtained. Our enlisted men are young and vigorous and their officers must be physically capable of direct leadership. Troops can be no more active than their leaders. For this reason the over-age condition of these grades strikes at the very heart of the efficiency of the corps, namely, its fighting effectiveness. Therefore I refer to it in such strong terms.

My opinion is not based on conjecture but on the experience of the Marine Corps in its field operations in recent years, which conclusively proved that many of our officers are too old for active field service. Unless some improvement is made in this condition, the efficiency of the Marine Corps in active operations in the future will be seriously impaired.

In this connection I would like to point out that the Marine Corps is the only one of the three services of our national defense that has not received the benefit of commissioned-personnel legislation.

The present method of promotion in the Marine Corps, with slight variation, is one of seniority. An officer can be promoted to the next higher grade only when a vacancy occurs therein. The rate of promotion depends entirely upon the number of vacancies, caused by such variable factors as retirement, death, resignation, discharge, and authorized increase or decrease in strength or change in distribution. One of the inherent faults of this method of promotion is its dependence upon the variable factors just mentioned, and, further, as a result of experience, the inability to promote the smart, efficient officer over others who lack these qualifications.

The correct system of promotion should stimulate an officer's interest in his profession, arouse his energies, and bring forth his best efforts. Only the entirely fit should be promoted.

That is the statement General Russell made before our subcommittee.

Upon referring to the chart which appears upon page 1344 of the hearings, which I want to insert in my remarks, we will find that the average age of our colonels is 55; of our lieutenant colonels, 52; of our majors, 45; of our captains, 42; of our first lieutenants, 34; and of our second lieutenants, 27; and, mind you, this is an average age.

The chart referred to is as follows:

The details as to ages are shown in the following table:

Ages of officers, 1933 and 1943

Age	Colonel		Lt. colonel		Major		Captain		1st Lt.	2nd Lt.
	1933	1943	1933	1943	1933	1943	1933	1943	1933	1943
63	0	*1	---	---	0	0	*2	0	---	---
62	*1	*3	---	---	0	*1	*1	0	---	---
61	0	*7	0	*2	0	0	0	0	---	---
60	0	*8	0	*2	0	0	*1	0	---	---
59	*1	*8	0	*2	0	*2	*4	0	---	---
58	*5	*2	0	*6	0	*3	0	0	---	---
57	*3	0	*1	*6	0	*3	*2	0	---	---
56	6	4	*2	*3	*1	*5	*3	0	---	---
55	9	0	*3	*5	0	*6	*4	*1	---	---
54	3	0	*5	*5	0	*2	*1	*3	---	---
53	3	0	*7	*3	*3	*4	*4	*9	---	---
52	3	0	*8	*7	*11	*3	*7	*5	---	---
51	---	---	*11	*3	*5	*23	*8	*15	---	---
50	---	---	*6	0	*7	*17	*6	*34	*1	0
49	---	---	1	0	*9	*22	*7	*24	*1	0
48	---	---	---	---	*11	*18	*11	*32	---	---
47	---	---	---	---	*13	*10	*14	*37	---	---
46	---	---	---	---	*7	*5	*11	*30	*1	0
45	---	---	---	---	*7	0	*9	*25	*1	0
44	---	---	---	---	*6	0	*15	*26	*4	0
43	---	---	---	---	*9	0	*12	*24	*1	*1
42	---	---	---	---	14	0	*29	*20	*2	*5
41	---	---	---	---	6	0	*40	*40	*5	*3
40	---	---	---	---	7	0	*39	*19	*2	*31
39	---	---	---	---	3	0	*43	*4	*7	*30
38	---	---	---	---	5	0	*29	0	*16	*33
37	---	---	---	---	---	---	*21	0	*16	*30
36	---	---	---	---	---	---	*6	0	*18	*30
35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*28	*40
34	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*35	*26
33	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*31	*22
32	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*30	*22
31	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*41	*2
30	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*22	0
29	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*11	0
28	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	0
27	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*31
26	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*33
25	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	*21
24	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	13
23	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	11
22	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1

Average age 55 59 52 54 45 49 42 46 34 36 27

#### OVER AGE

Rank	Maximum effective age, years	1933		1943	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Colonels	56	10	29	29	88
Lt. Colonels	49	43	98	44	100
Majors	42	89	72	124	100
Captains	35	329	100	329	100
1st lieutenants	28	273	99	275	100

\*Over age.

The increase of the average ages in the next 10 years shows that the situation is going from bad to worse, notwithstanding the fact that in the meantime many of the older officers appointed during the war will have passed off the active list.

It is the opinion of those best qualified to speak, that 7 years per grade is the most reasonable number of years that should be allowed to each grade above second lieutenant. On that basis a first lieutenant should not be over 28, a captain over 35, a major over 42, a lieutenant colonel over 49, a colonel over 56.

I will show you a little later that the officers who commanded the Marine Corps as a part of the Second Division in the A.E.F., were about this age. If we adopt this as a premise, and I believe it is a sound one, this is the condition of the present officers of the corps: 29 per cent of the colonels are over age; 98 per cent of the lieutenant colonels of the present corps are over age. Seventy-two per cent of the majors, 100 per cent of the captains, and 99 per cent of the first lieutenants, in what we call our finest fighting unit, are over age. Unless we are prepared to remedy this situation, and to remedy it immediately, we should disband the corps rather than delude ourselves by believing that it is either an available or an effective fighting unit.

While we are on the subject, it will be interesting to review briefly the ages of some of the Marine officers who served overseas during the World War with the A.E.F. and who wrote another brilliant chapter in the history of this great corps. Maj. Gen. John A. Lejuene, who commanded the Second Division, was 51; and Brig. Gen. Wendell C. Neville, who commanded the Marine Brigade, Second Division, was 48. The lieutenant colonels in the staff of the Fourth Marine Brigade averaged 40 years. Colonel Feland, the regimental commander of the Fifth Marines, was 49, while the age of two colonels who served as regimental commanders of the Sixth Marines, was 50 and 46 respectively. The average age of the majors who commanded the Fourth Machine Gun Battalion, Second Division, was 35. The battalion commander Fifth Machine Gun Battalion was a major of 27.

Today the average age, not only of the colonels, but also of the lieutenant colonels, but also of the lieutenant colonels of the corps is more than the age of Major General Lejeune at the time he commanded the Second Division. The average age of the majors today is 16 years above the average age of the majors who commanded the Fourth Marine Machine Gun Battalion of the Second Division, American Expeditionary Force.

At present, with promotion by seniority, it will take over 5 years to pass through the grade of second lieutenant, over 10 years to pass through the grade of first lieutenant, over 18 years to pass through the grade of captain, over 15 years to pass through the grade of major, 7 years to pass through the grade of lieutenant colonel, and 9 years to pass through the grade of colonel. This is more than 25 years beyond the time when a man will be retired from the Marine Corps because of age.

At the rate at which promotions were made last year it would require 55 years to pass through the grade of captain in the Marine Corps and 25 years to pass through the rank of major, making 80 years for these two grades alone. Of course, the result will be that practically all of the higher officers would go out at one time and then the Marine Corps would start again with very young men and go through the same experience they are now passing through.

Promotion by seniority is poor at best. There is no earthly reason to suppose that because one officer happens to be commissioned one day earlier than another, or maybe only a few minutes earlier than another, that he will until retirement be the more capable of the two. That one graduates number 1 in his class in 1934 does not mean that in 1944 or 10 years later he will still be the most capable officer. Too many things can happen. He may or may not be industrious. He may or may not take advantage of the opportunities presented. Promotion by seniority is a system so stupid and so costly in military organizations that those which adhere to it not only will perish, but they deserve to perish.

The Marine Corps has long recognized the danger of the plan and many attempts have been made to secure its change.

I have given you the general background. This bill proposes to correct the present situation by setting up a selection board composed of six officers from the active list, who are to pass on all promotions. It does not add a single dollar of expense nor does it add a single officer to the 1,024 now in the Marine Corps; it merely redistributes the officers somewhat in their



respective grades and provides a system of selection for the Marine Corps similar to that which now exists in the Navy. It is proposed that the names of those officers eligible for promotion be put on a list and certified by the Secretary of the Navy to the board for selection. After a careful examination of their record, their physical fitness, their moral fitness, their professional fitness, they may be recommended for promotion by the board. Not only do we propose to do that but we propose also to require that they receive a two-thirds vote of the board before they are advanced.

[Here the gavel fell.]

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DARDEN. We believe that in doing this we will get officer personnel of the highest grade. We propose to promote a second lieutenant after 3 years of service, and we propose, by making a part of this bill some of the sections of the Navy bill which was passed just a few minutes ago, to apply selection from first lieutenant to general. We do not intend, as is provided by the Navy bill, to exempt the high grades. In the navy admirals are promoted by seniority, but in the Marine Corps we expect to apply the selective system to all officers after they reach the grade of first lieutenant. We are going to redistribute the officers in the Marine Corps. I will not take the time to tell you how we are going to redistribute them, but the result will be that the officer personnel will be allocated to the Marine Corps on the identical basis that the officer personnel is allocated to the Navy, because the two arms are integral parts of one service.

Now, Mr. Chairman, this is a desperate situation. We have an opportunity, by this legislation, to lay the foundation for a corps even greater than we have known in the past. I hope that the House will see fit to support this proposal.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DARDEN. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. Will the gentleman explain what is proposed to be done under the new set-up with the excess number of officers who will be in the upper grades?

Mr. DARDEN. There will not be any.

Mr. KNUTSON. They will be retired.

Mr. DARDEN. No; they will not be retired. Section 16 of the bill deals with the situation. There will not be any excess of officers in the upper grades.

Mr. WHITE. There is bound to be in course of time.

Mr. DARDEN. We are not going to create an excessive number of officers in any grade by this bill.

Mr. WHITE. If a large number of the younger officers are going to be advanced in rank it will mean that before many years there will be an excess of officers in the upper grades.

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. It will bring about a redistribution of the officers. There are not too many officers in the Marine Corps at the present time; the corps is not over-officered, but the officers are badly distributed. Many of them are over age in their present grades.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. THOMPSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, being a Marine myself I am naturally very favorable to this bill. It has been very ably explained by the gentleman from Virginia and I will not take any further time on the floor.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the *Record*.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. THOMPSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the bill under consideration is a Marine Corps personnel bill submitted by the Navy Department and, as introduced in the House, has the approval of the administration. It provides for promotion by selection to the grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general, and major general, and promotion by seniority to the grades of captain and major. Second lieutenants would be promoted to first lieutenants after 3 years' commissioned service. This bill applies to the Marine Corps the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of its officers, a law which, as modified by the Britten bill of March 3, 1931, has been in effect for the line of the Navy for some 18 years, because the Navy law has been found to be practical and efficient, and because the Marine Corps is a branch of the naval service; most of its service is with the Navy, and most of its future officers will come from the Naval Academy.

The present Marine Corps laws provide primarily for promotion by seniority from second lieutenant up to and including the grade of colonel. Each officer, as a vacancy occurs, is promoted after prescribed examinations—moral, professional, and physical—but there is no method of promoting only the able, zealous, and efficient officer. Those less able can and do qualify for promotion under the obsolete and inefficient requirements of the present laws and must be promoted. Only a few are retired because of physical disability or are eliminated because of moral failure. Only one officer has failed professionally in the last 8 years. Colonels are promoted by selection, and only in this grade is there enforced retirement because of failure to be on a promotion or eligible list.

Under the present laws the average rate of promotion is so slow that a junior officer must spend most of his services in the lower grades, and can reach the higher grades only a short time before retirement for age.

During the last 10 years, the average promotion rate to pass through each grade was as follows: Second lieutenant, 5.4 years; first lieutenant, 10.4 years; captain, 18.2 years; major, 15.5 years; lieutenant colonel, 7 years; and colonel, 9 years—a total of more than 25 years beyond the time when an officer must be retired for age. Last year there were so few promotions that, in future at the same rate, it would require 55 years to pass through the grade of captain and 25 years to pass through the grade of major.

This bill, if enacted into law, when its provisions become fully effective and when the selection system is extended for the Navy to junior lieutenant, as is proposed, will correct the present stagnation of promotion and over-age of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and will result in average service in each grade of about 7 years, which is what it should be.

Because of stagnation and lack of promotion in the Marine Corps, 29 per cent of the colonels, 98 per cent



of the lieutenant colonels, 72 per cent of the majors, and practically 100 per cent of the captains and first lieutenants are now over-age for their respective grades. In 10 years without relief, 88 per cent of the colonels and 100 per cent of all other junior officers now in the corps will be over-age in grade.

During the period from 1899 to 1920, the Marine Corps was increased from time to time sufficiently to provide for promotion of its officer personnel at nearly the desired rate.

During the World War a great many Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers were given temporary commissions as in the Navy; and by the act of June 4, 1920, many of these were permanently commissioned, all of them in the rank of captain, first lieutenant, and second lieutenant. Their present status is a 14 years' increase of age without corresponding increase of rank. Many of them have held the same rank for this entire period.

As a result of the war it has been found that the distribution of officers in the various grades was obsolete. There were too few of high rank either to perform duties commensurate with their responsibility and experience or to provide a proper flow of promotion from the lower to the upper grades.

This condition has not so far been corrected in the Marine Corps, but it is provided for in this bill.

The mission of the Marine Corps in a national emergency requires that a large portion of the Regular Establishment be immediately available for overseas duty with the fleet and that the peace establishment be rapidly expanded to meet the large operating, supply, procurement, and training problems involved. These war-time needs demand that the active list be composed only of officers physically equal to the rigors of a campaign, primarily and essentially troop leaders, thoroughly trained in the duties of their ranks.

The peace mission requires intensive training for a high state of readiness for war and, if necessary, to furnish troops for active field service for the protection of American interests abroad and for minor emergencies at home.

The proposed legislation will permit the Marine Corps to develop potential leaders capable of carrying on its assigned mission in peace and war. It is essential that for the arduous service required, young, able-bodied, and efficient officers be made available.

The first 15 sections of this bill provide a complete system which will place the Marine Corps under Navy rather than Army personnel laws, which is sound and appropriate. The cost involved would amount to an annual increase of \$131,000. In ordinary times this expense would be eminently justified. Unfortunately present conditions seem to preclude the passage of this bill should it require additional cost to the Government. Therefore section 16, a saving clause, has been included to prevent any increased cost by limiting involuntary retirements to the grade of colonel, and by restricting increased pay by reason of promotion. However, the serious state of stagnation will be considerably relieved; the more efficient and deserving officers will be promoted; and many officers will assume new ranks and duties more in keeping with their age, experience, and length of service.

To sum up briefly, this bill applies the Navy system to the Marine Corps and provides:

(a) For no increase of cost to the Government and for no additional officers.

(b) For promotion by selection to the grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general, and major general.

(c) For promotion to captain and major by seniority.

(d) For extension of the selection system for the lower grades should such extension be authorized for the Navy.

(e) For promotion of second lieutenants after 3 years' commissioned service.

(f) For readjustment of grades to conform to the needs of the Marine Corps.

(g) For retirement of nonselected colonels after 35 years' service instead of at 56 years of age.

This year legislation has been passed which provides for building our Navy to treaty strength. I call particular attention to this, because satisfaction in having provided for such a construction program may dim the realization that material preparedness is valueless without personnel preparedness—the provision for adequate, well-trained personnel, composed of vigorous, intelligent young men, properly officered. Every organization always reflects the character of its officers. The high efficiency and morale of the Marine Corps cannot survive if the quality of its officer personnel is impaired by over-age, by retarded promotion, and by lack of reward. These restrictions now exist because of the application of obsolete and inefficient laws. It is an urgent duty that we take remedial action as is now proposed in this bill. [Applause.]

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. BROWN] such time as he may desire.

Mr. BROWN of Kentucky. Mr. Chairman, like the gentleman from Texas, I desire to commend our colleague from Virginia [Mr. DARDEN] for the excellent way in which he has presented this splendid bill. The gentleman from Texas is a former marine and knows their problems. During the World War I happen to have had a brother who was in the Marine Corps stationed down here at Quantico, Va., and secondhand I have heard a great deal about their problems also. If you take the name from the Marine Corps and apply the situation to any other name, I do not think you can ever successfully defend the seniority plan for any organization, and you can include Congress in that if you want to. Men are especially adapted to the particular grade that they fill. It is not necessarily because of their age. There are other contributing agencies and elements that make them desirable for the particular grade that they occupy. I think it is wise that we follow now with the Marine Corps, and possibly some of these days with the Army, the precedent that the Navy set some 18 years ago when they, partially, at least, set aside their seniority rule and put their officers on the basis of selection.

There is no use arguing the glories of the Marine Corps here on the floor of the House. Perhaps we may say that the American marine is the finest fighting human machine that the modern world knows. This bill here will simply perfect that organization until it will continue in the future the glorious past it has thus far rendered to this Nation. [Applause.]

Mr. BRITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH].

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I feel like an interloper, coming into this discussion. I have never

been a member of the Naval Affairs Committee, either in this body or in the other. I am so intensely interested in military legislation, having had experience with it on the Military Committee in another body, that I cannot refrain from making a few suggestions upon an occasion of this kind.

The Congress, generally speaking, has taken a quite different attitude toward the Navy and the Marine Corps than it has taken over a long period of years toward the Army. Students of military history and of the debates in the Congress with respect to military subjects will generally find that the average citizen in the United States and the average Member of Congress is perfectly ready and willing to admit that he could not command a battleship, but there are thousands and thousands of civilians who have been confident, as a general rule, at least up until the World War, that they could command a regiment of infantry. It has been the tradition of the American people that the command of soldiers was a comparatively easy thing, and that was the cause of getting us into many wars, causing the loss of thousands and thousands of lives and the expenditure of billions out of the Treasury.

It was not until 1920, when the National Defense Act was revised, that any important steps were taken to give the Army a chance to govern the Army in its interior organization and bring it up-to-date. You would be surprised—and I am saying this as raising a contrast between the way Congress has treated the Navy, wisely so, I believe, as compared with the way it has treated the Army—to know that prior to the World War, indeed upon the date on which we went into the World War, the laws of the United States prescribed the exact number of men that should constitute a company of infantry. There should be 1 first sergeant, 9 line sergeants, 10 or 12 corporals, so many privates (first class), and so many privates, and the Army was not permitted in its interior organization to change its own tactical organization in the slightest degree without an act of Congress.

I have sat with a committee in the other House and listened to a debate between Members of that body lasting 3 hours as to whether a company of Signal Corps troops should be increased by the addition of one technical sergeant. That all had to be wiped out when we went into the World War. It caused unutterable confusion. The same thing is true with respect to promotions in the Army.

Some of us were exceedingly anxious back in 1920 to install the selection system of promotions in the Army, but an overwhelming majority of our colleagues in the Congress said, "No; we cannot trust the Army to run its own promotion system." The Navy is being trusted as it should be. You are giving to these selection boards, as you should, the power to promote officers. You do not let the Secretary of the Navy have anything to do with the matter. Not even the President of the United States has anything to do with the promotion of officers in the Navy. You are now going to make it that way in the Marine Corps. Personally I believe in it, and I would welcome the day when the Congress of the United States would confer this trust upon the Army and let the Army select its officers for promotion. There is a hump in the promotion list of the Army worse than now exists in the Marine Corps.

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. As a matter of fact, it was stated by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. COLLINS], in presenting the military appropriations bill, that there are lieutenants 64 years of age in the Army.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes; but of course they are exceptions. The average age of the Army officer grade by grade is going up by leaps and bounds. They are traveling along the same road with respect to age as the Marine Corps is now traveling, and the Army is reaching that same point of overaged men, especially in the lower grades. I express the hope, in taking advantage of this opportunity, that something may be done for the Army in the same way.

Mr. DARDEN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. DARDEN. Does the gentleman believe that that is the fault of the Army rather than of Congress? Does not the gentleman think that failure to enact such legislation is due to pressure brought on Members of the Congress by the officer personnel of the Army?

Mr. WADSWORTH. That has not been my experience. I think the Army would welcome it.

Mr. DARDEN. I am just asking the question, because I do not know.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The Army has always been governed by law down to the details of its interior organization to an extent that the Navy and Marine Corps never have been, and one reason for the extraordinary effectiveness of the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force is that there has never been any law of Congress governing its interior organization.

Mr. McFARLANE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. McFARLANE. Has that matter ever been studied in the appropriate committee? It seems to me the gentleman's statements are very pertinent and I believe the matter should be gone into very carefully by the proper committees of Congress so as to permit the consideration of a promotion bill similar to the bills for the Navy and the Marine Corps.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I have not had the honor of being a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs. But in the other body, in the Committee on Military Affairs on which I served, the matter was given great study and many of us wanted to do this, but we ran up against a stone wall in the Congress itself at that time.

Mr. JAMES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield.

Mr. JAMES. I may say that, of course, there is no second lieutenant in the Army 64 years of age, because they have to retire at 64.

Mr. VINSON of Georgia. If the gentleman will yield, if my memory does not serve me falsely, that is my recollection of a statement made by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. COLLINS].

Mr. JAMES. Well, that is not true.

[Here the gavel fell.]

Mr. BRITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I shall only take



a minute of the time to suggest that most of us on this side are in hearty accord with this legislation. It is something which the Marine Corps should have had 10 years ago. It is something they are very glad to get now. It will improve the corps; it will improve the morale of the officers, even if those who cannot be promoted will ultimately go out. If anything, the Marine Corps will be more efficient in the future than it has been in the past, and we all know how efficient it has been prior to the war, during the war, and since the war.

I think that, man for man, the Marine Corps is the greatest fighting force in the world. We had instances during the World War where a marine would throw his steel helmet off and go dashing over the top and get shot. He did not care for his helmet. What he wanted to do was to fight. **This was a typical American attitude; and if there is a military force in this country that typifies American youth, it is the Marine Corps.**

Legislation of this character would have been enacted into law 10 years ago but for the influence of two or three officers, particularly one officer who did not want it because he was afraid he would not be selected up. He was afraid he would never be selected up, although he had a lot of influence. Frankly, I disagree with my distinguished colleague from New York [MR. WADSWORTH], when he says that it was the Congress that stopped selection in the Army. The real cause was the pull of a few individuals in the Army who reached Congress and prevented selection. Selection should prevail in the Army just as it is going to prevail from now on in the Marine Corps and just as it has prevailed for 18 years in the Navy, because it means efficiency. It stands for reward of merit; and if a man is good, if he is capable, if his superiors like him, if he is an outstanding officer, he ought to be promoted. If he does not have all these qualifications, he should be retired and put off the pay roll, so he can make room for some other youngster who comes up from below and who is efficient and will deliver when the time comes for him to do so.

I hope it may not be necessary to use any more time on this measure. We on this side are for it, and so far as we are concerned you may begin the reading of the bill now.

MR. VINSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the bill may be now read for amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 2. That of the authorized number of commissioned officers above the grade of colonel, one shall be the Major General Commandant, one half shall be brigadier generals, and the remainder shall be major generals.

MR. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Goss: Page 2, line 3, after the word "Commandant", strike out the words "one half" and insert the words "two thirds."

MR. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, we have just adopted the first section of the bill which puts the Marine Corps, so far as distribution of officers in grade and rank is concerned, on the same basis as the Navy.

Unlike the Navy bill, this bill for the Marine Corps attempts to redistribute the officers in grade and rank, and when the Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee had the floor a few minutes ago

he frankly stated to the House he was going to bring in a bill next year redistributing the officers in grade and rank.

If this amendment is adopted, as I hope it will be, I am going to offer an amendment to the next section which will make section 3 conform to the present law, and then next year, when we bring in the Navy bill, the Marine Corps bill can be considered in the light of the Navy bill and with the same distribution of the commissioned officers in grades.

If we do not do this, if this is the final bill for the Marine Corps, then section 16 should be stricken. However, I do not believe, in view of the fact that it has not gone to the Budget, it should be stricken.

MR. VINSON of Georgia. Will the gentleman yield?

MR. GOSS. I yield.

MR. VINSON of Georgia. I am in accord with the amendment offered by the gentleman, and I would like an approval from the Budget and see section 16 stricken out. Then that would make a perfect bill. But, unfortunately, it cannot pass the Budget and section 16 must remain in the bill.

MR. GOSS. I shall not offer an amendment to do that, although I think, in view of the redistribution of officers in grade and rank, we should do that.

MR. VINSON of Georgia. I think we should take care of that in the future. I am in accord with the gentleman's two amendments.

THE CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 3. That the heads of staff departments shall be general officers while so serving, in addition to the number of general officers otherwise herein provided, one with the rank, pay, and allowances of a major general, and the remainder with the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier general. They shall be carried in the grades or ranks from which appointed.

MR. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 2, line 4, strike out section 3 and insert in lieu thereof the following: "That the head of the staff department shall be general officers while so serving in addition to the number of general officers and otherwise herein provided with the rank, pay, and allowances of brigadier general. They shall be carried in the grade or rank from which appointed."

MR. GOSS. I will say this is to follow the same idea as section 3, and leave the matter of distribution the same as it is now.

MR. VINSON of Georgia. We have no objection to the amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 4. That promotion to major general of the line shall be by seniority from brigadier generals of the line.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 2, line 13, strike out the words "by seniority."

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 6. That commissioned service of officers for the purpose of this act shall consist of all commissioned service on the active



list of the Marine Corps, whether under a temporary or permanent appointment, and all commissioned service on active duty in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Page 2, line 23, after the word "reserve", insert "and the National Naval Volunteers."

Mr. BRITTEN. I would like to ask the gentleman how many officers would be affected by that?

Mr. DARDEN. I know of one, but I think there may be others. It is a fair thing and will do no injustice to any officer in the Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. AYRES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word to make inquiry as to the purpose of section 4. I was on my feet endeavoring to get recognition when we got through with section 4. What is the purpose of striking out the word "seniority" and making it read—

"that promotion to major general of the line shall be from brigadier generals of the line."

Mr. DARDEN. The purpose of that is to advance the brigadier generals by selection rather than by seniority. The bill as it came up provided that they should be advanced by seniority. We felt they should be advanced just as the colonels and lieutenant colonels and other officers, that they should go to the office of major general on the basis of merit, and not on the basis of seniority. We are applying the principle throughout the bill to all officers of the Marine Corps.

Mr. BRITTEN. The reason the bill came in this form was because the brigadier generals and the major generals took rank with the lower and upper half as it was called, and the contention was that all rear admirals were promoted by selection first, and then went up automatically from the lower half to the upper half.

Mr. AYRES of Kansas. As a matter of fact, they do now automatically.

Mr. DARDEN. Yes; and we insisted on brigadier generals being promoted by selection.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 7. That selection boards shall consist of officers on the active list of the Marine Corps, the composition and procedure of the boards to be determined by the Secretary of the Navy.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 2, line 24, after the word "or", insert "not less than six", and, on page 3, line 2, after the word "Navy", strike out the period, insert a colon and the following: "Provided, That no officer shall be recommended for advancement unless he shall have received the recommendation of not less than two thirds of the members of the board."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 9. That section 1493 Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 34, sec. 665), is so far amended in its application to the Marine Corps as to require that no officer shall be promoted to a higher grade, excepting in the case provided in section 1494, Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 34, sec. 566), until he has been examined by a board of naval medical officers and pronounced physically fit to perform all his duties at sea and in the field.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 3, line 16, strike out "566" and insert "666."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 10. That the requirement of sea service in grade shall not apply to promotion of officers of the Marine Corps, and officers in the upper four sevenths of the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, respectively, as established by the first section of this act, shall be eligible for consideration by selection boards and for promotion without regard to length of service in grade.

With the following committee amendments:

Page 3, line 20, strike out "Corp" and insert "Corps."

Page 3, line 22, strike out "of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, respectively," and insert "below brigadier general, subject to selection."

Page 4, line 1, after the word "grade", strike out the period, insert a colon and the following: "Provided, That no officer of the Marine Corps shall be ineligible for consideration for promotion by reason of completion of length of commissioned service until he shall have once been considered by a selection board."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 16. That officers of the Marine Corps in the ranks or grades of lieutenant colonel and major shall not be retired because of not being on a promotion list or on an eligible list for appointment as head of a staff department, and shall be eligible for consideration for promotion by promotion boards without regard to completion of 28 and 21 years' service, respectively. Upon promotion or advancement after the approval of this act, with the exception of the Major General Commandant, heads of staff departments with the rank of brigadier general, an officer of the Marine Corps who may be appointed as Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and commissioned warrant officers, which officers shall receive the pay and allowances provided by law for their rank, commissioned officers of the Marine Corps shall receive the pay and allowances of the grade or rank from which promoted or advanced: "Provided, That officers in the grades or ranks stated shall receive the pay and allowances of the grades or ranks in which serving upon attaining the number on the lineal lists of such grades or ranks, as follows: Major general, 2 (excluding the Major General Commandant); brigadier general, 4; colonel, 35 (common list); lieutenant colonel, 38 (common list); major, 80; captain, 254; first lieutenant, 220.

With the following committee amendments:

Page 5, line 23, strike out the word "promotion" and insert the word "selection."

Page 5, line 25, after the word "years" insert the word "commissioned."

Page 6, line 17, strike out "54" and insert "56."

Page 6, line 18, strike out "20" and insert "24."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

Mr. THOMPSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, which I send to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment by Mr. THOMPSON of Texas: Page 6, line 18, after the figures "24", insert:

"SEC. 17. Section 4 of the act approved February 28, 1925 (43 Stat. L. 1081; U.S.C., title 34, sec. 753), as amended, is hereby amended to the extent that hereafter the minimum age limit for retirement in the Naval Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve shall be the same as that for enlistment in the Regular Navy."

Mr. THOMPSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this is to make the enlistment age in the Marine Corps and Naval Reserve the same as in the regular service. As it is there is a year of inequality.

The amendment provides for an amendment to the Naval Reserve Act to the extent that hereafter the minimum-age limit for enlistment in the Naval Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve shall be the same as that for enlistment in the regular Navy and not the minimum age of 18 required for the reserve at present.

The enlistment age for the Navy and Marine Corps is 17 years and if this change is made it will enable the Navy and Marine Corps to enlist young men in the reserve with the same age requirements as the regular service (with their parents consent, of course).

The present law requiring as it does an 18-year minimum age limit and at the same time providing for the appointment to the Naval Academy each year of 25 members of the Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve where the maximum age for entrance is 20 years rather defeats its purpose, that of an appointment to the Naval Academy as a reward for faithful and interested service in the Reserve, as there is no time to judge the qualifications of the applicant.

The minimum age limit for the National Guard is 18 years without parents consent.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman, we accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Take the last paragraph on page 6. In view of the other two amendments we adopted on this redistribution in grades and ranks, should not this be changed to conform with that? I think the status is the 1-2-6, and the bill attempted to make it 1-4-4. We have held the status 1-2-6. Therefore, the brigadier should be stepped up to 6.

Mr. DARDEN. Six brigadier generals of the line?

Mr. GOSS. That is right.

Mr. DARDEN. And you have dropped one major general officer in your operation?

Mr. GOSS. Yes. So there ought to be 6 brigadiers, and that would leave 1 commandant, 2 major generals, and 6 brigadiers, as it now exists.

Mr. DARDEN. Three brigadiers of the staff. That is right.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Goss: In line 15, after the word "general", strike out the figure "4" and insert in lieu thereof the figure "6."

Mr. GOSS. That will then conform to the amendments earlier adopted.

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee will rise.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. BOYLAN, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H.R. 6803, and pursuant to House Resolution 348, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted in the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en grosse.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill. The bill was passed.

#### SENATE

Mr. WALSH, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 6803) to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes, reported it without amendment and submitted a report (No. 1175) thereon.

#### PROMOTIONS IN THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. WALSH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent also for the immediate consideration of a companion bill relating to the Marine Corps, being the bill (H.R. 6803) to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?

**There being no objection, the bill was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:**

*Be it enacted, etc.,* That hereafter commissioned officers of the Marine Corps shall be distributed in grades, promoted, retired, and discharged in like manner and with the same relative conditions in all respects as are provided for commissioned officers of the line of the Navy by existing law or by laws hereafter enacted except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the Marine Corps, or as herein otherwise provided.

SEC. 2. That of the authorized number of commissioned officers above the grade of colonel one shall be the Major General Commandant, two-thirds shall be brigadier generals, and the remainder shall be major generals.

SEC. 3. That the heads of staff departments shall be general officers while so serving, in addition to the number of general officers otherwise herein provided, with the rank, pay, and allowances of brigadier generals. They shall be carried in the grades or ranks from which appointed.

SEC. 4. That promotion to major general of the line shall be from brigadier generals of the line.

SEC. 5. That in computing the number of colonels to be recommended for promotion or to be designated for retention on the active list the general officers of the line shall be considered as constituting the grade next above that of colonel.

SEC. 6. That commissioned service of officers for the purpose of this act shall consist of all commissioned service on the active list of the Marine Corps, whether under a temporary or permanent appointment, and all commissioned service on active duty in the Marine Corps Reserve and the National Naval Volunteers.

SEC. 7. That selection boards shall consist of not less than six officers on the active list of the Marine Corps, the composition and procedure of the boards to be determined by the Secretary of the Navy: *Provided*, That no officer shall be recommended for advancement unless he shall have received recommendation of not less than two-thirds of the members of the board.

SEC. 8. That administrative staff duty performed by any officer under appointment or detail, and duty in aviation, or in any technical specialty, shall be given weight by the selection board in determining his fitness for promotion equal to that given to line duty equally well performed.

SEC. 9. That section 1493, Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 34, sec. 665), is so far amended in its application to the Marine Corps as to require that no officer shall be promoted to a higher grade, excepting in the case provided in section 1494, Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 34, sec. 666), until he has been examined by a board of Naval medical officers and pronounced physically fit to perform all his duties at sea and in the field.

SEC. 10. That the requirement of sea service in grade shall not apply to promotion of officers of the Marine Corps; and officers in the upper four-sevenths of the grades below brigadier general, subject to selection as established by the first section of this act, shall be eligible for consideration by selection boards and for promotion without regard to length of service in grade: *Provided*, That no officer of the Marine Corps shall be ineligible for consideration for promotion by reason of com-



pletion of length of commissioned service until he shall have been once considered by a selection board.

SEC. 11. That an officer whose name is placed on an eligible list for appointment as head of a staff department shall not be again considered for that office by any subsequent selection board, except as otherwise provided in this section, and shall, in respect to involuntary retirement, be in the same status as if on a promotion list: *Provided*, That the Secretary of the Navy may, in his discretion, with the approval of the President, remove his name from such list and submit it to the next ensuing selection board for consideration and recommendation. If recommended for appointment by said board and approved by the President, the name of such officer shall be replaced on the eligible list from which removed without prejudice by reason of its having been temporarily removed therefrom. If not recommended by said board, such officer shall be subject to involuntary retirement under the same conditions as provided for in the case of an officer whose name is not on a promotion list.

SEC. 12. That for the purpose of distribution and promotion in the Marine Corps grade and rank shall be considered as meaning the same.

SEC. 13. That the Major General Commandant shall be appointed as now provided by law.

SEC. 14. That the selection board recommending colonels for promotion shall recommend the number of officers of the rank of colonel directed by the Secretary of the Navy for appointment as head of each staff department, and the names of officers so recommended, approved by the President, shall be placed on an eligible list for such appointment, one list for each department. As vacancies occur hereafter, heads of staff departments shall be appointed for 4 years from officers whose names appear on the eligible lists for the respective departments.

SEC. 15. That section 7 of the act of March 4, 1925 (43 Stat. L. 1272; U.S.C., title 34, secs. 624, 630, 663, 669, and 684), and all other laws and parts of laws, insofar as the same are inconsistent with, or in conflict with the provisions of this act, are, except as they apply to officers heretofore retired thereunder, hereby repealed.

SEC. 16. That officers of the Marine Corps in the ranks or grades of lieutenant colonel and major shall not be retired because of not being on a promotion list or on an eligible list for appointment as head of a staff department, and shall be eligible for consideration for promotion by selection boards without regard to completion of 28 and 21 years' commissioned service, respectively. Upon promotion or advancement after the approval of this act, with the exception of the Major General Commandant, heads of staff departments with the rank of brigadier general, an officer of the Marine Corps who may be appointed as Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and commissioned warrant officers, which officers shall receive the pay and allowances provided by law for their rank, commissioned officers of the Marine Corps shall receive the pay and allowances of the grade or rank from which promoted or advanced: *Provided*, That officers in the grades or ranks stated shall receive the pay and allowances of the grades or ranks in which serving upon attaining the number on the lineal lists of such grades or ranks, as follows: Major general, 2 (excluding the Major General Commandant); brigadier general, 6; colonel, 35 (common list); lieutenant colonel, 38 (common list); major, 80; captain, 256; first lieutenant, 224.

SEC. 17. Section 4 of the act approved February 28, 1925 (43 Stat. L. 1081; U.S.C., title 34, sec. 753), as amended, is hereby amended to the extent that, hereafter, the minimum age limit for enlistment in the Naval Reserve or the Marine Corps Reserve shall be the same as that for enlistment in the Regular Navy.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the report submitted by the committee on the bill just passed may be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[S. Rept. No. 1175, 73d Cong., 2d sess.]

#### COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. WALSH, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted the following report (to accompany H.R. 6803):

The Committee on Naval Affairs of the United States Senate, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6803) to regulate the distribution, promotion, retirement, and discharge of commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon and recommend that the bill do pass.

The bill provides:

(a) For no increased cost over that which obtains at present.  
(b) For no increase in the number of officers now authorized.

(c) For readjustment of the percentage distribution by grades, on the same basis as that now in force in the Navy.

(d) For promotion to first lieutenant after 3 years' commissioned service, as is done in the case of naval officers.

(e) For promotion by selection rather than by seniority.

(f) For boards to prepare eligible lists for appointment as heads of staff departments and promotion lists for promotion to brigadier general of the line, colonel, and lieutenant colonel; and for the composition and procedure of such boards.

(g) For elimination by transfer to the retired list of colonels not selected for promotion, upon completion of 35 years of commissioned service, instead of at 56 years of age as at present.

(h) Against too great a number of retirements in any one year by restricting the number that may be retired.

(i) For the payment of officers transferred to the retired list for nonselection at the same rate as now provided by law.

The officer personnel of the Marine Corps is in a condition which has reached a critical stage because of stagnation of promotion and over age. The present laws are ineffective and inefficient. As a result, the rate of promotion is the same for all officers without regard to the high efficiency of some and the comparative inefficiency of others. Marine officers are years behind their running mates in the Navy.

Sections 1 to 15 of the bill constitute a complete system, which will place the Marine Corps under Navy rather than Army personnel laws, which is sound and appropriate.

Section 1 is the basic section of the bill. It applies the Navy system to the Marine Corps by placing the commissioned personnel of the Marine Corps under the laws governing the line commissioned personnel of the Navy.

Sections 2 to 14, inclusive, contain the necessary provisions to adapt the Navy system to the Marine Corps. Section 15 provides for the necessary repeal of former conflicting laws and section 16 contains the economic provisions necessary to prevent any additional cost to the Government.

Section 17 is a provision which was inserted on the floor of the House of Representatives. It makes the enlistment age in the Marine Corps and the Naval Reserve the same as in the regular service, namely 17 years. At the present time there is a year of inequality.

Section 2 provides that two-thirds of the general officers shall be brigadier generals and the remainder major generals including the Major General Commandant. This continues the number of officers with the rank of major general as at present.

Section 3 provides that three heads of staff departments shall be brigadier generals while so serving as at present.

Section 4 provides that promotion to major general of the line shall be by selection by the President from brigadier generals of the line.

Section 5: This is purely a technical provision to adapt the Navy law to the Marine Corps. In the Navy there is only one grade above that of captain, which is rear admiral. In the Marine Corps there are two grades above the rank of colonel, which are major general and brigadier general, and in order to make Marine Corps computations on the same basis with the Navy, it is necessary to include these two grades in one. It is merely for a matter of computation.

Section 6: The purpose of this section is to adjust the Navy laws to the Marine Corps as far as computation of commissioned service is concerned, the Navy laws being based on the length of commissioned service.

Section 7: The Navy law provides that the selection boards shall consist of nine rear admirals. It would be impracticable for the Marine Corps to assemble nine general officers. This section provides that the selection board shall consist of not less than six officers on the active list of the Marine Corps the composition and procedure of the boards to be determined by the Secretary of the Navy. It further provides that no officer shall be recommended for advancement unless he receives the recommendation of not less than two-thirds of the members of the board. This also follows the Navy practice.

Section 8: This section insures that the selection of an officer for promotion shall not be jeopardized by reason of duty in a staff department, aviation, or other technical specialty.

Section 9: The only effect of this provision would be to require that the Marine officers, in addition to being able to perform all their duties at sea would be qualified to perform duty in the field, as much of the service of the Marine Corps is field duty.



Section 10: This proviso safeguards the interest of those officers who may complete sufficient commissioned service prior to reaching the upper four-sevenths of their respective grades, as to make them automatically ineligible for consideration for selection by reason of such service. Every officer will thus be eligible for consideration by at least one selection board in each grade before otherwise being considered ineligible by reason of length of commissioned service.

Section 11: Gives to officers whose names are placed on staff eligible lists the same right for retention on such lists as is given officers whose names appear on promotion lists of the line.

Section 12: This provision is to eliminate possible ambiguity regarding the words "grade" and "rank", which are used somewhat interchangeably in laws regarding distribution and promotion.

Section 13 provides that the Major General Commandant shall be appointed as now provided by law.

Section 14 provides for the preparation of eligible lists for appointment as heads of staff departments in the same manner as line promotion lists are prepared, these lists to be prepared by the same board that selects colonels for promotion. The present practice of appointing heads of staff departments is continued.

Section 15 is a general repeal section.

Section 16: The purpose of this section is to eliminate all extra costs which would be incurred under preceding sections. The first sentence of this section limits involuntary retirements to colonels who have completed 35 years' commissioned service and are not selected for promotion. Under the present law colonels 56 years of age and not selected for promotion are retired. Lieutenant colonels and majors will not be involuntarily retired for nonselection and will be eligible for consideration for promotion notwithstanding the completion of 28 and 21 years' service, respectively, this variation from the Navy system also being for the purpose of preventing any increased expense. The remainder of section 16 is to prevent the cost of pay and allowances under the proposed redistribution in grades from exceeding the cost under the present distribution.

Section 17 makes the minimum age limit for enlistment in the Naval Reserve or the Marine Corps Reserve the same as that for enlistment in the Regular Navy.

#### WHITE HOUSE

**The President of the United States signed the bill on May 29, 1934, thus making it a law.**

#### LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

There has been no personnel legislation since 1925.

*H. R. 13685*, introduced by Mr. Darrow of Pennsylvania, 70th Congress, on May 11, 1928. Reported favorably to the House on Dec. 10, 1928. Passed by the House on Dec. 12, 1928. Reported favorably by Senate Naval Affairs on Feb. 11, 1929 (with amendment adding 1 major general to the staff). Bill reached on Senate calendar on Feb. 28, 1929, and passed over.

*H. R. 1191*, introduced by Mr. Britten of Illinois, 71st Congress, on April 18, 1929 (same as *H. R. 13685*). Hearing by House Naval Affairs Committee on Dec. 19, 1929.

*S. 551*, introduced by Mr. Hale of Maine, 71st Congress, on April 23, 1929 (same as *H. R. 1191* but provided for 1 major general for the staff). Reported favorably to the Senate June 3, 1929. Reached on Senate calendar April 1, 1930, and, on objection of Senator Brookhart, passed over. Passed by the Senate June 6, 1930. Bill restored to Senate calendar on motion of Senator Connally on June 9, 1930. Bill reached on Senate calendar on Feb. 23, 1931, objected to and passed over.

*H. R. 7974*, introduced by Mr. Britten of Illinois on Jan. 6, 1930 (substituted for *H. R. 1191* but provided for 1 major general to the staff and made other changes). Favorably reported to the House Jan. 7, 1930. Objected to in the House and removed from consent calendar on May 19, 1930.

*H. R. 5344* (conforming to Britten Bill for the Navy), introduced by Mr. Vinson of Georgia on Dec. 10, 1931. Reported favorably to the House on Feb. 18, 1932, and placed on Union Calendar.

#### PAY

As the Commandant's Number of the *GAZETTE* went to press the Independent Offices' Appropriation Bill for the fiscal year 1935, carrying numerous provisions affecting the pay and allowances of government personnel, both civil and military, was resting in the House of Representatives where it had been returned without Presidential approval. This Bill, with its modifications of the Economy Act of March 20, 1933, was later passed by both the House and Senate, notwithstanding the disapproval of the President, and accordingly became law on March 28, 1934. The act as finally passed modifies the Act of March 20, 1933, to the extent that for the period February 1 to June 30, 1934, only a ten per centum deduction from compensation is required, and for the period July 1, 1934, to June 30, 1935, the deduction may not exceed five per centum. Through the medium of radio instructions broadcasted throughout the entire Naval service adjustments of over-deductions for the period February 1, to March 31, 1934, were authorized to be made immediately on current rolls and vouchers, some of these adjustments actually being made on March rolls.

#### RENTAL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES

Under the language used in the amendment modifying the rate of percentage deductions an increase of rental and subsistence allowances of officers of the military services actually resulted. By virtue of this provision in the Act these allowances may not be reduced in excess of ten per centum of the basic rates during the period February 1, to June 30, 1934, nor in excess of five per centum of such basic rates during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1934. By basic rates is meant the rates established in the 1922 pay Act; that is, twenty dollars per room for rental allowance and sixty cents for each subsistence allowance. Accordingly, rental and subsistence allowances commencing February 1, 1934, except in those cases where total pay and allowances are limited by law, may be credited at the rate of eighteen dollars per room and fifty-four cents for each subsistence allowance, and no percentage deduction is required to be made from such credits. Prior to February 1, 1934, these rates were set by Executive Order at seventeen dollars per room for rental allowance purposes and fifty-one cents for each subsistence allowance. Where total pay and allowances are limited by law, as in the cases of general officers, certain high ranking field officers, and some commissioned warrant officers, rental and subsistence allowances are creditable at the same rates as in the cases of other officers, subject, however, to the limitations as to total pay and allowances required by basic laws. The percentage deduction is then made from the total compensation as limited by such basic laws. Commencing July 1, 1934, rental allowance will be at the rate of nineteen dollars per room and subsistence allowance at the rate of fifty-seven cents for each allowance.

#### PAY FREEZES

The Act of March 28, 1934, also contains provisions removing the restrictions on increases due to promotion and by reason of passing from one pay period to another in the cases of commissioned officers. These provisions, however, are not effective until July 1, 1934.

The removal of these restrictions was accomplished through an amendment of the pay freeze section of the Act of June 30, 1932, which added the following proviso at the end of that section:

"This section shall not apply during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1935, except to the extent that it suspends the longevity increases provided for in the tenth paragraph of section 1 of the Pay Adjustment Act of 1922. This amendment shall not authorize the payment of back compensation."

The tenth paragraph of Section 1 of the Act of June 10, 1922, referred to, provides for an increase of five per centum of base pay for each period of three years' service in the case of commissioned and commissioned warrant officers. These longevity increases, therefore, continue to be suspended during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1935.

In the case of commissioned officers and commissioned warrant officers, automatic increases by reason of promotion and increases following the completion of a period of service entitling the officer to a higher pay period may be made effective July 1, 1934, regardless of whether the promotion occurred or the service was completed before or after July 1, 1934, but such increase may not be credited for any period prior to July 1, 1934.

An officer who, during the period July 1, 1932, to June 30, 1934, completed a period of service which, under the Act of June 10, 1922, would have authorized him to receive the pay of a higher pay period, is entitled, under the Act of March 28, 1934, on and after July 1, 1934, to the base pay of such higher pay period increased by five per centum for each three-year period of service completed before June 30, 1932, and to the rental and subsistence allowances of such higher pay period. He is not entitled to such increases prior to July 1, 1934. For example, a major on June 30, 1932, was drawing the pay of the fourth pay period, with over twenty-two years' service, or \$4,050 per annum. He completed twenty-four years' service during the period July 1, 1932, to June 30, 1934. He is entitled on July 1, 1934, to the base pay of the fifth pay period, \$3,500, increased by the longevity (five per centum for each three year period) he is entitled to

count on June 30, 1932, that is, for twenty-one years' service, or \$4,725, and to the rental and subsistence allowances of the fifth pay period. A second lieutenant who, on June 30, 1932, with less than three years' service, was receiving \$1,500 per annum, and who was promoted to first lieutenant on June 6, 1933, is entitled on July 1, 1934, to the base pay of the second pay period (under three years' service), \$2,000, and to the rental and subsistence allowances of the second pay period.

Warrant officers and enlisted men are entitled to count all creditable service for purposes of longevity pay effective July 1, 1934. Such increases may not be made effective prior to July 1, 1934, except in the cases of those enlisted men who became entitled to such increases in longevity on reenlistment or extension of enlistment under decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States holding that an enlisted man who reenlists or extends his enlistment during the period from April 1, 1933, to June 30, 1934, is entitled, from and including the effective date of such reenlistment or extension, to longevity pay on the basis of prior creditable service. The measure of pay in such cases is the base pay of the enlisted man's rank increased by the statutory longevity pay for service which may be counted and which was completed prior to the effective date of reenlistment or extension of enlistment.

#### COMMISSIONED WARRANT OFFICERS

In a decision dated January 9, 1933, the Court of Claims held that a commissioned warrant officer of the Marine Corps, under the Acts of June 10, 1926, and February 15, 1929, is to be considered as having been commissioned on the date of completion of six years' commissioned and warrant service, and is entitled to period pay accordingly. Under date of March 22, 1934, the Comptroller General authorized adjustments on current vouchers in the cases of all commissioned warrant officers affected, from and including July 1, 1933, only. Adjustments for periods prior to July 1, 1933, will be accomplished following the submission of formal claims to the General Accounting Office.

### Dunlap Bill Vetoed

On the grounds that it would be bad precedent, and in violation of the rules governing the administration of the Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia, the President of the United States, on May 28, 1934, vetoed H.R. Bill 276, which authorized the placing of a bronze tablet bearing a replica of the Congressional Medal of Honor upon the grave of the late Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, U. S. Marine Corps.

### New Second Lieutenants

The following midshipmen of the 1934 Graduating Class, U. S. Naval Academy, have been selected as Second Lieutenants in the Marine Corps:

Clyde R. Nelson,  
Joseph L. Dickey,  
Elmore W. Seeds,  
John P. Condon,  
John A. Butler,  
Ralph K. Rottet,  
George C. Ruffin, jr.,  
Victor H. Krulak,

Harold O. Deakin,  
Maurice T. Ireland,  
Henry W. Buse, jr.,  
Samuel R. Shaw,  
Robert S. Fairweather,  
Robert E. Hommel,  
Joseph P. Fuchs,  
John W. Sapp, jr.,  
Harry W. G. Vadnais,  
Frank C. Tharin,  
Bennet G. Powers, (son of Lt. Col. W. C. Powers),  
Samuel F. Zeiler,  
Lawrence B. Clark,  
Arthur J. J. Hagel,  
John E. Weber, (U. S. M. C. enlisted),  
Floyd B. Parks, (U. S. N. enlisted),  
Lehman H. Kleppinger.

### H. R. 6835 Status

■ This Bill carried a request on Congress to permit the acceptance by the officers mentioned in the February, 1934, issue of the GAZETTE of certain foreign decorations. It has not been acted upon to date, and will probably be tabled this Session.



## THE FAIRCHILD CAMERA

### A Bit About Something We Need

■ Aerial machine gunnery training under conditions closely resembling those of actual combat is made more practical by a new camera machine gun manufactured by the Fairchild Aerial Camera Corporation. Details of this interesting device, which closely resembles an aircraft machine gun in appearance, size and operation but shoots pictures instead of death dealing bullets, have just been made public for the first time. With camera guns the contending aircraft can engage in all manner of combat manoeuvres. Where only real aircraft machine guns are used in training, firing must be confined to slow moving and unmanoeuvrable sleeve targets towed behind another aircraft, or to stationary ground target. Such training is too limited and for best results must be supplemented by the use of camera guns.

According to their engineers, refinements and exclusive features of the new Fairchild gun result in greater simplicity, far greater economy and more realistic training than it has ever been possible to secure with equipment heretofore available.

The Navy has adopted this camera gun as standard equipment and recently placed an order for a large number of them. The Fairchild gun has also become an indispensable item in aerial gunnery training equipment in a dozen air forces throughout the world.


To increase the value of camera gun training the Fairchild gun has the same appearance as a standard service machine gun, weighs the same, is mounted on regulation mounts and is operated in the same manner.<sup>1</sup>

Like other camera guns, the Fairchild camera machine gun is basically a motion picture camera which shoots photographs at the rate of 16 shots per second as long as the trigger is depressed in the conventional machine gun manner.<sup>2</sup> In preparation for a practice combat period the guns are placed on the usual flexible mount, when they are to be operated by a gunner other than the pilot, and on fixed mounts with remote control from the pilot's stick, when he is the only occupant of the plane. After the planes have "fought" each other in groups or pairs, depending upon the nature of the training period, the film is developed and projected (not as a motion picture, but one frame or photograph at a time) upon a screen or in a film viewing device. On each negative a reticle system (circles and cross-hairs) is automatically superimposed at the

<sup>1</sup>On the bottom are mounting lugs for attaching the gun to both fixed and flexible types of machine gun mounts by the insertion of two bolts. The gun is designed to fit directly in either the Browning or the Colt machine gun mounts and can be fitted to any other by a simple adapter.

<sup>2</sup>16 mm motion picture film contained in light-proof metal magazines which are loaded in the camera unit of the gun just as a clip of cartridges is slipped into an automatic pistol, is used. Each magazine has 25 feet of film which takes 1,000 photographs in 56 seconds of firing. The focal range is 25 feet to infinity.

Reproduction of film showing burst of fire on four frames—three of target—  
one the watch and data card.





## MACHINE-GUN

time of exposure so that the effectiveness of the individual shot can be judged as easily and accurately as shots appearing on an ordinary target. When the film is projected before the crews of the competing aircraft or before a class, the faults can be quickly and graphically indicated, the corrective measures pointed out, and examples of approved technique presented with maximum effect.

The exclusive features incorporated in this design have made it entirely practicable for the first time for extensive training use under every service condition. The main feature is its ease of loading. While other designs require the intricate and bothersome threading of film—which wastes time, effort and considerable film—the Fairchild gun is loaded by merely inserting a small, light film magazine into a chamber so designed that it cannot be inserted improperly. This gun is as simple as slipping a clip of cartridges in to an automatic pistol. This removes entirely the major objections which used to be raised to the use of this type of equipment.

This camera gun is distinguished further by the fact that it is more economical than other designs because it uses 16 mm motion picture film instead of 35 mm film. Additional efficiency is achieved as a result of a simple optical system which transmits many times more light than any other design. It enables the gun to be used under a wider range of light conditions. While most camera guns are limited to the mid-day hours—and then only on bright, clear days—it can be used in the early morning and late afternoon hours and on days when other camera guns would be impractical or useless altogether.<sup>3</sup>

The time-recording system is the simplest that has been achieved in any model. It automatically registers the exact time of each burst, to the split second, and has the added advantage of saving film. Maintenance has been minimized by concentrating practically all moving parts within the camera unit, which can be removed quickly and easily from the gun case for inspection and replacement, and can be as easily installed in the well where it is held in position for operation. This arrangement is exclusive with Fairchild. The gun is so rugged it withstands with ease even the


<sup>3</sup>The reticle is automatically photographed on the film with each image of the target and shows position of the target with respect to the path of travel of the imaginary bullet; correctness of "lead" allowed by the gunner to compensate for relative velocities of aircraft and bullets and the distance from the plane to the target at the instant of firing, providing the dimensions of the target are known.



Camera Machine gun on flexible mount on observation plane.

extreme shocks of catapult launchings from naval craft and landings on carrier decks with the aid of arresting devices. With the benefit of a background of years of precision camera manufacturing and intimate contact with actual service experience, the manufacturer has spared no effort to make the gun entirely suitable for every service requirement.

Loading the camera gun involves only the insertion of the film magazine in the camera unit of the gun. The illustration below shows the film magazine being inserted in the camera unit. When the latter is wound and replaced in the gun it is fully loaded and 1,000 individual photographs or exposures can be made without reloading or rewinding. The camera unit fits into guides and is held in place by a spring on the hinged cover of the camera gun case. There are no attachment screws or locks of any kind to contend with when replacing or removing it. Only a second is required for the complete operation.



Loading the camera gun with film magazine.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### An Outline of International Political Conditions Today, Our Relations to Them, and the Bearing on the Outlook for America's National Defense

■ The world is a big place with vast physical resources under the control of two billion human beings, divided into a large number of nations and semi-nations. It is a fundamental rule that neither the peoples, the resources, nor the national "line-ups" are static. There is a ferment of change, usually gradual but sometimes sudden. A change in one place may affect in an important way many other parts of the world. It is no easy task to give even an approximately accurate sketch of what is going on. The following observations are based partly on fact and *partly on surmise*. They are based on the situation as of May first and naturally, changes may develop between that time and the present. To make the picture fairly complete, it has been found necessary to restate briefly some background facts which may already be well known to some of our readers.

Starting with Europe, it seems that the key is still the long existing impasse between France and Germany, with France continuing to demand security and Germany openly demanding equality and covertly working towards a tremendous expansion of German influence. Italy with limited resources, is temporarily playing one of the leading roles, but on a lesser scale. The smaller nations are either aligned more or less definitely with one of the three leaders or watch anxiously from the side lines. All realize the great importance of Great Britain, the United States, and the Far Eastern situation in the general European equation.

It is obvious that the European situation continues to be critical in spite of a superficial lull. The possibility of an early war can not be denied. It should not be forgotten that ten days before the World War broke out a responsible British official expressed his conviction that the situation had improved considerably and that there was no prospect of war. The writer feels that unless some *unexpected* incident precipitates matters, there is little *probability* of a war this year or even next. We believe that there are important fundamental changes going on that alter considerably the general picture. What are these changes, what do they mean, and how and why are they taking place?

For a number of years past, France has been the most important nation in Europe, having almost a hegemony, despite the antagonism of Germany and Italy and the changing and dubious attitude of Great Britain. As the powerful leader of the status-quo group, she has been the great protagonist of the sanctity of the World War Peace treaties and the mighty sword against territorial revision. On the theory of

"hang together or hang separately," France has been interested not only in her own status-quo but in that of other nations who feel themselves menaced by the revisionist movement. She allied herself with Belgium, Poland and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia). While by force of circumstances, Germany temporarily could not be very active, she was the most dangerous menace to this group. Germany could naturally count on enthusiastic cooperation from Hungary, which has been more publicly insistent on territorial revision than any other nation in Europe. To a certain extent she could likewise count on Austria and Bulgaria.

Italy was another threat to the status-quo group, partly because she felt the French hegemony was detrimental to her interests and secondly because she herself was interested in certain territorial revisions. This community of interest between Germany and Italy resulted in these two nations cooperating on various occasions.

The traditional British policy, which is opposed to any one nation or group of nations becoming predominant in Europe, resulted more than once in Great Britain siding either with Germany or Italy or with both. The power of Russia permeated the atmosphere and all nations in Europe were interested either in having her on their side or at least neutral. Grave social and economic troubles in many parts of Europe added further complications. The French group have been faced not merely with external but internal enemies, political, social and economic.

As long as Germany was weak, both economically and in a military way, while simultaneously France was strong and had no grave internal trouble, France was able to maintain her hegemony with a certain amount of success. The French group had not only economic and military predominance, but also a strong juridical justification in the Covenant of the League. It is not surprising that they have clung to the League and that Germany did what she could to weaken the League, aided and abetted somewhat by Italy.

Up until recently France and her Allies have successfully withstood attacks against themselves and the League. However, developments of the past year have strengthened Germany considerably, deprived the League of much of the life that was left in it and created grave internal problems for France. France is finding it increasingly difficult, if not impossible to maintain her former position.

Her present choice seems to be limited to two alternatives: (1) a preventative war now before her enemies become too strong, and (2) acceptance of a revised role, giving up her protective leadership while still maintaining herself as one of the major powers. The first alternative seems to us highly improbable, as we do not believe that the French people would tolerate a costly war of prevention, even if they were able to engage in one. We are inclined to think that the second alternative is rapidly on its way.

National psychology plays a major role in many in-



ternational happenings. And in this connection we should like to stress a French psychological factor which is all too often overlooked. In spite of the fact that the French have normally played a leading role in international affairs and have become mixed up in the problems of many foreign countries, there is probably no race on the face of the globe today that is more naturally isolationist than the French. For those of us who have actually lived in French families it is obvious that their strongest psychological characteristic is the desire to be left strictly alone, they are loath to mix intimately with strangers who come to France and they themselves rarely migrate to foreign countries. If they become involved in foreign affairs it is not because they want to, but in spite of the fact that they do not want to. Their ventures abroad are usually traceable to the fact they feel that their home safety or home vital interests necessitate this, although by nature they find it distasteful.

Obvious necessity compelled the French in recent years to arm to the teeth and assume the leading role in the status-quo group, because they felt that if a general revision started in Europe it would not be long before the turn of France would arrive. However, circumstances change all cases. France cannot continue to maintain her role against increasingly powerful opposition without making grave sacrifices and running directly contrary to the most fundamental characteristic of the French temperament. Recent developments have brought the French face to face with the disagreeable alternatives mentioned above. We believe that they are becoming rapidly resigned to the second, as the lesser of two evils, although they realize that even this alternative holds future dangers for France.

The attitude that France is taking and may take affects not only France but practically every other nation in Europe and particularly Poland, the Little Entente and Austria. No one knows this better than those countries. They have been watching anxiously for the trend of French policy and there are increasing signs that they are coming to the conclusion that an important change is now under way. This necessitates a change in their own individual policies and there are indications that this too is already under way.

First let us consider these changes as they may affect France herself. France will probably find it necessary to give up her role as fairy godmother to Poland and the Little Entente and will concentrate exclusively on safeguarding herself. While such a policy holds considerable future danger for France, at the same time it has its compensating advantages. France has been carrying on a role that required vast resources, huge military strength and involved not only grave responsibilities but dangerous risks. The most dangerous opposition came from Germany, Italy and, to a lesser degree, Great Britain, largely because the permanent success of the French policy would have given France a predominating position and enabled her to resist changes in Central and Eastern Europe. It is reasonable to suppose that if the fundamental cause for much of this opposition (namely, the predominance of France), ceases to exist, then the opposition against France will be considerably lessened. Germany, Italy and Great Britain would be much less antagonistic against a France which while a major nation, did

not attempt to predominate in European affairs. Furthermore, Italy might then find it profitable "to play ball with" France as a countercheck against the aspirations of the re-armed Germany which might conflict with Italian interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Great Britain does not desire to be confronted by a Germany as dangerous as in 1914.

Official declarations of Germany that she intends to rebuild her Navy, enlarge her air force, promote her export trade in every way possible, expand her territory and possibly regain some of her lost colonies (now largely in the hands of Great Britain) have caused the British to remember that it was a similar conflict of interests in 1914 that necessitated Britain's entrance into the World War against Germany. If Germany is allowed to go too far now, it will be in Britain's interest, just as much as in 1914, to checkmate her. While Great Britain might not object seriously to territorial revision in Eastern Europe, she doubtless feels that her own safety and interests will be menaced if German plans involve territorial changes in Western Europe at the expense of Belgium, France or Holland. It looks as though history is repeating itself and that Great Britain will again find it necessary to cooperate with France for the joint purpose of seeing that German expansion does not go too far. Some observers believe that negotiations are already under way for a renewal of the pre-World-War understanding between France and Great Britain, which to a certain extent might result in a British guarantee of French security. With the changed set-up, some believe that *even if there is no definite understanding in advance*, that Britain would find it necessary in her own interests to come to the rescue if France were menaced by a German military invasion.

Great Britain might find such a coalition both necessary and advisable for even other reasons. In case of trouble in Europe, a combination of the British and French naval, military and air forces would make an almost irresistible combination. The combination would be particularly interesting because the French contribution would supplement the British army and navy in ways that it is now deficient, namely, in submarines, destroyers, airplanes, and the like. Furthermore, the Mediterranean is a vitally essential link in British empire communications and France would be in a strategic position to concentrate its forces there and keep it open, while the British could perform a similar task on the Atlantic and North Sea. Furthermore, it is believed that a conflict in Europe would probably precipitate hostilities in the Far East, where Great Britain has very important interests to protect. Great Britain would find it very difficult to safeguard simultaneously her interests in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East, unless she could count on the co-operation of France.

Taking all these factors together, it is thoroughly possible that French security will be better guaranteed in a practical way under the new policy than under the old.

And now let us examine the effects of the possible change of French policy on the other members of the French group. That Poland has been reading the handwriting on the wall is indicated by the recent ten-year non-aggression pact which she has signed with Germany. As a distinguished Polish soldier—General



Haller—has just indicated in an interview in Washington, this arrangement is possibly nothing more than a breathing spell and Poland may have to face later on the risk that Germany will take back by force the Polish Corridor. It is believed that the Poles, realizing that they could no longer count on one hundred percent joint action of the French group to keep Germany in check, felt that it was wise to make this arrangement with Germany, even though it be purely temporary. Poland recently made a similar arrangement with another potential enemy—Russia. Of course much can happen in the space of ten years and it is possible that Germany will permanently give up her claims to the Polish Corridor, although at the present moment this does not seem probable. Some authorities have suggested that possibly when the time comes for Poland to give the Corridor back to Germany that Poland will be compensated by territory in Russia (probably the Ukraine) and possibly by a free hand to take Lithuania and possibly other territory in Northeastern Europe and thus gain additional outlets to the Baltic Sea. The strained relations that have existed for some years between Poland and Lithuania would add to this possibility. We should not overlook the fact that many years ago Lithuania was for two centuries a part of Poland.

The Little Entente is vitally interested in French policy and the results of any fundamental change therein. The three nations which compose it received much of their territory from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. They have been brought closely together largely because of the insistent world wide propaganda by Hungary in favor of revision and the return of this territory to Hungary. Two of them (Rumania and Yugoslavia) have only a secondary hostility towards Germany, largely because Germany interested in revision on her own account might help Hungary achieve her purpose. Czechoslovakia is menaced not only by Hungary but also by Germany, because a part of her territory came from Germany and she now has approximately three and a half million German inhabitants. Hence it is not surprising that Czechoslovakia was vitally disturbed when a few weeks ago it seemed that Germany might absorb Austria, as this would be a further link in encircling Czechoslovakia. The Czech Foreign Minister, Mr. Benes, made a hurried trip to Paris, presumably in the hope that France would take a definite stand in the matter. For the reasons outlined above, France found it necessary to stand on the side lines and wait developments. While the Austrian situation has been temporarily solved in a way which is not particularly dangerous to Czechoslovakia, this episode certainly gave Czechoslovakia a hint as to modifications in French policy. The pact between Poland and Germany did not help reassure the Czechs, nor did the Balkan Pact entered into recently by Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece. In many respects the economic and political bonds between Czechoslovakia and Germany are rather close and in view of the fact that the erstwhile unity between the members of the French bloc is not what it used to be, it is not entirely outside the realm of possibility that Czechoslovakia will find it necessary to come to terms with Germany in the near future and with the best bargain that she can obtain in view of her rather weak position. Germany

herself might find it wise to strike such a bargain, although if she waits some years longer she might do even better.

If Rumania could be certain that Hungarian revision is checked, there are many economic and political reasons which might lead her to make a mutually advantageous arrangement with Germany. There are a number of things that might lead Rumania to doubt the wisdom of relying too strongly on a hundred percent cooperation of France in protecting them. For various reasons, the Rumanians would not look with favor on going over into the Italian orbit or seeing Italian economic and political influence expand too much in Eastern Europe. It would not at all surprise some competent observers if in the not far distant future there would be a rapprochement between Germany and Rumania. To a certain extent, the same observations apply to Yugoslavia. In the case of that country there is an additional reason, namely, that the Yugoslavs have had considerable friction with Italy who they think has designs on Yugoslav territory in Dalmatia.

The Austrian crisis has been temporarily solved, due partly to the vigorous action of Italy who practically threatened war in case Germany attempted to absorb Austria and secondly, and probably more important, because for the present it would not be in the interests of Germany to take Austria. Ostensibly Austrian independence has been preserved by the military and financial aid of Italy. Premier Dollfus has established what amounts to a fascist dictatorship with Italian backing. On the surface, things are fairly quiet. It is believed that in the space of a few years, when Germany is ready, Austria will either become a part of Germany or at least a protectorate of Germany.

The so-called World Disarmament Conference has more lives than the proverbial cat. While it was obvious, even before the Conference started over two years ago, that it was doomed to failure, the pulmotors have been kept constantly in operation so that even now the Bureau of the Conference still continues to meet, usually for the purpose of arranging for a postponement until a subsequent meeting. The practical fruits of the Conference have been that every nation in Europe has busied itself with increasing its armaments. This is particularly true of Germany, which in spite of the Treaty of Versailles, and this Conference, is rapidly on its way towards becoming a major military power again.

In many respects the League of Nations is also like the proverbial cat. It has already received sufficient blows to knock the life completely out of even a wild cat, much less the domesticated animal it is supposed to be. However, it comes up again after each blow, groggy and not able to do anything and yet keeping some breath in its body. It has stood up against the refusal to join of the United States and Russia, the withdrawal of Germany and Japan and the sword-like attacks of Italy. The reason for its continued existence is probably due to the fact that the French group feel that it is essential to them and that under no circumstances should the Covenant be allowed to die. The Covenant furnishes the legal and moral justification for the aims of the status-quo group. Great Britain being interested in European peace, as a traditional policy, has helped save the League, although she

would probably like to see some of the changes in the Covenant recommended by Italy and bitterly opposed by the French group. We are not looking for the complete demise of the League, but it seems obvious that for practical purposes it is now but a mere shadow of what its founders expected it to be. The next few years may witness very important modifications in its structure to bring it more in conformity with the realities. The most important basic reality is that neither the League nor any other body is going to be able to maintain permanently the existing status-quo in its entirety.

The peace of Europe hangs on a slender thread which a sudden incident might break at any time, just as it was broken in 1914 by the Serbian incident. In certain respects it is like riding over a rough road strewn with tacks with a tire whose tread has been worn down to dangerous thinness. A blow-out might destroy the steering control and precipitate a wreck in a ditch. And yet in spite of this, we feel that (*unless war breaks out in the Far East*) there will be no war in Europe this year or even next, because it is dangerous for everyone concerned to start any war at this time and the nations who will profit most by it are not yet ready for the showdown. Possibly the showdown has been merely postponed for several years, but on the other hand the breathing spell may permit of time for adjustments which may postpone still longer the showdown or even possibly make it eventually unnecessary.

Such peace as may exist for the next several years will be in the nature of an armed neutrality, with everyone preparing for eventualities and watching carefully every move made by the others. It will mean again an armed balance of power and the fate of European civilization depends on whether any nation will be rash enough to upset the delicate balance and precipitate trouble. Because if any trouble starts *it will be extremely difficult to isolate it.*

The development of the European situation is not only of considerable importance to us, but our possible attitude is one of the major problems for Europe. Peace and practical disarmament are two of our cardinal policies, not only for humanitarian reasons, but because they are of great importance for our own safety and economic welfare; to cite merely one example, the threats to peace and the increase in armaments (which have resulted from those threats) have produced a deplorable effect on our foreign trade and investments. While for a number of years we have taken the lead in promoting disarmament, our country now realizes clearly that armaments are comparative and that there is little chance for disarmament for us or any other major nation if the unsettled conditions in Europe (as well as in the Far East) make disarmament impossible in Europe.

Independently of disarmament, the peace itself of the United States might be involved. We were drawn into our two largest European wars (1812 and 1914) in an attempt to protect our neutral rights during a general European conflict. Another general European war would impose grave military problems on the United States and on the other hand the final attitude of our country might be the deciding factor against one of the European belligerents, as it was in the World War.

The United States is therefore watching carefully all developments in Europe (as well as in the Far East) and standing ever ready to do what it can to promote real peace and real disarmament, when and if the other nations are prepared to take practical steps which will not necessitate an unreasonable sacrifice of our interests. Our government now admits regretfully that there is little chance for disarmament at this time. *It is apparently determined to keep out of purely European squabbles and in the meanwhile we are improving our national defense.* In so doing we are not counting on hostilities breaking out over night. We are working on the theory that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and furthermore that if trouble is to come, even three or four years hence, armies and navies cannot be built up over night and that common sense and economy dictate that reasonable preparations be made in advance. We hope that there will not be trouble and our present activities are merely commonsense preparation to avoid trouble or to be able to meet it if it unfortunately arrives.

Considering the matter from the European angle, it is obvious that America's stand on neutrality may be the decisive factor in the fate of any European combination and European nations must consider this in advance. One of the greatest worries that Great Britain has in connection with the rumored alliance with France is the possible attitude of the United States. Great Britain's naval help to France in case of war and vice versa might create again the same problems as to neutrality which caused so many dangerous arguments between Great Britain and the United States during the first several years of the World War, leading almost to a declaration of war against Great Britain.

What we would do in the matter is largely problematical. However, there are two factors that might throw some light on this. First, there seems to be a growing sentiment in the United States toward a possible relaxation of our traditional claims towards neutral rights, particularly if by insisting upon them in their broadest scope we would be in the position of helping an obvious aggressor and risking war for ourselves with nations whose main purpose is to keep the peace. Obviously the determination of who is the aggressor is a very difficult matter and there is no assurance that an easy and quick solution could be reached in case war did break out in Europe. In spite of this, it is well to remember that there is this definite trend towards relaxation or at least limitation of our claims as neutrals when and if we are convinced that one of the nations is an aggressor.

The second point is that *for practical purposes* there are very few really definite rules as to the rights of neutrals and the practice of all nations, including our own, has been both inconsistent and conflicting in carrying out these rules. Hence, it might be both logical and not extremely difficult for us to agree in advance to a more definite limitation on these rights than now exists in theory. If we did this there would not be so much risk of running into difficulties with major naval powers, such as Great Britain.

If and when a large scale war breaks out in Europe or the Far East it is fervently hoped that our country will occupy the position of a neutral. Hence, it is important for us to understand just what are the neutral



rights that we should claim and how they should be exercised. The subject is in a state of wild confusion at the present moment and it would seem highly important for us to clarify it, at least in our own minds, just as promptly as possible. We were involved in two major wars largely because of disputes on neutral rights and we might become involved in the next one for a similar reason, unless we use some foresight. Will Rogers, in his homely but sound humor, tells us that it is the messenger boy who gets hurt. He suggests that if any of the belligerents wish to buy our goods that it would be a good idea to have them send their own ships and their own men after them. While his suggestion may not be expedient in the case of small wars, it might be well taken for a large war where major naval powers, such as Great Britain or France, would be involved.

And now for a glimpse at the Far East. Japan has created a furore by her recent announcement which, stripped of its verbiage, seems to claim the following: First, that Japan henceforth will "supervise" China and that certain foreign transactions with China must be visaed by Japan; secondly, and by implication, that at least Eastern Asia is to be for Asiatics, presumably under Japanese leadership.

This pronouncement has some of the earmarks of the so-called Tanaka Memorial which was officially denied by the Japanese Government. It has been said that it violates the Nine Power Pact, the Open Door agreements and other treaties which Japan has signed with us and other nations. Some read into it an open declaration of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine under the hegemony of Japan and certain observers feel that in its ultimate effect it might go much further than the American Monroe Doctrine, inasmuch as it might tend to a control by Japan of all sorts of foreign transactions with China.

The press has given so much prominence recently to the details of the actions of the Japanese, British and American Governments in this matter that it is assumed that our readers are familiar with them and that therefore detailed repetition here would not be warranted. However, a few special observations might help to clarify the matter.

It is important to remember that the latest episode is but a logical sequence of a number of others that have been recurring more or less regularly during the last thirty-five years. It is a part of a general trend of Japan towards rather broad objectives to increase her general control of the Far East. The official statements should be read in connection with so-called unofficial statements made recently by leading Japanese statesmen. Of these statements, probably the most astoundingly frank and pointed is the long article by Mr. Matsuoka published in the New York Times of April 29, 1934. Taking all factors together, it would seem that the latest Japanese moves are directed primarily against the United States and the League of Nations; against the United States, because of credits made by our government to China and the increasing sales of airplanes and other war materials by Americans to China; against the League, because apparently Japan feels the time has arrived to block any further movements on the part of the League to reorganize China in any way that might enable China to offer effective military resistance to Japan.

The British Government took the initiative in trying to clarify the Japanese position. On April 30 the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, discussed the matter in the British Parliament and apparently the British Government is satisfied with the explanations as given and considers the matter closed. Sir John intimated that Japan has given assurances that she has no intention of closing the "Open Door" and will continue to adhere to the Nine Power Pact guaranteeing the sovereignty of China. *He made the rather mystifying acknowledgment that Japan had special rights in China which are recognized by the other powers as unshared by them.* The conciliatory attitude of Great Britain has by no means lessened the rather proverbial friendship between Japan and Great Britain.

Inasmuch as no official note has been sent to the American Government and since our general stand on the Far Eastern situation had been clearly stated by our government in a series of previous notes, some observers felt that our government would make no new statement at this time and let the past record speak for itself. However, on April 30, our Secretary of State disclosed that our government had made very pointed representations to Japan, rejecting flatly the Japanese claim to control China. It was stated that the United States has with regard to China certain rights and obligations covered by treaties and that these rights and obligations cannot be changed by the unilateral action by one of the signatories, Japan. Press reports indicate the expected unfavorable reaction in Japan to the American stand. It is not possible to predict at this time what the next step may be on either side. It is obvious that our present administration cannot see eye to eye with the Japanese and with characteristic frankness and directness has said so in no uncertain terms.

The arguments against Japan's policy have been discussed so often and in such detail that it is assumed that our readers are thoroughly familiar with them. We thought that it might be useful to our readers to outline very briefly some of the Japanese arguments, *without expressing any opinion whatsoever as to their validity.* Japan feels that just as we are the leading power in the Western hemisphere and have promulgated a "hands-off" policy in the American Monroe Doctrine, that Japan is by right the leading Asiatic power and is justified in proclaiming a "hands-off" policy in the Far East, whether it is called an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine or something else. She feels that in order to obtain her objectives she must expand considerably and is not only determined to carry out this expansion but believes that she cannot be stopped except by a major war waged by a major power or powers.

As China is her next door neighbor she looks with distinct disfavor on operations of the white race there which tend to impede her in her general program. She feels that if it had not been for the interference of the white races that she would have already consolidated her position in China and even possibly have gained the cooperation of China towards the ultimate goal of Asia for the Asiatics. She expresses amazement at the so-called solicitude of the Western powers for the so-called territorial integrity of a so-called China. She claims that there is no such thing as a Chinese nation in the strict sense of the word and that furthermore

(Continued on page 41)



# DECORATED

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13 March, 1934.

SIR:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting, in the name of Congress, the Medal of Honor to

**COLONEL DAVID D. PORTER, A. A. & I., U.S.M.C.**

for service in Samar, P. I., as set forth in the following:

## CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism and eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle at the junction of the Cadacan and Sohoton rivers, Samar, P. I., November 17, 1901. Colonel Porter, then Captain, in command of the columns upon their uniting ashore in the Sohoton region, made a surprise attack of the fortified cliffs and completely routed the enemy, killing 30 and capturing and destroying the powder magazine, 40 lantacas (guns), rice, food and Cuartels. Due to his courage, intelligence, discrimination and zeal, he successfully led his men up the cliffs by means of bamboo ladders to a height of 200 feet. The cliffs were of soft stone of volcanic origin, in the nature of pumice and were honeycombed with caves. Tons of rock were suspended in platforms held in position by vine cables (known as bejuco), in readiness to be precipitated upon people below. After driving the insurgents from their position which was almost impregnable, being covered with numerous trails lined with poisoned spears, pits, etc., Captain Porter led his men across the river, scaled the cliffs on the opposite side, and destroyed the camps there. He and the men under his command overcame incredible difficulties and dangers in destroying positions which, according to reports from old prisoners, had taken three years to perfect, were held as a final rallying point, and were never before penetrated by white troops. Captain Porter also rendered distinguished public service in the presence of the enemy at Quinapundan River, Samar, P. I., on October 26, 1901."

For the President,  
Secretary of the Navy.

Colonel David D. Porter,  
A. A. & I., U.S.M.C.,  
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Washington, D. C.



Colonel David Dixon Porter

Back in 1901 in far away Samar trails were knee deep in mud, rivers were swollen—so were Marine's feet—high cliffs with falling boulders claimed impregnable were scaled with bamboo ladders, food was the prayer—but Sojoton was captured by Captain Porter and his Marines.

13 March, 1934.

SIR:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in the name of Congress, in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

**COLONEL HIRAM I. BEARSS, U.S.M.C., RET.,**


for service in Samar, P. I., as set forth in the following:

## CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism and eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle at the junction of the Cadacan and Sohoton Rivers, Samar, P. I., November 17, 1901. Colonel Bearss, then Captain, second in command of the column upon their uniting ashore in the Sohoton region, made a surprise attack of the fortified cliffs and completely routed the enemy, killing 30 and capturing and destroying the powder magazine, 40 lantacas (guns), rice, food and cuartels. Due to his courage, intelligence, discrimination and zeal, he successfully led his men up the cliffs by means of bamboo ladders to a height of 200 feet. The cliffs were of soft stone of volcanic origin, in the nature of pumice and were honeycombed with caves. Tons of rocks were suspended in platforms held in position by vine cables (known as bejuco) in readiness to be precipitated upon people below. After driving the insurgents from their position which was almost impregnable, being covered with numerous trails lined with poisoned spears, pits, etc., he led his men across the river, scaled the cliffs on the opposite side, and destroyed the camps there. He and the men under his command overcame incredible difficulties and dangers in destroying positions which, according to reports from old prisoners, had taken three years to perfect, were held as a final rallying point, and were never before penetrated by white troops. Captain Bearss also rendered distinguished public service in the presence of the enemy at Quinapundan River, Samar, P. I., on January 19, 1902."



Colonel Hiram I. Bearss, U.S.M.C., Ret.,  
Gotham Hotel,  
New York, New York.

For the President,  
Secretary of the Navy.




Colonel Hiram Iddings Bearss, Ret'd.

Trails to Liruan were lined with poisoned bamboo spears and death pits laid by hands of tricky bolomen—the volcanic stone cut both shoes and feet—bancas were worth their weight in gold—food was too—the tropical moon was on a vacation but the rain was not—and still they pushed on, Captain Bearss and his marines, to join their comrades on time. They did!



# REMEMBERS?

39





# DECORATED



Colonel Richard Peters Williams

He whispered plain words of experience and wisdom into the ears of Haitien high authorities—as they were hypnotized by his piercing blue eyes. They liked it too because he saved them money and made their army better so they could still remain the high authorities. He was not "the sentimental gentleman from Georgia."

13 March, 1934.

SIR:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES F. B. PRICE, U.S.M.C.  
for service in Nicaragua as set forth in the following

## CITATION:

"For exceptionally distinguished and meritorious service rendered the Government while in a position of great responsibility as Vice-Chairman and Inspector of the United States Electoral Mission to Nicaragua and Vice-President of the Nicaraguan National Board of Elections in 1932. Colonel Price exhibited exceptional intelligence, judgment, diplomacy and tact. His loyalty, cooperation and executive ability were of the highest order. His knowledge of electoral affairs and clear recollection of precedent and procedure gained by his connection with previous Nicaraguan elections and his excellent command of the Spanish language were of inestimable value. These together with other superior qualifications and excellent performance of duty contributed in a large measure to the success so happily attained."

For the President,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. B. Price, U.S.M.C.,  
Marine Barracks,  
Quantico, Virginia.

13 March, 1934.

SIR:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL to

COLONEL RICHARD P. WILLIAMS, U.S.M.C.

for service in Haiti as set forth in the following

## CITATION:

"For exceptionally distinguished and meritorious service in the line of his profession while in a position of great responsibility as Commandant of the Garde d' Haiti from February 25, 1930, until June 7, 1933. During most of this period he relieved a delicate political condition by his foresight, judgment and tact. His reorganization and management of the Garde d' Haiti during the active period of the replacement of the American personnel by the Haitien personnel resulted in such smoothness of operation and saving to the Budget of the Republic of Haiti as to create a highly favorable impression, and added much towards the further cementing of the friendly relations existing between the American Government and the Haitian Government."

For the President,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

Colonel Richard P. Williams, U.S.M.C.,  
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Washington, D. C.



Lieut. Colonel C. F. B. Price

Around the ballot boxes he used a brand of arithmetic that had never been taught in the political schools of Nicaragua—the results were surprising. When he finished the populace feted him; the successful acclaimed him loudly, while the losers shrugged their shoulders and rolled their eyes, but when he left—all alike they saluted him with: Gracias—Adios!

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*(Continued from page 36)*

the disintegration of China was started by the Western powers and is still being continued by them. The four or five hundred million persons of the yellow race (one fourth of the world's population), who inhabit the large area known as China, have for physical and political reasons lacked many of the attributes which are usually considered essential for a nation or country in the accepted sense of the word. As Japan sees it, China is more a geographical name than a political entity, although there have been certain loose political links between the members of this vast population. Even the geographical unity has been a misnomer, as there have been steady encroachments on Chinese territory for the last century by both European and Asiatic nations. During this time, China has lost control of nearly one-half of her five million square miles of territory. Great Britain has assumed control of the vast area of Tibet as well as other parts of China, France has practically a protectorate over Yunan in Southeastern China, another huge slice of China, known as Outer Mongolia, has recently become a Soviet Republic affiliated with Russia, etc., etc. Japan's theory is that the white nations are not so much interested in preserving the territorial integrity of China as they are in getting an equitable distribution of the spoils for themselves. In view of the ravages to which China has been subjected at the hands of the white man, Japan thinks that it is very logical for the yellow races, including the Chinese, to work together to preserve Asia for the Asiatics and that Japan is the natural leader in this program which they feel will ultimately redound to the interest even of the Chinese.

Japan is not worried by the possible reaction of either Great Britain or France, because she feels that they see more or less eye to eye with her and will not directly interfere, unless there is an attempt to encroach on their own particular bailiwicks. As for Russia, the Japanese feel that for many years Russia has been steadily infringing on the territorial integrity of China and will go even further if she gets an opportunity. Japan considers that she is strong enough at the moment to prevent this. And incidentally while we are on this point, indications continue that there will be no war between Japan and Russia at least for the next several months.

The only other major nation who might be considered as a possible deterrent to Japan is the United States. And frankly, the Japanese cannot understand why we get so upset over the matter and why we take steps which the Japanese feel are not even in our own interest. On several occasions, (notably in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement) we have publicly admitted Japan's special rights in China, although in recent years we have withdrawn these declarations. Japan cannot understand why we center our protests against Japanese encroachments, while we view with comparative complaisance the steady eating-into China by Great Britain, France, Russian and other nations. Their surprise is not diminished in view of their belief that one of our own Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, allegedly suggested to them that they establish an Asiatic Doctrine.

As we have never sought a share of Chinese territory and seem to have no intention of doing so in the future, they conclude that our solicitude is largely for economic reasons. While they deny emphatically any intention of closing the "Open Door" in China against legitimate American business transactions, they point to the fact that our business relations with Japan are far more important than those with China and that while Japan is undoubtedly in full control over business in and out of Japan she has not placed any undue obstacles on American trade relations with Japan. There is twice as much American money invested in Japan as in China and our trade with Japan (both export and import) is three times as great as our trade with China. Japan is our third best customer, outranking major nations such as Germany, France and Italy. The United States is Japan's best customer, accounting for nearly one-third of all of her sales abroad and our purchases from Japan are many times as great as that of any other nation. In the case of China we are considerably below other nations both in investments and trade. For example, British investments in China are five times as great as ours. Last year China accounted for only three per cent of our total exports and much of this was raw products, largely non-competitive in nature.

Japan cannot understand why we, with much larger business interests in Japan than in China, feel compelled to take such a drastic stand against Japan, when Great Britain, with comparatively small business interests in Japan and much larger ones in China, adopts a more conciliatory attitude. In view of the very important role we play in Japan's economic life she does not understand how we can fear unreasonable restrictions on our operations with China which might logically result in expensive retaliations by us against Japan. She feels that her supervisory control of China will, if anything, increase the possibility of American sales to China rather than diminish them. She believes this to be probable even though, in the expansion of Chinese markets made possible by reorganization, Japan might logically take off "the cream" of the increased trade. If Japanese declarations are to be taken at face value, she does not intend to close the "Open Door" against ordinary commercial transactions but only against transactions which are inimical in a military way, directly or indirectly.

Such are some of the major arguments presented by Japan and they are given here for what they may be worth. The actions of Japan in Korea and Manchuria lead some of our specialists to doubt very much whether these arguments will work out in the future along the lines that Japan claims. The subject is a highly controversial one and even among Americans there is considerable conflict of opinion.

The acceptance by the Filipinos several days ago of the Independence Act may be of far reaching importance in the general Far Eastern situation. As independence will not be completed for some years yet and as the United States has not yet decided what to do about the naval bases, it is difficult to predict what might happen and how it may affect us. As the Filipinos are Asiatics, some observers see a possibility in the future of Japan eventually absorbing these Islands.

The Latin American situation can be dismissed rather briefly. Probably the most significant thing is



the recent address of Mr. Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Cuba, wherein it is indicated that the time is not far off when the Platt Amendment will be revised to eliminate our right of intervention in Cuba. In the meanwhile we have been helping Cuba to get on her feet, partly through lending her a few million dollars within the last several weeks. The recent Sugar Act may have a beneficial economic effect on Cuban conditions.

The President of Haiti recently paid an interesting visit to Washington, where he was received by President Roosevelt. As our readers already know, all American Marines are to be withdrawn shortly from that Republic. However, we are still maintaining a certain amount of financial control (to guarantee bond payments) and the Haitian Government is interested in terminating this just as quickly as possible. The amount of bonds held by Americans is not very large and it is possible that out of the Haitian President's visit to Washington may result some agreement whereby our financial control can be terminated. If this can be done soon, it will remove another important source of friction against the United States in Latin America. In general, it seems that our government is definitely against any further intervention in Latin America in

a military or financial way and that the few remnants of such control will be withdrawn just as quickly as possible. In the meanwhile, there are increasing signs that Latin American public opinion is becoming more friendly to the United States.

## Barnett Memorial in the Washington Cathedral

■ At the invitation of the Bishop of the Washington Cathedral, Major General Logan Feland, Brigadier General George Richards, and Colonel C. R. Sanderson, all of the U. S. Marine Corps, were chosen as the Committee to make arrangements for the Ceremony in connection with the placing in the Cathedral of a Memorial Tablet in commemoration of Major General George Barnett, Wartime Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps.

This signal honor is greatly appreciated by the officers of the Marine Corps, and the family and friends of General Barnett.

The ceremony will take place at 5:00 p.m., June 8, 1934. The Rt. Rev. Bishop James E. Freeman will officiate.

## Tun Tavern Museum

### Food for Thought

■ Late one night around a flickering, half-spent candle, a few fiery, red-blooded American colonists gathered. They milled quietly as they listened to prominent citizen Captain Robert Mullen, their leader and owner of the tavern, whisper the names of over forty trusted friends who had just pledged themselves as selected patriots to serve their country against the British in the brewing Revolution. These men were more than comrades in arms—they were comrades in fraternity—for in this same small room, cramped by the sharply falling eaves, they had all pledged themselves to support the ritual of the Masons' Lodge.

So on the following morning, 10 November 1775, Philadelphia was startled when these comrades in arms and fraternity mustered in front of Tun Tavern. This constituted the first formation of the United States Marine Corps.

Time and custom have taken away the old tavern, but the sacred spot still remains. It lay in ignominious silence for 150 years, until the former marines of Philadelphia with commensurate ceremony marked the spot by a bold, bronze plaque emblazoned on the wall of Webb's dingy brick warehouse, which stands on the south side of Water Street (between Walnut and Chestnut) and Tun Alley.

For the past quarter of a century there has been much talk throughout the Corps about a suitable location for a Trophy House; and most certainly our Corps deserves one adequate to its deeds of nearly 160 years of glorious existence.

To further the spirit of the Circular Letter of the Major General Commandant as quoted below, why not erect a replica of Tun Tavern at Quantico, where most all marines serve some time during their career? In this replica of the original "Marine Corps Head-

quarters" our battle trophies, expeditionary mementos and other historical tokens could be collected and exhibited to all our personnel and their friends. This monument would elevate our esprit and traditions. It could be built in some convenient spot, perhaps at the entrance to the reservation. The old tavern style of colonial architecture would blend very harmoniously with the restoration program being carried on at present by the State of Virginia. Perhaps a board of officers could be convened by the Commandant to select a suitable and appropriate spot and supervise the construction of this museum. A contract to build this replica could be let, and the expenses for its completion and installation of the trophies could be borne by levying Post Exchanges through the Exchange Fund kept at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

Certainly no one would challenge the propriety of such levies, as this plan would realize a monument of pride to every member of our Corps and be an inspiration to those who are yet too young to serve with us.

Circular Letter No. 133, from the Major General Commandant to all officers of the Marine Corps.

"1. The Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., has established a room for War Trophies and other things of historical importance, such as photographs, flags, fire-arms, swords, etc.

2. The object of this letter is to circulate this information throughout the Marine Corps in order that officers or men who have fire-arms, trophies, etc., captured in our various expeditions, may have the opportunity to donate or lend articles of this nature so that they may be placed on display.

3. Each article sent in should have a short description outlining its history.

4. Shipments which would result in expense to the Government will not be made until specific authority therefor is obtained from this Headquarters

B. H. FULLER."

The above observation and plan is offered as an objective for the Corps. Comment is invited. Address communications to the Editor.

# STREET FIGHTING

## A Worth While Thought

■ The following tactics and formations are recommended for use against unarmed or poorly armed mobs where it is not desired to resort to fire power or bayonet, and special weapons or materials such as gas are not available. If serious fire-arm resistance is expected advance will ordinarily be through buildings as a street advance is very vulnerable.

The Marine will practically always have his rifle with him and it in itself is a pretty capable weapon. With his piece at the High Port opponents within reach can be clubbed on the head or jabbed in the face or body with the muzzle or hit on the head or body with a butt stroke. The danger lies in letting a member of the mob get hold of the rifle. If his piece is seized he should kick assailant in groin or stomach at the same time wrenching the rifle from the opponent's grasp.

Riflemen should be close enough together to prevent members of mob penetrating between them and at the same time have enough interval for the free use of their pieces. This should make the interval between men about two paces or in other words require each man to cover a front of about two and a half paces.

When enough men are available a second wave of riflemen of the same strength as leading wave is recom-

mended to follow leading wave at about two paces, men in second wave covering their file leaders, taking care of any members of mob who may penetrate intervals in leading wave, and be ready to replace file leaders in leading wave when they become exhausted.

The center part of the street in rear of the two waves of riflemen should be clear except for leaders, the special fire power units, such as automatic riflemen, should be at the sides of the street watching the buildings on the opposite side of the street.

It is recommended that the leaders be armed with Thompsons as they are the ones responsible if fire is opened and should be the ones to do the firing. The limited range of the Thompsons should tend to reduce unnecessary casualties.

In no case should riflemen break to the rear or turn their backs as to do so encourages the mob and renders them liable to be knifed in the back. To break to the flank is unnecessary as fire should not be opened except as a last resort in self-defense such as leading waves being overpowered in which case there would undoubtedly be enough men on the ground to enable leaders, at such close range, to fire on mob without much danger of hitting their own men.

The following formations for street fighting are

(Continued on page 76)

STREET Mob				STREET Mob				STREET Mob			
2F	1F			3F	2F	1F		2F	1F	2F	1F
2R	1R			4R	2R	1R		2R	1R	2R	1R
		4F				4F					4R
3R				3R				Sgt.			3R
3F								3R			3F
								3F			4F
		4R						4F			
About 5 paces Squad				About 7½ paces Squad Variation 1				About 10 paces Section			

1F, 1R, 2F, 2R—Riflemen.

3F—Rifleman (Assistant Automatic Rifleman).

3R—Automatic Rifleman.

4F—Squad leader (rifle or Thompson).

4R—Rifleman (Assistant squad leader).

Sgt—Sergeant (section leader).

STREET Mob						STREET	
3F	2F	1F	3F	2F	1F	Mob	
4R	2R	1R	4R	2R	1R		1R
							1F
							2R
							2F
							3F
							4R
3R							
4F							
Sgt.							
About 15 paces Section, Variation 1							
						Formation for a squad acting alone to get through a mob	



## CATERPILLAR CLUB

### A Refresher on Narrow Escapes

■ Forced parachute jumps were responsible for the creation of a mythical organization among flying men, known as the "Caterpillar Club." It is the most exclusive society in the world. Only airmen, who jumped for life from aircraft during flight, are eligible for membership.

No one is particularly anxious to join this organization. Initiation is strenuous. The honor of being dubbed "Caterpillar" is not sought; fate thrusts it at times on those who travel by air. At one time or another in the career of an aviator, a critical moment arrived when trouble encountered during flight was of such a serious nature as to force him to resort to the parachute. Then and there he automatically became a "Caterpillar" with a life membership in the Club.

This organization exists in name only. It has no officers, constitution or by-laws, and there are no dues to pay. It is merely a paper work organization, and statistics covering emergency parachute jumps, reports of those who made these jumps are maintained in the Information Division, Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C.

The Caterpillar Club originated shortly after the enforced jump at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio, on October 20, 1922, of former Lieut. Harold R. Harris, the first Army flier to jump with a parachute from a disabled aircraft during flight. He was then on duty as test pilot at the Engineering Division, then located at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio, and the accident occurred when he was flight-testing a new type of airplane.

The miraculous escape of Lieut. Harris created considerable comment and discussion. Two members of the Parachute Branch of the Engineering Division of the Air Corps at McCook Field, Messrs. Mumma and St. Clair, collected photographs of Lieut. Harris at the scene of the wreck of his plane, also a photograph of the parachute, a piece of the plane which bore its numerical designation, etc. These photographs and souvenirs were utilized in decorating a portion of the wall in the office of the Parachute Branch, and came in for considerable attention from the visiting public, especially Messrs. Timmerman and Hutton, Dayton newspapermen.

Discussion arose as to the probable outcome of this one jump and the likelihood of others following it. Mr. Timmerman's suggestion that a club be formed to embrace these intrepid airmen met instant approval, but the selection of a proper name for it proved a problem. Many names were submitted—from Crawlers to Sky-hookers. None appeared particularly effective, and for the time being the matter was dropped. Sometime later, Mr. St. Clair received literature from a caterpillar tractor company, showing a new design for their advertisement—a wavy streak with "Caterpillar" written across its face. The design caught his fancy immediately. Getting in touch with the two Dayton newspaper men, he suggested that the organization be known as the "Caterpillar Club." He advanced as his reasons that the parachute main sails and shroud lines are made from the finest silk

obtainable; that the lowly worm spins a cocoon, crawls out and flies away from certain death which would overtake it were it to remain inside of the cocoon. A better example of what a pilot and passenger would do in case of an uncontrollable airplane could not be better analyzed.

Messrs. Hutton and Timmerman readily agreed that the name was most adaptable, and from that day the Caterpillar Club came into being.

The following Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve personnel have saved their lives by the use of parachutes:

#### COMMISSIONED

Captain Ford O. Rogers—On October 1, 1925 was accidentally thrown from the cockpit of an Army plane and landed safely with his 'chute. Was under instruction at Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, Va., at time of accident.

Major Louis M. Bourne—On February 14, 1928 was caught in bad wind and rain storm near Reidsville, Va., and bailed out with 'chute, landing safely.

Major James T. Moore—Jumped with 'chute at Hsin Ho, China on April 22, 1928, when lower left wing of plane collapsed.

1st Lieut. Francis B. Loomis—On August 8, 1929 safely jumped from plane that was in an inverted spin at the NAS, Pensacola, Fla.

2nd Lieut. Richard J. DeLacy—Landed safely with 'chute after collision with another plane near Bonita, Calif., on May 19, 1930. Has since left the service.

1st Lieut. Edward L. Pugh—On April 8, 1931 safely jumped from plane at Corinto, Nic., after elevator controls had carried away.

1st Lieut. Lawson H. M. Sanderson—On August 30, 1931 safely landed with 'chute after collision in air over National Air Races at Cleveland, Ohio.

1st Lieut. William O. Brice—Same as above.

Captain William J. Wallace—On May 23, 1932 plane caught fire in air about five miles West of Pt. Loma, Calif. Landed safely in water and rescued by naval vessel.

2nd Lieut. John C. Munn—Passenger in above plane. Jumped and was rescued in same manner as Captain Wallace.

1st Lieut. Clovis C. Coffman—On August 21, 1932 was pilot of plane which went out of control over jungle in Northern Nicaragua during tropical storm. Jumped and landed safely in jungle and was later rescued by search party.

1st Lieut. Albert D. Cooley—On November 17, 1932 was pilot of plane which collided with another plane in air about 3 miles south of Lake Hodges, Calif. Landed safely but received minor cuts and bruises.

2nd Lieut. John S. Holmberg—Passenger in above plane.

2nd Lieut. Edward C. Dyer—Pilot of plane which was in collision with above plane. Also landed safely

- with 'chute and received minor cuts and abrasions.
- 1st Lieut. Glen M. Britt—On January 6, 1933 was pilot of plane which went out of control over Miami, Florida. Landed safely with 'chute.
- 2nd Lieut. John Wehle—On 24 October, 1932, while student at NAS, Pensacola, Fla., jumped safely from plane which became disabled in a snap roll to right.

Total commissioned to date—16.

#### ENLISTED

- QM Sergt. Clarence V. Mix—On April 6, 1925 jumped and landed safely at Quantico, Va., after collision with another plane in air. Later killed in plane crash.
- Sergeant Robert G. Fry—On August 18, 1927 bailed out and landed safely near Hsin Ho, China, after tail surfaces of plane had failed during roll. Later killed in crash of commercial plane.
- Corporal Randle W. Alcorn—On 31 July, 1929, while under instruction at Pensacola, Fla., jumped safely from plane after collision in air. After designation as pilot and promotion to Staff Sergt., again saved his life on October 31, 1932, when he jumped from a plane near San Diego, Cal., after it had gone out of control with jammed elevators.
- Staff Sergt. Irvin V. Masters—On May 19, 1930 jumped safely from plane after collision near Bonita, Calif. (Lieut. DeLacy.)
- Private D. M. Anderson—Passenger in above plane with Staff Sergeant Masters and also landed safely.
- Gunnery Sergt. Stanley G. Davey—Passenger in plane which collided with above plane and also landed safely.
- Private 1cl John P. Grando and Private 1cl J.J. Vlack—On 24 March, 1931 were ordered to jump from Fokker transport plane which was about to crash near Condega, Nicaragua. Jumped and landed safely.
- Gunnery Sergt. Walter E. Schofield and Corporal Raymond E. Townsend—On August 21, 1932 passengers in plane piloted by Lieut. Coffman which crashed in jungle in Northern Nicaragua. Both jumped and landed safely and were later rescued by searching party.
- Staff Sergt. Edwin O. Billings—On November 17, 1932 was passenger in plane piloted by Lieut. Dyer which was in collision with another plane near Lake Hodges, Calif. Jumped and landed safely.

Total enlisted to date—11.

#### RESERVE-COMMISSIONED

- Captain Stephen A. McClellan—On April 15, 1927 was testing a commercial plane over Bolling Field, Anacostia, D. C., when wings collapsed in power dive and pilot jumped, landing safely with 'chute.
- 2nd Lieut. John P. Adams—On October 21, 1930, while on active duty with Aircraft Squadrons, WCEF, San Diego, Calif., was pilot of plane which caught fire in air over El Cajon, Calif. Jumped with 'chute and landed safely. 'Chute of observer, Lt. Neale, USMCR, fouled plane and he was killed in crash.
- 2nd Lieut. John V. Kipp—On October 15, 1931, plane of which he was pilot went into spin over city of St. Paul, Minn., and crashed in outskirts of city. Pilot jumped safely but passenger was killed in

crash. Discharged from MCR because of reckless flying.

- 2nd Lieut. Parker B. Abbott—On December 18, 1932, at Long Beach, Calif., was pilot of plane which went into outside spin. Jumped and landed safely. Mechanic killed in crash.

The following personnel were killed as the result of airplane and balloon accidents:

- Private Edgar B. Lloyd, Lake Charles, La., 17 January, 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Louis C. Beauman, Miami, Fla., 23 March, 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Melville Sullivan, Miami, Fla., 5 May, 1918.
- Private Alvin E. Cronk, Miami, Fla., 5 May, 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Duncan H. Cameron, Miami, Fla., 24 June, 1918.
- Private Ernest L. Alstrand, Miami, Fla., 24 June 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Thomas J. Butler, Miami Fla., 21 August, 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Chapin C. Barr, France,<sup>1</sup> 28 September 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Harvey C. Norman, France,<sup>1</sup> 23 October, 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Caleb W. Taylor, France,<sup>1</sup> 23 October, 1918.
- Cadet Percy McK. Gerwig, Miami, Fla., 22 Oct., 1918.
- Cadet Martin L. Hope, Miami, Fla., 22 Oct., 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. Ralph Talbot, France, 25 October, 1918.
- Cadet Wilmer H. Brickley, Miami, Fla., 31 October, 1918.
- 1st Lieut. Walter S. Poague, Azores, 5 Nov., 1918.
- Cadet James R. Ristine, Miami, Fla., 13 November, 1918.
- Cadet Joseph C. McKeone, Miami, Fla., 13 November, 1918.
- 2nd Lieut. John R. Whiteside, St. Petersburg, Fla., 23 January, 1919.
- 2nd Lieut. Edward Cain, Miami, Fla., 15 February, 1919.
- Corporal Ferdinand N. Zele, Miami, Fla., 15 February, 1919.
- Cadet Byron M. Gendreau, Miami, Fla., 29 March, 1919.
- 1st Lieut. Gwendell B. Newman, Bolling Field, D. C., 2 February, 1920.
- 2nd Lieut. Fred T. Molthen, Parris Island, S. C., 25 June, 1920.
- 1st Lieut. Stephen St. George, Parris Island, S. C., 25 June, 1920.
- Captain Gustav Karrow, (Line), Parris Island, S. C., 25 June, 1920.
- 2nd Lieut. James G. Bowen, Haiti, 10 August, 1920.
- Captain T. L. Edwards, (Line), Haiti, 10 August, 1920.
- 2nd Lieut. Samuel P. MacNeill, Arcadia, Fla., 18 August, 1920.
- 2nd Lieut. John H. Weaver, Parris Island, S. C., 26 August, 1920.
- Gy. Sergt. Donald H. Mack, Haiti, 17 February, 1921.
- Pay Clk. Douglas H. Booth, (Staff), Haiti, 17 February, 1921.
- Private John O. Elder, (Balloon), Pensacola, Fla., 2 March, 1921.
- Private Edward L. Kershaw, (Balloon), Pensacola, Fla., 2 March, 1921.
- Private Willard H. Trefrey, (Balloon), Pensacola, Fla., 2 March 1921.
- 2nd Lieut. Walter V. Brown, Quantico, Va., 9 June, 1921.




- Captain John A. Minnis, Quantico, Va., 23 September, 1921.
- Sergeant Louis Gulbransen, Haiti, 5 December, 1921.
- 1st Lieut. Elton C. Hersman, Pensacola, Fla., 3 January, 1922.
- 1st Lieut. Earle M. Randall, Quantico, Va., 17 April, 1922.
- 2nd Lieut. Duncan W. Lewis, Quantico, Va., 17 April, 1922.
- Private Joseph J. Dhooge, Quantico, Va., 17 April, 1922.
- Captain George W. Hamilton, Gettysburg, Va., 26 June, 1922.
- Gy. Sergt. George R. Martin, Gettysburg, Va., 26 June, 1922.
- 1st Lieut. Herbert V. Hansen, Baltimore, Maryland, 23 September, 1922.
- 2nd Lieut. John M. Patton, Baltimore, Md., 23 September, 1922.
- Captain Rolland E. Brumbaugh, Pensacola, Fla., 20 Oct., 1922.
- Gy. Sergt. Herbert Hughes, Haiti, 9 December, 1922.
- Sergeant August J. Christian, Haiti, 10 March, 1923.
- Sergeant Edward Josupiet, Haiti, 10 March, 1923.
- Captain George F. Hill, Pensacola, Fla., 22 August, 1923.
- 2nd Lieut. Cornelius McFadden, Pensacola, Fla., 22 August, 1923.
- 1st Lieut. Walter S. Hallenberg, Haiti, 28 May, 1924.
- Gy. Sergt. George P. Moore, Haiti, 30 May, 1924.
- 2nd Lieut. Harold D. Hail, Garrisonville, Va., 10 June, 1924.
- Corporal Ralph W. Lehman, Garrisonville, Va., 10 June 1924.
- 1st Lieut. John M. McKasson,<sup>2</sup> Quantico, Va., 15 October, 1924.
- 1st Sergt. Peter P. Tolusciak, Haiti, 24 January, 1925.
- Gy. Sergt. Merle V. Slocum, Haiti, 24 January, 1925.
- 1st Lieut. Guy B. Hall, Pensacola, Fla., 2 April, 1925.
- 2nd Lieut. Thomas L. Cagle, Pittsburgh, Pa., 30 July, 1925.
- Captain Harry H. Shepherd, San Diego, California, 2 December, 1925.
- 2nd Lieut. John D. Christian, San Diego, California, 2 December, 1925.
- MT Sergt. Clarence V. Mix, Cumnor, Va., 14 April, 1926.
- 1st Sergt. Neil W. Abbott, Cumnor, Va., 14 April, 1926.
- 1st Sergt. Jeff B. Davis, San Diego, California, 17 May, 1926.
- Pvt. 1cl. Robert K. Thrasher, San Diego, California, 17 May, 1926.
- 1st Lieut. Harmon J. Norton, Anacostia, D. C., 13 September, 1926.
- 2nd Lieut. Earl A. Thomas,<sup>3</sup> Nicaragua, 8 October, 1927.
- Corporal Frank E. Dowdell,<sup>3</sup> Nicaragua, 8 October, 1927.
- 2nd Lieut. John T. Harris, Haiti, 21 February, 1928.
- Captain William C. Byrd, Nicaragua, 8 March, 1928.
- Sergeant R. A. Frankforter, Nicaragua, 8 March, 1928.
- 1st Lieut. Jay D. Swartwout, San Diego, California, 15 March, 1928.
- 2nd Lieut. Lawrence R. Dewine, San Diego, California, 15 March, 1928.
- Pvt. 1cl. Hewlett C. Chappell, San Diego, California, 15 March, 1928.
- Private H. C. Bailey, San Diego, California, 15 March, 1928.
- Major Charles A. Lutz, File, Va., 23 June, 1928.
- 1st Lieut. H. C. Busbey, File, Va., 23 June, 1928.
- Corporal D. C. McChesney, File, Va., 23 June, 1928.
- Corporal Leon W. Bryant, Mather Field, California, 19 July, 1928.
- Private Edward D. Schutt, Mather Field, California, 19 July, 1928.
- Captain Robert J. Archibald, Langley Field, Va., 1 November, 1928.
- Sergeant Thomas E. D. Nickle, Santee, California, 11 February, 1929.
- Sergeant R. S. Wiley, Santee, California, 11 February, 1929.
- 2nd Lieut. John B. McHugh, Nicaragua, 13 April, 1929.
- Sergeant Byron O. Piner, Nicaragua, 13 April, 1929.
- Corporal Otto Miller, Nicaragua, 13 April, 1929.
- Captain Euvelle D. Howard, Nicaragua, 22 July, 1929.
- 2nd Lieut. Clarence M. Knight, (Line), Nicaragua, 22 July, 1929.
- Private Robert K. Moody, Nicaragua, 22 July, 1929.
- 2nd Lieut. Joseph L. Wolfe, Quantico, Va., 20 February, 1930.
- Corporal Albert Wassell, San Diego, California, 12 May, 1930.
- 2nd Lieut. Guy D. Chappell, Quantico, Va., 11 June, 1930.
- Gunner Walter L. Pounders, Nicaragua, 16 July, 1930.
- Sergeant Chalmer L. Martin, Nicaragua, 16 July, 1930.
- Captain Arthur H. Page, Chicago, Ill., 1 September, 1930.
- 2nd Lieut. E. B. Ryan, San Diego, California, 26 March, 1931.
- 2nd Lieut. Raymond B. Sullivan, Jr., Pensacola, Fla., 19 May, 1931.
- Gunner Elmo B. Reagan, Pensacola, Fla., 12 June, 1931.
- St. Sergt. Lee Clark, Nicaragua, 23 August, 1931.
- Private Richard C. Campbell, (Line), Nicaragua, 23 August, 1931.
- 1st Lieut. William W. Conway, Memphis Tenn., 7 September, 1931.
- Colonel Thomas C. Turner, Haiti, 28 October, 1931.
- 2nd Lieut. Raymond P. Rutledge, Nicaragua, 24 August, 1932.
- Sergeant Orville B. Simmons, Nicaragua, 24 August, 1932.
- 1st Lieut. Donald G. Willis, At Sea off California, 20 September, 1932.
- Sergeant Frank H. Reynolds, At Sea off California, 20 September, 1932.
- Private Ira W. Snodgrass, San Diego, California, 13 December, 1932.
- 1st Lieut. D. L. McCloud,<sup>4</sup> Virginia Beach, Virginia, 12 April, 1934.

## RESERVE

- Private 1cl Andrew Brink, Pensacola, Fla., 4 February, 1929.
- 1st Lieut. George B. Stephens, Squantum, Mass., 9 July, 1929.
- Gy. Sergt. Ernest D. Jones, Squantum, Mass., 9 July, 1929.

(Continued on page 71)

HAVE YOU A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH ON THE OFFICIAL FILES?



## CONGRATULATIONS

■ The Marine Corps Association congratulates:

Colonel David D. Porter for being decorated by the President with the Medal of Honor, in recognition of his heroic action beyond the call of duty while serving in Samar.



Colonel Hiram I. Bearss for being decorated by the President with the Medal of Honor, in recognition of his heroic action beyond the call of duty while serving in Samar.



Colonel Richard P. Williams for being decorated by the Secretary of the Navy with a Distinguished Service Medal, in recognition of his splendid achievements while in command of the Garde d'Haiti.



Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. B. Price for being decorated with a Distinguished Service Medal in recognition of his outstanding achievements while on duty in Nicaragua with the Electoral Mission.



Brigadier General Rufus H. Lane for his composition of the fine personnel measure and the great work he has done incident to its introduction before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives.

Major Alphonse De Carre upon being decorated by the President of Haiti with the Haitian Order of Honor and Merit with rank of officer, for his splendid service with the Garde d'Haiti.



Captain Roy C. Swink upon being decorated by the President of Haiti with the Haitian Order of Honor and Merit with rank of officer, for his splendid service with the Garde d'Haiti.



The Commanding General and Staff of the Marine Corps Schools for the excellent work they did in composing the new Landing Operations Manual.



The Editor and Staff of the publication of the 4th Regiment of Marines, the "Walla Walla," for its fine appearance and interesting news.



Lieut.-Colonel Rowell and the aviators—pilots—of the F. M. F. Air Force, for their splendid flight to the West Indies, and the high state of efficiency of their organization.



Colonel Ellis B. Miller upon his useful and thorough pamphlet, "The Marine Corps in support of the Fleet."



The Commanding General and Staff, and Organization Commanders of the Fleet Marine Force, upon carrying out a successful landing in the Fleet Problem just completed in Caribbean Waters, and upon the fine professional expression they received from the Admiral of the Fleet.

First Lieutenant L. H. M. Sanderson upon being selected by the National Aeronautical Association of America to represent the United States in the International Air Meet at Vincennes, France, in June, 1934.

The Staff of the Fourth Marines' Annual, 1933-1934, for their splendid book which represents much thought and effort.

The United States Infantry Association upon the publishing of the interesting and valuable book—"Infantry in Battle."

Captain L. G. Stedman, U.S.M.C.R., of the Western Reserve Area, for his fine work in connection with the affairs of the Association.

Major Clark W. Thompson (Reserve) and Lieutenant Colgate W. Darden, Jr. (Retired), both Members of the 73d Congress, upon their fine work in piloting our Personnel Bill successfully through the House of Representatives—"May their kites fly high in the days to come!"

Lieutenant-Colonel William C. Powers, Jr., upon the designation of his son, Midshipman Bennet G. Powers, from this year's graduating class at the U. S. Naval Academy, as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps.



President Roosevelt decorating Colonel David D. Porter with the Congressional Medal of Honor. Colonel Bearss—in rear of President Roosevelt—decorated a moment later. Left to right standing: Colonel Porter, Mrs. Porter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, Mrs. Bearss, Miss Bearss, General Russell, Colonel Bearss, General McCawley, General Lee.



## CORRESPONDENCE

In answering inquiries on Association and GAZETTE affairs this section offers the best service it can produce. It does not desire to initiate or carry on controversial topics.

The circulation of the GAZETTE is about 1,100. It reaches all stations we serve via our officers. The Navy takes 70 copies for its various libraries. It is not sold on news stands.

The Prize Essay government is explained fully herein. It is hoped the entry list will be large. Only one contest will be held each year.

Yes—old photographs are desired. Thanks!

Absolutely not—is it compulsory for all officers to join the Association, but professional pride and interest should make them. The Infantry and Cavalry Associations are run with the same thought.

Yes! In each number of the GAZETTE will be found at least one article which covers some professional topic the knowledge of which will assist you when you come up for your promotional examination.

On about July fifth boards will meet to review records of officers falling within the group for consideration for promotion. The character of the examination required for promotion is still a matter of discussion.

You are right. The Marine Corps Association is 20 years old and has every intention of reaching the century mark.

Right! Admiral Cowie is still the active head of the Navy Mutual Aid Association. Very active too.

No, Sir. The F.M.F. can be either one battalion or one dozen battalions or more, depending upon the size of the job to be done. Its Commanding General can be located on either coast.

Yes! Our Reserves are organized basically as the regular establishment—in battalions—with a Lieutenant Colonel or senior Major in command and a Major as the Executive Officer. A mobile, flexible organization.

It will probably be late summer before anything is definitely known as to the results of promotion boards.

The August issue of the GAZETTE will be dedicated to the Marine Corps Reserve and called the RESERVE NUMBER. Already our Reserve officers have forwarded several fine articles for this issue. More will be welcome! This issue will run an article, "The German Operations against the Baltic Islands—1917." This story will cover a topic touching upon F.M.F. duties.

Sorry! But the Association has nothing to do with sending or keeping athletes at the different posts.

The actual medals mentioned in the list of Foreign Decorations printed in the February GAZETTE are still in the vault of the State Department. You should receive yours by July or August next, as Congress usually acts on this class of legislation toward the end of the session.

Yes! Each GAZETTE issue will carry latest data on both the Personnel and Pay situations.

ADMIRALTY, S. W.,

Royal Marine Office

6 April, 1934.

My dear General:

Captain Anderson, your naval attache here, told me yesterday that you have succeeded General Fuller as Major General Commandant of The United States Marine Corps.

On behalf of the Corps of The Royal Marines, and on my own behalf, I send you hearty congratulations on your appointment, and at the same time best wishes for a happy and successful tenure of command.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

R. FOSTER (Lt-Genl.)

Adj. Gen. Royal Marines.

Major General Commandant

John Russell,

United States Marine Corps.

## RIVER CLYDE AT "V" BEACH

### It depicts many worth while lessons

■ On the 23rd of March 1915, there was a conference on board H.M.S. *Queen Elizabeth* at Tenedos. Thereat Admiral de Robeck informed Sir Ian Hamilton that the Navy would need the assistance of the Army to win through to Constantinople.

Up till that moment the function of the troops had been undefined. Some had collected at Mudros, and others, including the Twenty-ninth Division, were on their way. But they were there as a standby. The exact mode of their employment had not as yet been envisaged. In Sir Ian Hamilton's words, he was a waiting man, and it was the Admiral's innings for so long as he could keep his wicket up.

The General's first act after hearing the Admiral's pronouncement was to take his troops off to Alexandria, there to repack the transports ready for an opposed landing. This occupied several weeks, during which possible alternatives were reviewed and the plan of campaign decided upon.

On the 10th of April, Sir Ian, back at Mudros and housed in the transport *Arcadian* with his staff, unfolded his plan to Sir John de Robeck.

Then had begun the detailed organisation, a matter intricate beyond the dreams of civilians.

Mudros was in ferment; all the old battleships which could be spared from English waters had long since collected, and now the harbour was crowded with merchant ships, store ships, transports, and every imaginable kind of vessel. The shores were lined with camps, and Australian soldiers, New Zealanders, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Senegalese toiled and sweated at their drills and fraternised with songs and laughter in their leisure hours. The little Greek village on the shores of the bay enjoyed a prosperity undreamed. Any stores they could get in by hook or crook, from Athens or the other islands, or could buy from the merchant ships, found a ready sale at ten times their value. Labour parties of Egyptian fellahen marched here and there to their allotted tasks, chanting their strange desert choruses.

Over all this hubbub reigned with benign smile Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, serene and ever cheerful. With eyeglass firmly fixed in eye he moved hither and thither, settling matters great and small, presiding at courts of justice on shore, and smoothing over points of dispute between Allied officers, naval and military alike. Wherever he went he gained golden opinions; troubles and difficulties melted away before that sunny smile, even as clouds are dispersed by the penetrating rays of his more ubiquitous prototype.

He had selected Commander Escombe as his Chief of Staff, and now that the organisation of the landing at Helles had been entrusted to him, his Flagship was one of the busiest imaginable.

Not long before there had arrived upon the station one Commander Edward Unwin, an officer who had

entered the Navy from the Merchant Service as long ago as the 'nineties. Unwin had distinguished himself in his time by the invention of new methods for facilitating and speeding up that most onerous of naval duties, coaling ship. In this branch he had made himself a name, and he had then retired, and nothing was more natural than that on volunteering when war broke out he should have found himself appointed as Coaling Officer to the Grand Fleet, on the staff of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, wafted away into the misty regions of the north.

Here colliers appeared as if by magic, emptied their bellies into the great and hungry warships, and vanished silently into the blue. Such a responsibility might have satisfied some, but Unwin was looking for glory and promotion, and finding himself merely one of a number of other commanders on the Admiral's staff, he decided that the prospects were not good enough. Accordingly, he asked the Commander-in-Chief if he could get him a command.

No one could fail to like Unwin, an immense, broad-chested fellow, of commanding appearance, with a ready joke always upon his lips; he was *bon camarade* with every one, and where he went, smiling faces and loud laughter were his accompaniment. But he was no buffoon, and was always ready with a strong and sound, if often original, opinion on any subject that might be broached, and this opinion he was generally prepared to back. Jellicoe, like the great man that he is, ever ready to help the interests of those who have served him well, took trouble to get him a command.

Thus it occurred that he was appointed in command of H.M.S. *Hussar*, an old gunboat, which in time of peace fulfilled the duties of Admiral's yacht to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station. Now, in company with every other craft capable of steaming the *Hussar* was at Mudros, where duties of a minor character were found for her, and into the hubbub of preparation for the great landing on the peninsula arrived Commander Unwin to take up his first naval command. He was then fifty-one, but his looks and strength were those of a much younger man.

It was not long before Unwin went on board the Flagship to obtain for himself special duties in connection with the landing. Escombe, the recently appointed Chief of Staff, saw him, and had no difficulty in finding a job for him. Escombe was a good organiser and a dressy man, and shooting his linen as was his wont, he detailed Unwin for charge of the lighters.

"Right," replied Unwin, and returned to his ship to make an inventory of the said lighters, and to get his new duties, however humble, firmly within his grasp.

*As is well known, the operation of landing troops on a hostile and defended shore is one of the most difficult of all war, and its difficulties are only added to by the fact that it necessitates the closest co-operation between the Services, which do not in peace time often work together. History can show many cases where combined operations have produced friction, and even open quarrels, between the naval and military commanders.*



But in this war, at least, it can be said that never was there a whisper of dispute or unbridgeable disagreement between the Services when operating in the field. In the Dardanelles campaign the relations between them were particularly happy. The delightful personality of Sir John de Robeck, the smiling charm of Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, and the lavish hospitality of all the naval messes, dispelled any suspicion which might have lurked in the military breast, and blended to a common purpose the Khaki and the Blue. While, on the other hand, the fire-eating keenness of General Hunter Weston, the resolute sufficiency of General Birdwood, and the magnificent spirit of all the troops who were about to set out on the glorious adventure, filled the Navy with admiration.

The military Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff dispensed from the transport *Arcadian* a wisdom which was reassuring, and a forbearance from interference in detail which argued well. It would be hackneyed to speak of this staff as large and glittering; certainly there were a lot of them, but a Commander-in-Chief's staff is always large and cannot be otherwise.

The secret of the plan of landing, when, where, and how it was to be carried out, was well kept, and known only to a few. All the troops knew was that they would have to embark in ships and from thence transfer themselves to boats, and that in these they would have to approach the shore, towed in most of the way, but making the final approach under oars, scramble out as best they could, form up in their units, and move forward as quickly as possible to capture enemy advance positions and consolidate themselves on shore.

*This complex operation had been practised again and again at Mudros by the troops of the advance party until some proficiency had been reached, and the natural clumsiness of soldiers, encumbered with rifle and heavy pack, in climbing in and out of unfamiliar boats, was reduced to a minimum.*

Aerial and naval observation had revealed that the coast, especially in the vicinity of Helles, was strongly defended, and resistance was expected, but the degree of tenacity with which the Turks would hold the defenses, lay in the realm of speculation.

It was only known to a few higher officers that the landing was to take place on a number of small beaches round the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula. A whole division being landed thus under the command of General Hunter Weston, while some thirteen miles to the north, in the vicinity of Gaba Tepe, a second force was to land under General Birdwood.

As the great and complex plan matured, a combined meeting was held on board the *Arcadian* to consider and thrash out certain details concerned with the landing from boats.

Captain G. P. W. Hope presided, and as Officer-in-Charge of Lighters Unwin obtained permission to attend, feeling that he would be better able to understand the orders he would subsequently receive if he were present at the discussion from which they sprung. When the conference was nearly over, some one asked him if he had any suggestions to make.

"I have only this to say, Sir," replied Unwin, "that as the beaches on which our men are to land are defended, it seems to me fatal to land them from open boats. The boat grounds and becomes a sitting target,

full of men without cover, scrambling over one another trying to get out. The troops will be hampered by their packs and at their very worst. The enemy has only got to concentrate on the boat and scarcely a man will get out alive. Panic and confusion is certain!"

This statement was received in silence by men who knew well that if the shore was defended casualties must be expected, but that landings had been made on hostile shores before and had succeeded, and that by dash and élan and force of numbers they might succeed again. Moreover, there was no other way.

In the distant north, the far-sighted Lord Fisher had set in motion the construction of large lighters ideal for this very purpose, having their own engines, protection against rifle-fire, shallow bows and a draw-bridge to make contact with the shore. But these were not ready, and there could be no question of further postponing the landing, already too long delayed.

"What do you suggest, then?" asked Captain George Hope.

The resourceful Unwin, his hand called, was not going to back down without a suggestion, and as he bent his mind to it, he visualized in a flash the possibilities of a steel-sided merchant ship, filled with soldiers, taking the ground on a shelving beach.

"Why," he said, "run an old ship ashore full of troops, cut a hole in her bow, then make a gangway with lighters to the shore, and the troops can dash ashore along it, covered by machine-gun fire from the ship. Also," he went on, "the ship can bring in tons of ammunition and stores—the more weight you put in the stern, the higher up it will bring her bow—and what is more, she can carry large supplies of water, and would be a distilling-station and clearing-station for wounded ready made." He paused. "Of course," he went on, "if the enemy have field-guns ashore, doubtless they could defeat her, but I understand they have no artillery."

"Yes, that is so," put in an Intelligence Officer. "Our information is that there are no guns near the landing places, other than the fixed defenses."

Hope considered this scheme and discussed it on the spot with his immediate entourage. In the end he



The River Clyde at V Beach

decided against it. "A clever idea," he probably said, "but it is putting too many eggs into one basket, and the whole essence of landing from boats is that of dispersion; one boat may get knocked out, but others will get through."

Thus the matter was decided, but as the conference ended a bright and well-known face appeared at the door. It was none other than Rosslyn Wemyss, with eyeglass well screwed in and smile stretched across his countenance.

"Well, how are you getting on?" he asked. "Oh, we've done very well, Sir," replied some one, "most of the details are thrashed out now. By the way, Sir, Commander Unwin has just proposed a new scheme." And the idea was described to him.

Wemyss saw it differently to Hope. He liked the plan, and decided then and there to give it a chance.

"A capital idea," he said, "the very thing, we'll try it. You'd better see to it, Unwin. You can pick any merchant ship you like and get her fitted up, and we will work her into the landing."

"Thank you, Sir," said Unwin, "I'll get right on with it." And away he went, delighted to have got, at last, a job which was worth while, and having no doubt in his mind as to who was going to command that merchant ship in the landing.

Thus the *River Clyde* epic was born, but as ever when a new weapon or new device for making war comes into our hands, we followed our invariable instinct to experiment with it on a small scale first, rather than stake all and employ it on such a scale that, should the experiment be successful, it would inevitably turn the tide of battle in our favour. If one such ship seemed advantageous, why not one for each beach?

Unwin had plenty of ships to choose from, for they swarmed in Mudros harbour like mackerel in a shoal. In the end he chose the *River Clyde*, a stout old collier which had been chartered by the French and had brought out a cargo of military stores, some of which were still in her. She was a bigish ship of some 6,000 tons, and could hold a lot of troops, was built of good stout steel-plating, and, above all, could distil 100 tons of water a day. So without delay, he had the remainder of the cargo out and got her alongside the repair ship *Reliance* to be fitted for her job. Casting around for the best means of bridging between her and the shore, his roving eye had been attracted by a hopper, a small vessel designed for carrying mud out to sea and dropping it in the ocean. This ship, some 150 feet long, drew only about 8 feet of water aft, tapering to almost nothing in the bow, and was capable of some 5-knots speed. She seemed the very thing. As Unwin conceived it, the hopper would be towed alongside, and when the *River Clyde* took the ground, she would surge ahead by reason of her momentum, assisted by her own engines, and would be steered in ahead of the *River Clyde* to take the ground between her and the shore. There would probably be a gap between the stern of the hopper and the bow of the *River Clyde*, and this would be filled in by lighters from his own command, which he would tow on his other side.

So the hopper was got alongside the repair ship, too, and an immense hinged drawbridge built in her bows

which, when let down, would be an easy run for the troops on to the beach. In the *River Clyde* four holes were cut in the hull each side, and wooden staging was arranged, making a pathway outside the ship from these holes right to the bows, where it reached the correct level for men to step into the lighters.

Having got the plans so far advanced and the work well in hand, Unwin went over to see the Rear-Admiral.

"I must have Maxims," he told him, "otherwise the ship may be rushed by the enemy."

"Of course you must," replied Wemyss. "There's a ship just come in with an armoured train unit and she's got twelve Maxims on board; you shall have the lot!"

"Thank you, Sir," said Unwin, and only staying to obtain a written order for the Maxims, he went on board the new arrival and brought them away with him with one of the officers of the armoured train unit, Lieutenant Josiah Wedgwood, M.P., in charge. He armoured the bridge with two thicknesses of half-inch plating, and in the bows Wedgwood built a fortress with sandbags in which the twelve Maxims were mounted and furnished with an unlimited supply of ammunition.

In all this planning of the details of his scheme, Unwin stood alone. While the success of an idea or an invention is unproved, there are few who will associate themselves with it, and until his first success, the inventor ploughs a lonely furrow! In this case, except the Rear-Admiral who supported him heartily, there was no one who wished definitely to associate himself with a rather doubtful and hare-brained expedient.

The idea, once launched, had marched on of itself, and had already become a corner-stone in the landing plan, involving over two thousand of our best troops.

It was a huge responsibility on the shoulders of any man, but go over it as often as he might, the scheme seemed to him fool-proof and infallible.

Unwin thought a lot of R.N.R. Midshipman G. L. Drewry, and he gave him command of the hopper. This vessel had a Greek crew, and the crews of Greek merchant ships have not, as a rule, been renowned for their anxiety to come under fire, but this crew was an exceptional one, or perhaps it was the personality of Commander Unwin which inspired them. At all events, they particularly requested that they might not be replaced by naval seamen, but might be allowed to remain on their own ship. *Unwin granted their request, unwisely, as matters turned out.*

Eventually the preparations were completed. The position allocated to the *River Clyde* was known as V Beach. It was a curving bay on the very point of the peninsula looking south, with the old castle of Sedel-Bahr backed by the village on the right as you face it from the sea. As in the case of all the beaches at this famous landing, the actual shore was only a narrow strip of sand; then came a low bank some five feet high, and above this the ground sloped gradually up, forming of the beach itself a natural amphitheatre. Unwin wished to beach his ship in the very middle of this curved bay, but the Admiral would not allow this, thinking, rightly or wrongly, that it would disorganize the troops landing from boats. For there was to be a boat landing as well as the *River Clyde* at V Beach, so the latter was allotted a position to the right of the centre of the bay, not far from Sedel-Bahr. The troops

MR. MEMBER! BE SURE WE HAVE YOUR LATEST ADDRESS



in the *River Clyde* were the First Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, and the 2nd Hampshire Regiment, and the West Yorkshire R.E. Field Company, while to be landed from boats in the same bay were five tugs of Dublin Fusiliers.

In charge of all the troops in the Helles covering party was Brigadier-General Hare, who landed at W Beach, and Colonel Carrington Smith commanded the troops in the *River Clyde* itself.

The day of landing approached, and Unwin organized his small forces to man the *River Clyde*. He had a crew of twelve petty officers and seamen and six stokers. Rather late in the day a leading seaman of the *Hussar*, by name Williams, had begged to be allowed to come with him, but Unwin, whose crew was complete, had replied that he had enough petty officers and leading seamen. "Oh well, Sir," said Williams, "I'll dip my hook and come as a seaman." He referred to his leading seaman's badge, an anchor, or in the vernacular, "hook." Unwin agreed to let him come, unable to resist the man's keenness, and taken by the apt expression which usually implied the punishment of disrating.

Thus when on the night before the actual landing he detailed his little crew for their special duties, Williams appeared, to know what his job was to be.

"Well, I have told everybody off," said Unwin, "but if you still want to come, stay close to me; there's sure to be some job you'll be wanted for." And so it was arranged.

That evening Midshipman Drewry had approached him.

"I have got a lovely axe, as sharp as a razor, for the hopper."

"What do you want an axe for?" asked Unwin.

"Why, to cut the tow-rope when the *River Clyde* takes the ground."

"You won't want an axe, my son," Unwin told him. "You will have a bowline in the end of the towing hawser, and this you will put over the bollard of your hopper. As the old ship takes the ground, the hopper must infallibly surge ahead, the towing hawser will slacken, and all you will have to do is to lift it off the bollard."

Drewry went away perhaps disappointed, but the mental picture of cutting the hawser with an axe, as, commanding his ship for the first time, he steamed gallantly forward into action to make the bridge, was too dramatic to be lightly effaced, and he determined in his boyish mind to have that axe ready in case of emergency.

It was the 25th of April, 1915, calm, peaceful, lovely. The fateful morning had at last arrived. The *River Clyde* was to take the ground at 6 A. M. at the same moment as the accompanying boats, but in spite of an early start she was somewhat late, for the speed she made with the hooper in tow on one side, and lighters on the other, was very small. The boats, however, were later, and as Unwin approached, in the fast-breaking day, he perceived that he would be before them. The whole area was crowded with ships. Battleships closing in were already hard at it bombarding the shore, a battleship to each beach, making a terrific din: other battleships, cruisers, destroyers, trawlers loaded with troops, and all manner of craft, were moving to their assigned stations. Everything was organized to a hair. But already a clockwork organization began to strain, for the *River Clyde*, with its attendant craft, was an unmanageable assemblage, which could not afford to stop, far less to go astern. Her beaching was to synchronize with the boats, but the boats were not there. Just as this problem became acute, a signal was received from the

watchful Wemyss: "Do not wait for the boats, go straight in." Unwin's mind was relieved, but when the military officers with him on the bridge heard the decision, they were dismayed. "For the Lord's sake, don't do that," they said; "it will upset all the arrangements. Second line troops will get ashore before first line, and the whole plan will be disorganized."

Unwin had to make a decision. His quaint argosy was moving forward, drawing ever nearer to the fateful spot. There was the Admiral's signal, "Go on," here, the military officers in charge of the troops about to face a desperate landing, imploring him not to land them piecemeal. What was he to decide?

He gave a decision for the soldiers, and putting his helm over, went round in a big circle since he could not stop or go astern, thus giving the boats another ten minutes. This brought him into the very thick of the crowded ships, all of whom naturally wondered what he was about.

He passed close across the bows of one ship and close under the stern of another, then finding himself with two destroyers right ahead, one of which it seemed he must certainly hit, he just managed to steer between them, and as he did so one of them, just in time, let go a wire which they had passed from one to the other ready to sweep for mines. This wire gave Unwin a nasty turn, for he realized that had it fouled his crew his whole plan must have miscarried.

"I am going in now," he said, "whether the boats are there or not. I cannot risk another circle like the last." And in he went, and finding a transit of two objects on shore which he had picked out on a previous reconnaissance, he ran in on it, taking the ground in the exact spot which had been allocated to him; but owing to the presence of an unexpected reef, he grounded considerably further out than anticipated.

The thunder of bombardment had ceased. These old shores, which had seen the ships of Agamemnon sail up against the hosts of Troy, had today received a plastering such as they had never known before. There was still heavy firing to the north, and shell from the Asiatic shore were falling spasmodically round the *River Clyde*, but the *Albion*, who had been bombarding V Beach, was now silent, and on and round V Beach itself nothing stirred, nothing betrayed the presence of human beings; it might have been deserted.

Opposite all the beaches, boats were approaching in long lines, towed by steamboats. The steamboats were casting off, the boats, rowed by skeleton crews of seamen, were paddling in to the beach. This was the moment for the enemy to unmask his fire. Men were leaping out in waist-deep water and with wild cheers dashing up to the shelter of the cliff. On some beaches there was no resistance, on others it was severe.

We will confine our attention to V Beach, where, in carefully protected stone redoubts and sandbag emplacements, the enemy had mounted four Maxim guns and a couple of pom-poms, and in addition to this, there were a good few riflemen in concealed positions.

The boats were not far behind. The *River Clyde* grounded, and Unwin, seeing at a glance that the distance between her and the shore, though greater than anticipated, was still bridgeable by the craft he had in tow, glanced over the port side to see whether the hopper was behaving according to plan. To his horror he perceived that she was not. There was Drewry, axe in hand, standing in the bow,



having severed the hawser, but the lighter had taken a big sheer off to port and was sailing away across the bay, and even as he looked, took the ground in a position which made it impossible for her to become a bridge between the *River Clyde* and the beach.

"The scheme's bust," thought Unwin. "Never mind now why, somehow or other that miserable hopper has misbehaved, and we have got to do the best we can without her."

There was no time to be lost, the lighters were still alongside on the starboard side. By careful handling, these might be wheeled into position to make the essential gangway, and though they could never give the clear passage ashore the hopper would have given, they would have to do now. The machine-guns had opened on the boats, and these, under the gruelling fire, were rapidly becoming funeral galleys piled with dead. Some never reached the shore at all, but with crew and cargo all shot down lay drifting there in tragic helplessness pitiful targets for the Turkish fire.

The troops in the *River Clyde*, keyed up for the desperate rush, were impatient of delay. But where was their gangway? Unwin decided to do himself the task which almost certain death, of manœuvring those lighters into position. Taking a light line from the foremost lighter, he plunged overboard and swam ashore. When he got there, he looked round and saw to his surprise that Leading Seaman Williams had obeyed to the letter his orders to keep near him, and had swum ashore close behind him. Together, under a hail of bullets, they hauled the first lighter to the shore, where it grounded in some three feet of water, and assisted by a few men in her and the other lighters, managed to work them all three into position. Their maintenance there depended on a taut line from the bows of the *River Clyde* to the shore, to which line they could all be lashed, but there was nothing on the shore to which such a line could be made fast. So Unwin himself became the securing point, and taking a couple of turns round his body, sat down in the water, holding taut the rope on which the whole landing depended. Williams sat by his side and helped. No sooner was the bridge established, than the men began to pour ashore. First came Captain Henderson with his gallant company of Munsters. Under a terrible fire they hopped and jumped across those lighters, leapt into the water, and wading ashore, dashed up to the little bank. As they did so, they fell like ninepins, some into the sea, some on to the decks; only a few reached the ridge alive. Next came Captain Geddes with his company, and while they were landing, something occurred which caused one of the lighters to break adrift, leaving a little group of soldiers, of whom Captain Geddes was one, adrift and at the mercy of Turkish fire. Geddes plunged overboard and swam ashore, followed by his men, but with the weight of their equipment many, alas, must have perished.

There was a pause while Unwin and the lighter men got her connected up once more, and once again the redoubtable Commander, who bore a charmed life indeed, settled down to his position at the end of the rope.

Perhaps it was now, or it may have been a little earlier and may have caused the incident when Captain Geddes found himself adrift in the lighter, that Unwin heard a groan from Williams sitting at his side.

"What's the matter, Williams?" he asked.

"Hit by a shell, Sir," was the reply, as poor Williams, who had been hard hit by a rifle bullet or perhaps a pom-

pom, sank down in the water as his strength ebbed away. Unwin propped him up, and in his arms he died!

It is difficult to elucidate from survivors' accounts the sequence of individual incidents such as these, and perhaps it is not very important. It seems clear, however, that Unwin held that line until the third company of Munsters, led by Major Jarrett, had made their dash for the shore, and received as terrible a reception as their predecessors. Jarrett himself reached the shelter of the ledge, and passed the word back that landing was impracticable, and Colonel Carrington Smith gave orders to stop further disembarkation.

Meanwhile Unwin, having been immersed in cold water and under fire for over half an hour, had lost consciousness, and rescued by those who were working with him, was got back to the *River Clyde* and laid on his bunk.

It is not to be supposed that he had been working entirely alone; besides the two petty officers in each of the lighters, Lieutenant Morse, R.N., and Midshipman Malle-son had assisted in forming and keeping the lighter bridge, and Midshipman Drewry, R.N.R., was still struggling to get his hopper into position. All these men escaped with the exception of poor Williams, who, in dipping his "hook," at the same time half-masted the colours for his own funeral, and engraved his name on the roll of heroes.

The immunity of the naval personnel remains to this day incomprehensible, when all around them the Munsters were falling like autumn leaves, but it could not last for ever, and while Unwin was lying unconscious, Drewry was brought in with a bullet graze on the forehead. It proved not to be serious, and he soon returned to work.

It must have been about nine o'clock when Unwin came to himself, and springing up, he threw on a pair of flannel trousers and a shirt and came out to see what was going on.

There had been little change. The fringe of men who had reached the low cliff hung on there doggedly, waiting for opportunity. Drewry had managed to get the hopper in such a position that her stern was accessible from the gangway on the *River Clyde's* port side, but her bow was still away to port, and completely out of the line of the lighters. Seated in her, in rigid attitude gazing at the shore, was Brigadier-General Napier, and beside him was his Brigade-Major, Captain Costeker. Unwin must have wondered how they had got there. It had happened in this way.

At about 8.30 the main body began to land, and a trawler containing the Brigadier and his staff and some troops of the Worcesters and Hampshires had closed V Beach.

A few boats only had escaped destruction in the first landing, and these, rowed by the remnant of sailors, had struggled seawards once more, and embarked the General and those with him. Seen from the *River Clyde* to be rowing to this beach and approaching certain death, they were hailed to come alongside her. This they did, and thus a second holocaust was averted. On arrival alongside, the General, confronted for the first time with the unwelcome news that the landing was held up, determined to try for himself. It was in a gallant attempt to lead a new landing that, accompanied by Costeker, he found himself in the hopper, and there, alas, both had received their death wounds.

But to Unwin they seemed to be sitting there calmly, studying, with serene contempt for bullets, the tense dead-lock outspread before them.

So he went out to talk to them, and as he stood there a bullet struck a stanchion close to him, and splinters splashing into his face, gashed it slightly and covered it with blood. He retired to the ship and had his wound dressed, and some time later mounted the bridge to survey the situation. A party of troops from W Beach were fighting their way across in short rushes to join those on V Beach, and from the men watching in the *River Clyde* went up a rousing cheer. Colonel Carrington Smith mounted with Unwin, but instead of going right up to the well-protected bridge, stayed just below it to have a look with his glasses. This action cost him his life, for even as he lifted them to his eyes, he received a bullet in the throat and fell dead. Commander Unwin, with Colonel Williams and Colonel Doughty Wylie at his side, stood on the bridge and took stock.

There was nothing to be done at the moment. The attack from W Beach had been held up by wire supported by machine-gun fire, and the general state of affairs was one of deadlock. The Maxim battery in *River Clyde's* bow under Captain Josiah Wedgewood, undoubtedly did much to keep down the Turkish fire, and precluded any attempt at counter attack by the Turks. But it could not penetrate the stone redoubts in which the enemy's machine-guns were ensconced, and was unable, therefore, to knock them out.

If only *River Clyde* had had a gun, a 12-pounder or ever a 3-pounder, at the point-blank range of 200 yards or so it must have been an easy matter to destroy the enemy emplacements one by one.

But the troops who had gained the shore were not satisfied to leave things as they were, and a party of four, clearly seen from the bridge, made a dash for the nearest emplacement to clean it up with the point of the bayonet, but it was an impossibility. The Maxims spoke, three were bowled over as one man, and the fourth, finding himself alone, beat a retreat as hard as he could, and jumping clean from the cliff top, over the heads of his comrades, landed on the sand, shaken but unhurt. Undeterred, another party of these incredibly gallant lads resolved to try again. But in the meantime the fire of ships had been called into play to attempt to silence the deadly emplacements, and at the very instant that the four volunteers dashed forward, a 6-inch gun, unknown to them, was sighting on their objective. Just as they reached it, strangely enough unscathed, the 6-inch spoke, and its potent messenger entered the very door of the casemate, blowing the whole affair to smithereens. The four heroes fell instantly, enveloped in a cloud of smoke and dust, and it appeared to the watchers on the *River Clyde* bridge that they too must be added to the long roll of gallant sacrifice, but so wirily resistant is the human frame, and so strange the chances of battle, that it was not so; as the dust cleared away, four grimy figures were seen to pick themselves up, and, their objective having vanished, to return to their line.

This shot heralded an intense bombardment by the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Albion*, and *Cornwallis*, but it accomplished little, and as Sir Ian Hamilton has it, "the naval shells, smashing as their impact appeared, might as well have been confetti for all the effect they had upon the Turkish 'trenches.'"

The great advantage of the *River Clyde* now became apparent, for it was realized that the vast majority of the casualties came from the boats, while the troops still on

board were safe and well, and able to partake of their dinners. In the afternoon, the situation remaining unchanged, Unwin felt that something must be done about the many wounded lying groaning at the water's edge. His practice was, when there was something dangerous to be done, to do it himself, so getting hold of a launch, the largest type of naval pulling boat, and coiling a light line in her stern, the end being left inboard, he manned her single-handed, and using a long oar, punted her to the beach, where she grounded in some two feet of water. Getting out, he attempted to lift one of the wounded men. He was too heavy, but on cutting off his accoutrements he was just able to get him on his back, and staggering to the launch, drop him over her gunwale.

Leading Seaman Williams had a successor, for a man named Russell in the R.N.A.S., had swum ashore and joined him. Seven or eight men were thus lifted into comparative safety, when poor Russell was hit, and Unwin tore off his shirt sleeve to bind up his wound; then putting Russell into the launch along with the rest, and feeling his strength exhausted, he climbed in himself and waved for her to be pulled off. Thus these few at any rate received attention, and let us hope their lives were saved. Unwin himself staggered to his cabin, lay down, and at once entered the sleep of utter exhaustion. His efforts were continued by Sub-Lieutenant Tisdall of the Royal Naval Division.

The day was wearing on with varying success. At 4 p. m. one more dash ashore, led by Lieutenant Nightingale of the Munsters, had shared the fate of the earlier attacks. Y Beach was proving intractable, but at W there was no resistance, and had the scheme had more elasticity, and had it been possible to pour troops ashore at W Beach, it may well be that the peninsula had been ours. One must guard oneself from unfair criticism, in the light of knowledge not available at the time, and such is far from my purpose. The organization of a landing such as this is, admittedly, highly complex, and must be even more so, perhaps impossibly so, if it is to provide for that flexibility which, some now think, would have won the peninsula at the initial landing.

This story is not a chronicle of the landing as a whole, but of the *River Clyde* incident only; nevertheless, one cannot help feeling that flexibility of plan as to the landing-place of the main body, and even of a large part of the covering force, must be embodied in any such operation in future.

There was a further bombardment late in the afternoon, and at 7 o'clock Major Jarrett led the remnant of Munsters and Hampshires along to the right of the beach, in an attempt to affect a lodgment in the old fort. But this attempt, which cost Jarrett his life, also failed, for a Turkish machine-gun and some riflemen in the lower part of the fort made it still unassailable.

It was pitch dark when Unwin once more awoke, and rising much refreshed, tumbled out to see what was happening. As soon as dark had fallen, the landing of troops had recommenced, and a considerable party had collected at the right hand end of the beach and were forming up in good order. The wounded were collected and brought off, and a little pier was built of the now useless packs of the dead and wounded. Most important, a night reconnaissance of the fort and village was carried out.

But it was not till dawn that it was possible to attack the enemy defences and consolidate the position. After a



preliminary bombardment, Colonel Doughty Wylie and Colonel Williams landed, and organising the troops, led an attack on Sedel-Bahr castle and the village, the latter especially being still strongly held. After severe fighting, the attack was completely successful, the whole village falling into our hands, and those enemy emplacements which had not already been destroyed were abandoned. Alas! at the climax of this gallant attack Colonel Doughty Wylie received his death wound, and so one more splendid Englishman perished in the immortal conquest of V Beach, which had now at length been achieved.

Now the secondary use of the *River Clyde* became apparent. Firmly connected to the shore, and forming a pier which comparatively big ships could go alongside, she was invaluable as a supply depot, a clearing station, a fresh-water supply, and a host of other things. It did not take long for Unwin to get her decks well covered with sand-bags, so that against the shell-fire, which seemed to fancy her as a target, she afforded fair protection.

What comment can one make on events such as these? The deeds speak for themselves, and all that is necessary is to ascertain them as truly and as fully as possible for the benefit of future generations. For pure undiluted valour, the conduct of those involved in this incident would be hard to surpass.

Admiral Wemyss says in his book on the campaign: "The ship was magnificently handled by Unwin, who has since earned the V.C. several times over. He, with two midshipmen and two seamen, performed perfect prodigies of valour and heroism—they seemed to bear charmed lives." He adds in another place: "Had it not been for her (the *River Clyde*) I do not think it is an exaggeration to say we should not now be where we are."

Ian Hamilton, on the 25th, while the deathless scene was being enacted before him, writes: "The *River Clyde* so far saves the situation."

Yet there were some who, after the landing, considered the *River Clyde* had been a mistake, and a costly one. These must surely have been misinformed, or else blinded by prejudice; for though V Beach was in fact a shambles, it

was vital that it should be won, and by the agency of the *River Clyde* it was won. Had the scheme worked as intended, and had the hopper gone forward and made the bridge according to plan, it might have been won far more quickly.

There is no reason in seamanship why that hopper should have failed, and the true cause only emerged afterwards. It was that when, on the *River Clyde* grounding, the machine-guns unmasked, and the pom-poms added their venomous drumming, the nerve of her engine-room crew must have failed, for instead of keeping her engines to full speed ahead, they reversed them. With engines going astern, the ship would be unmanageable and thus the contretemps, beyond the control of the leader, must have occurred. Had there been no *River Clyde* it is probable that hardly a soul would have landed alive, and the long tows of boats, coming up in relays one after another, would have shared the same fate.

On the other hand, had the *River Clyde* scheme been applied to all the beaches, it seems impossible to doubt that the peninsula would have been ours on the very day of landing.

Let us be warned, however, against too hastily applying to the future lessons from the past. The weak point of the Turkish defence was the absence of field guns, and such conditions cannot be expected again. Had there been at V Beach one field-gun, as carefully emplaced as the Maxims, the *River Clyde* scheme would have broken down indeed. But let us note that if the *River Clyde* had had a gun, her value would surely have been more than quadrupled.

To the gallantry of the soldiers in this episode let us bare our heads, and to that of the sailors likewise. The latter must have been largely inspired by the magnificent example of the Commander who, having conceived the idea, gave it birth with such terrifying labour, so that it lives now, and for ever must endure, a shining page in the chronicles of the world's most gallant deeds.

Refer Book Reviews—one on "Smoke On The Horizon," page 76.

## NAVY MUTUAL AID AFFAIRS

There are approximately 620 of the 1,023 Marine officers who are members of the Association.

Since 1930 the beneficiaries of deceased Marine officers have been paid \$251,653.59. In 1930 there were seven (7) deaths (\$54,306.73); in 1931, eleven (11) deaths (\$85,829.35); in 1932, six (6) deaths (\$47,742.84); and in 1934 to date, there have been two (2) deaths (\$15,988.52).

It is with a feeling of great satisfaction that members can look back upon the growth of their Association, since Admiral Cowie assumed the duties of Secretary and Treasurer in 1920:

	December 1920	May 1934
Membership .....	\$ 1,318.00	\$ 6,724.00
Total of on assessment .....	4,142.88	16,902.75
Amount of benefit paid .....	4,076.88	7,500.00
Reserve fund .....	None	1,610,327.96
Total assets .....	65,757.22	2,480,874.67

In 1920 the actual cost was one full assessment for each death. During 1933, although we had fifty-eight (58) deaths, the actual net cost to each member was but twenty-four (24) assessments—less than one-half

( $\frac{1}{2}$ ) an assessment for each death. Members were required to pay forty-five (45) assessments for 1933, therefore, members had a savings of twenty-one (21) assessments for the year. This savings accrues from year to year, increasing the amount to be paid the beneficiaries over and above the \$7,500.00 benefit. The largest benefit paid so far was \$8,724.28.

The assistance rendered the dependents of deceased members is of inestimable value at a time when most needed. Immediately upon notice of a member's death the total benefit of over \$7,500.00 is wired to the named beneficiary. All claims against the Government, such as Arrears of Pay, Six Months' Gratuity, Pension, and Government Insurance, are prepared and followed up until satisfactorily settled. Assistance is also rendered in the collection of any and all outside insurance. This is all done without any cost or trouble to those left behind.

The age limit is thirty-five (35) years, and age is determined by deducting the year in which born from the current year, ignoring month and date, therefore, all officers born in the year 1899 or subsequent thereto are eligible for membership.

—IT'S UP TO YOU—



# RIOT DUTY

## Some pertinent remarks on an ever likely emergency call

■ Military training is for the purpose of being successful in battle, but a broad interpretation should be applied to the word battle. A battle takes place when troops face a disorderly crowd or riotous mob as well as when they face the troops of a foreign country. The mere presence of troops at the scene of a disorder may be sufficient to defeat a mob but usually it will be necessary to use some force.

History has shown that troops, whose training for battle against the troops of foreign countries has been excellent, have been woefully lacking in any training for riot duty. This lack of training has been the direct cause of unnecessary loss of life and destruction of property.

Riot duty has always been very unpopular because military commanders feel that they are "placed between the devil and the deep blue sea." That is if they use force to handle the situation they will at the very least bring down much unfavorable criticism upon themselves and their branch of the service and if they don't use force the situation will get out of hand and they will not accomplish their mission. Usually they have no plan of action or idea as to what formations the troops should take to meet the situation, but hope to muddle through somehow. This lack of knowledge on the part of the commander and lack of training on the part of the troops will often result in the use of fire power when a small amount of shock power would be sufficient to handle the situation.

It is not my intention to go into a long discussion of mob psychology or to specify the proper troop formations to meet every contingency but there are some general principles for riot duty that should be known by every man in the military service and troop formations should be based on these principles.

These principles are as follows:

1. The Marine Corps units will not be called upon for riot duty until conditions have become so bad that they are beyond the power of local police to handle. Therefore small units such as a squad or section should not be employed separately until after the mob has been broken into smaller, isolated groups.

2. Troop formations should be such that when it is necessary to use force, it may be applied in ever increasing amounts. This increase of force echeloned in depth should be accomplished by the weapons employed rather than by numbers of men.

3. Unit formations should be at least double ranked so that they cannot be broken through.

4. A Marine who becomes separated from his organization is only as good as one member of the mob, is of practically no use in breaking up the mob and becomes an easy prey for the mob to do him bodily injury.

5. Shock power should be used to the limit before resorting to fire power. Public opinion rightly demands that fire power should only be used as a last resort.

6. A little positive force judiciously used in the be-

ginning will usually obviate the necessity for the use of a larger amount of force later.

The requirements of riot duty involve relatively little special preparation in drill but such special preparation is very important.

Special formations which will carry out the general principles outlined and by their use have proved efficacious are the wedge and the diagonal. The wedge is the basic formation for crowd tactics and should be thoroughly practiced in drill together with its modification, (i. e.), the diagonal.

The following specific instructions for the application of the wedge principle in drill are given:

The platoons, being in column of squads, the command is 1. Platoon Wedge, 2. March. At the command of execution, March, all men bring their pieces to the position of Port Arms, the leading squad (less a automatic rifleman) execute squad half right and when number 4, front rank, arrives on the new line, they all face to the original front in marching. The automatic rifleman marches at the rear left flank of his squad.

(See diagram A.) Diagram "A" Showing Leading Squad.





Diagram "B" Showing Leading Section Forming Right Side of Wedge. S.L.—Section Leader.

The third squad (less automatic rifleman) executes squad half left and when number 1, front rank, arrives on the new line, all face to the original front in marching and double time into position opposite the first squad, so that number 1, front rank, is on the left of and abreast of number 4, front rank, of the first squad. The automatic rifleman marches at the rear right flank of his squad. (See diagram C.)




When your troops arrive on the scene of disorder do not let them stand around as if you were undecided as to when, where and how to use them. If possible make a reconnaissance of the situation before they arrive and when they arrive take your wedge formations and immediately advance on the disorderly crowd. If you are at all skeptical as to the value of these formations stand out in front of one of those wedges when it is advancing.



## A few observations on an interesting outdoor topic

In skeet one is confronted with the "outgoers" and "incomers." There are also targets thrown at various angles which the writer likes to call "sideswipers." Those who wish to pursue this sport further are referred to the sporting publications. Practically every shot fired at such targets involves a certain amount of "Lead." This is most obvious in the case of the "sideswiper" or target which flies directly across the shooter's front. However, it is equally important in the case of a target flying on a level plane at any distance above and away from the shooter's position. Thus if the target is thrown from a trap-house some twelve feet above the shooter he must hold his gun slightly below the target in order that the shot pattern will coincide with the target along the line of

For the benefit of those readers who are not familiar with the art of wing shooting, the writer will attempt to give a brief account of the essential requirements. See Illustration. In a coming article the



writer will refer to the utter necessity of gun-fit." Let us assume that you have a properly fitted weapon and that you are standing and facing in the direction of a target which is moving rapidly away from you; your gun is in your hand. (1) You look intently at the target or especially at that part of it which you wish to hit; (2) you raise the piece rapidly to the shoulder and find yourself looking along the top of the barrel or through the sights, at the same time hardly aware of them; (3) by instinct you know that you are on the target and you press the trigger. All of this can happen in a very short time, in fact of record in one-fourth of a second. Obviously coordination is required; basically it is the same coordination which is found in the expert golf, squash, tennis, or ping-pong player, etc. It involves timing and especially the synchronization of the eyes, body, hands, arms, fingers and nerves. The writer has witnessed many examples of this sort of shooting. Thus a man using an automatic shotgun fires the gun so as to eject the empty shell several feet into the air and scores a direct hit before the shell materially drops from its summit. It is no secret that "snap" shooting is very fascinating but it is only fair to say that this type of shooting does not lend itself to the type of coordination and avoidance of nervous tension so requisite in super-accurate rifle fire at stationary targets. This type of wing shooting especially involves the use of the "master" eye. Almost every one has such an eye. Ordinarily the right eye is the master eye. The accepted method of test is to take a piece of paper with a pin-hole in it, select a small object on a wall, look through the hole at the object with the left eye closed, then open the left eye; if you can still see the object your right eye is the master eye. Check on it by the reverse process, shutting the right eye, sighting with the left and then opening the closed eye to determine whether the object is still visible through the peephole. There is a split of authority as to the necessity of using two eyes on moving targets. The writer is very strongly in favor of both eyes and understands that a majority share this view. Certainly the target can be picked up more readily if both eyes are employed. With the receiver or aperture rear sight both eyes may be used effectively, permitting the shooter to concentrate on the target and the front sight. In a word you simply hang the front sight on the object and fire. With such equipment on a Springfield rifle the writer has witnessed successful attempts to fire upon and break outgoing clay pigeons; and while much more might be said on this subject attention will now be directed to the shooting of wild birds with the service rifle.

In another article the writer suggested that an improved stock and aperture sights were essential, especially for this type of shooting. The writer has for some time been interested in the possibility of hitting wild ducks, crows, etc., with such a rifle. The writer has already witnessed the "brutal destruction" by such an instrument as the Springfield Sporter calibre .30 of upwards of fifty wild ducks, especially shell-drakes which are considered an obnoxious species, as well as several crows, hawks and other like birds, all of which were hit in the process of flying. The success of such operations is a combination of some skill and much luck. The writer has witnessed the expenditure of at least one bandolier without a single hit, though the shots were fired at birds flying from all angles and at all distances up to two hundred yards. From a sporting standpoint, if the reader ever has an

opportunity, he is urged to try this as it is a lot of fun, quite humane, and not conducive to slaughter. As regards a flying duck there is a lot of available air to protect him from a .30 calibre bullet. From this sort of shooting which the writer has witnessed it appears that the most successful attempts have been those made upon ducks flying away from the shooter, or at a slight angle. A few birds were shot directly at right angles and several which approached the shooter, passing overhead. Many vain bullets were directed from an 18-foot canoe and as a result the writer has concluded that it is best to have one's "carriage" put in-abatage on the adjacent shore. On one occasion a duck was brought down at a distance of over 200 yards, flying high away from the shooter. It is significant that the front sight was dropped considerably underneath the duck, the bullet contacting the lower side of the neck and passing through the forward part of the head. It is significant to note therefore that the target was led considerably by holding underneath. An amusing illustration of this important factor arose in one case where the shooter was precariously perched on the thwart of a canoe. A small duck was passing overhead and the shooter attempted to fire before it went by his position. In attempting to follow the duck with his rifle he lost his balance and as he was falling backwards into the bottom of the canoe pulled the trigger. The loss of balance caused the barrel to move appreciably ahead of the rapidly moving target and the gunner had this "picture" of lead in his eyes at the moment he fired. The duck was hit in the head and struck the water close by the canoe. By way of digression the writer cannot refrain from recalling with amusement that another member of the party that day happened to connect with a small bird, flying near the canoe, which is commonly known as a sand-piper. The "killer" was using a .22 calibre Colt automatic pistol. This episode utterly unnerved several members of the party using shotguns. It is hardly necessary to point out that in using the rifle in this kind of shooting it must be very accurately sighted-in, preferably at 100 yards. The high front-sight on the service rifle causes some difficulty on those occasions when the ducks are flying closer, thus at short ranges, that is, in the 30 or 40-yard area a rifle sighted for longer ranges tends to shoot a bit low. Thus with small objects tossed in the air the writer has found that one who uses a service sporter for such practice must raise the rear sight, or rather receiver sight, approximately ten "minutes." The writer has witnessed many other interesting incidents in the pursuit of wild birds in this manner. For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is most relevant to point out that the most important factors necessary to bring about success are lead and "follow-through." The gun must be ahead of the target at all times and must be kept moving at the same rate, even after the piece has been fired. With regard to the exact amount of lead it is rather difficult to present any figures; as a rough estimate it is suggested that the average flying duck requires about a four to five-foot lead when passing across the shooter's front at a distance of 60 to 75 yards. The whole problem is fundamentally similar to skeet or other forms of trap-shooting.

Before passing to the specific problem of anti-aircraft fire, the writer wishes to emphasize the necessity of proper "gun-handling" and coordination of the body. If one is standing one should always face a point appreciably ahead of the target so as to allow the free



swing of the whole body from the knees up. The writer believes that bending of the knees materially aids the shooter in attaining this necessary "cooperation" of the body. If the target is flying at the shooter, passing overhead, he should develop a very free "back-swing," again utilizing the whole movement of the body from the knees up. The speed with which the body may be swung is of the utmost importance in maintaining lead and "follow-through." It is really the same kind of "follow-through," with different applications, that is found in the expert tennis player or golfer. Undue emphasis cannot be placed upon the rule that one must never "stop his gun." The writer recalls an occasion when shot-gunners were attempting to break clay pigeons while facing the trap-house at a distance of less than ten yards. It was observed that the follow-through was so pronounced that the shooter on most occasions practically fell over backwards, yet the targets were broken before they had passed the vertical point. It is hardly necessary to point out that for this type of shooting as well as every other "dry-practice" on moving objects is essential in attaining proper gun-handling and form. Proper training for any type of wing-shooting, as well as for any other kind of sport requiring coordination necessitates proper coaching, at least on the fundamentals. It is rather difficult to do this sort of thing on a "correspondence school" basis. Having all of the preceding observations in mind attention will now be turned to the specific problem at hand.

In Volume 18, No. 3 of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, November 19, '33 issue there appeared a very interesting article by Colonel William P. Upshur, U.S.M.C., entitled "The Waziristan Campaign," page 56. At page 58 it is said: "There was no hostile anti-aircraft defense in Waziristan, but low flying airplanes were by no means immune. Pathan marksmanship was good against an airplane flying below 2,500 feet. Three machines were shot down by Mahsud rifle fire at Atnai Tangri, and bullet holes were constantly found in airplanes returning from low flying missions." In this connection such a commentary is of great significance. If the Mahsuds can do it, so can the Marines. It would seem that a dive-bombing plane should require very slight lead if any. Concerted accurate volleys from ground troops should be reasonably effective at lower altitudes. At least the rifle should have the same effective range as the light machine gun—and if accurately directed should be comparatively economical. "Blazing away" is not the proper method either from the standpoint of inflicting casualties or conserving ammunition. If the writer may paraphrase one of the nine principles of war, "economy of ammunition (force)" should be given due consideration. Apparently ground-strafters approach the target at an angle, firing as they approach, and after passing return to higher altitudes. If the rifleman fails to score on the approach at least he surely has a golden opportunity to hit the plane as it goes away from his position. Now if the plane going away rises abruptly it will be obviously necessary to shoot somewhat above the target. This is simply a question of angles and ordinary judgment. The fire should be deliberate yet the rifleman should "get in action" rapidly, putting to practice those principles which have been suggested above. The chief question is that of the angle at which the plane is flying, but it is submitted that effective fire cannot be maintained by riflemen who have had little or no training or instruction in the fundamentals of wing-shooting. Speed is

vital and one does not acquire this sort of "quick coordination" merely by reading about it. Of course rapid manipulation of the bolt may be acquired at the range. Units in the future will be equipped with the new Garand semi-automatic which if used properly and economically will materially increase the ground-strafters' flying hazard. Obviously the use of tracer ammunition will be of great aid in connection with this arm. The tracer will at least prove the necessity of lead and follow-through.

Numerous collateral matters suggest themselves here. One may learn much from the aviators as to the vulnerable and mortal areas to be sought as a target on the average pursuit plane. Those who are mathematically inclined are urged to work out the amount of lead necessary on various airplanes flying at various angles and at various distances from the ground, using the elapsed time of flight of the calibre .30 M 1 as a basis. This will at least give the rifleman a general idea as to where he should hold on the target. This is somewhat of a new problem and the writer is aware that the proposition that infantry should devote some attention to wing-shooting problems may not meet with general approval for many obvious reasons, not the least of which is impracticability. Nevertheless, it is submitted that this kind of air craft defense necessitates some such training. Attention is directed again to the article cited above, page 60: "It was found absolutely necessary for all combat troops to have a very high standard of individual training. Self confidence and skill at arms are the first essentials on which any sound method of training for frontier fighting should be based." It is further submitted that some degree of skill in shooting moving targets would be of great value in other connections, since it appears that more and more military problems involve rapidly moving targets on land as well as in air.

From a practical standpoint the .22 calibre Springfield used in training lends itself admirably to this type of practice. Valuable and inexpensive training on moving targets might very well be developed with this arm. However, the writer shuns any dogmatic assertions of this kind in a controversial field, especially since it is not apparent that any active steps have been taken in this direction. This paper has therefore been confined to the mere possibilities, and to a drawing of analogies from the sporting field. Since this has been only a rather general survey specific conclusions are perhaps unnecessary. Those who are interested in skeet shooting may obtain complete information by writing to the National Skeet Association, 108 Massachusetts Ave., Boston. The reader is assured that all the anecdotes mentioned herein actually occurred in the presence of reliable and available witnesses. Attention is also directed to an interesting account of the Lewis & Clark expedition in an article in *The American Rifleman* for February, 1934, which contains an extract from Clark's diary to the effect that Clark "killed a crane flying—some geese killed—Labiche killed 3 geese flying." On this basis one may almost believe that duck shooting episode in Cooper's "Deer-slayer." In connection with the mechanical advantages of the aperture sight from an optical standpoint the same issue contains an interesting article by E. Naramore.

Certainly this subject has unlimited possibilities. The rifle still has military importance; often it is available when no other arm is at hand. It is perhaps our most

(Continued on page 71)



# EDITORIALS

## Navy Department Reorganization Board

■ In late March the Report of the Board on the Reorganization of the Navy Department was made known to the service. It made some interesting observations and recommendations upon the future needs of all the Bureaus composing the Department. Those touching upon Marine Corps affairs are recited as a matter of general information to the members of the Association and Gazette readers.

(a) It has been customary for individual members of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department to make inspections, in most cases of our smaller barracks. This method of making annual inspections was economical and expeditious, but the Board of Reorganization says that this system of inspecting our shore establishments should be changed and that a board of marine officers—not necessarily all members of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department but members from Operations and Training, likewise the Quartermaster's Department and Paymaster's Department—should conduct the inspection concurrently and upon a schedule fixed by the Major General Commandant. This plan seems to parallel the method of inspecting ships of the Fleet—Admiral's Inspection.

(b) The present authorized officer strength of the Corps is 1,093 but our present appropriated strength is 1,023. This Board recommends that our peace-time officer strength be reduced to 991 by the removal of certain officers below the rank of colonel who are not physically "up to snuff," replacing them by a proportionate distribution through the various ranks and by a uniform influx into the lowest ranks. The total number of officers recommended for accomplishing of the initial mobilization plan for an overseas expedition and immediately available is 2,069. Of this figure 1,078 are to be pulled over from the retired and reserve lists and placed on active duty. A few temporary commissions are to be given to noncommissioned officers.

(c) It believes also that the number of enlisted men needed for mobilization providing for First Expeditionary Force, Training Establishments, Schools, etc. and reduced strength other activities is 38,356. The regular Marine Corps and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve reaches 24,015 in enlisted strength, which is 14,341 short of the number needed for the initial mobili-

zation. The Fleet Marine Corps Reserve can be counted upon for 8,205 men.

This lifts the total strength available but it is still insufficient, and must be augmented further by recruits.

Finally, the Board recommends that the number of enlisted personnel be not permitted to fall below 75 per cent of the number to provide complete expeditionary units in the 1934 Operating Plan, and in addition to maintain other normal activities. This minimum number is 17,000. Congress has been asked through legislative channels for an increase in personnel to bring our strength to this figure. Congress approved the measure, and recruiting for these men will start as of July first coming—upon which date the appropriations will be available to handle the extra thousand men involved.

The Board touched upon the question of the combination of the Paymaster's Department with the Quartermaster's Department in a favorable light. The immediate consolidation of these two departments under a common head is not anticipated.

The Board also expresses the opinion that the Chief of Naval Operations should supervise all military activities of the Naval Establishment and advise the Secretary of the Navy in regard thereto. In the past the Major General Commandant has been reporting direct to the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Now whether or not the opinion of the Board requires him to report via the Chief of Naval Operations is a matter of conjecture.

The observations and recommendations of the Board were approved by the President in March and consequently the Executive Authority exists—should the Secretary of the Navy desire to effect these provisions at his pleasure.

## Blue vs. Gray

■ Sounds like we are trying to renew an old family quarrel, but this is the name given the present Fleet Problem which is being rehearsed down among the West Indies. It is the first test for the Fleet Marine Force in which troops from both the base at San Diego and Quantico are participating. This opportunity will create many valuable lessons, as it will afford the commands a chance to work out the various phases of landing operations which have been studied in our schools. It will also be a chance to judge the present

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worth of our various caliber and type weapons and equipment.

Upon the completion of this problem about the last week in May, in all probability the various commands will return to their bases and the Fleet will proceed to New York, where it will be reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief.

## Board of Directors

■ The Constitution of the Marine Corps Association calls for a Board of Directors numbering twenty officers who are to be selected by the Board of Officers. This Board is charged with representing the Association and its organ the Gazette, in and near the locality in which they are stationed. Each one of these assignees has been notified in a special letter from the President of the Association. Each assignee has also been given written instruction as to the policy and administration of the Association. In the fore part of the Gazette is listed the full officership of the Association. Consequently, if there are any questions arising in regard to Association affairs, pick out the nearest

member of the Board of Directors and ask him to give you the answer.

The Secretary-Treasurer will be glad to answer questions not covered elsewhere.

## The Passing of G. O. 99

■ Over two decades ago this famous order was written. The standard ceremony lamenting its incoming was a farewell wet party at which the ship's silver service was draped in black crepe and the old drinking songs were lifted to the highest pitch—alike by the officers of the ward room and junior messes. Some smart wag added the following touching verse to the famous song, "The Armored Cruiser Squadron":

"Here's to G. O. 99—

That put the ban on beer and wine; a-n-d—  
Some people say it's very fine—  
For the Armored Cruiser Squadron."

But now that G. O. 244 has buried the old dry edict—and once again we can go into close harmony—we might fire a 21 gun salute to G. O. 244 and a 1 gun salute to G. O. 99.

## Pensions—(Widows and Dependents)

■ The laws and regulations relating to pensions have been so radically and so often changed during the past few years that it is difficult to furnish a summary in regard to them, but the following information is furnished members of the Marine Corps Association after a study of the laws, Executive Orders and Veterans' Regulations governing the payment of pensions.

The Act of March 20, 1933 (Economy Act) repealed all pension laws from the beginning of the Spanish American War, and the present rates of pension are established by Executive Orders and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, and by the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1935 (Public Bill No. 141, 73rd Congress).

### CIVIL WAR PENSIONS

All reduced by 10 per cent.

### OTHER PENSIONS

These rates are regardless of the rank of the deceased, provided death was a result of injury or disease incurred in active service:

#### FOR PEACE TIME SERVICE:

Widow but no child .....	\$22	
Widow and one child .....	30	
(with \$4 for each additional child)		
No widow but one child .....	15	
No widow but two children .....	22	(equally divided)
No widow but three children .....	30	(equally divided)
(with \$3 for each additional child; total amount to be equally divided)		
Dependent mother or father .....	15	
(or both) .....	11	(each)

The total pension payable shall not exceed \$56 monthly, regardless of the number of dependents.

#### FOR WAR TIME SERVICE:

Widow but no child .....	\$30
Widow and one child .....	40
(with \$6 for each additional child)	

No widow but one child .....	20	
No widow but two children .....	30	(equally divided)
No widow but three children .....	40	(equally divided)
(with \$5 for each additional child; total amount to be equally divided)		
Dependent mother or father .....	20	
(or both) .....	15	

The total pension payable shall not exceed \$75 monthly, regardless of the number of dependents.

No provision for any increase in pension for aviation or submarine deaths.

Dependents of those on retired lists are not entitled to pension unless death is a *direct result* of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by *active service*.

#### FOR SPANISH WAR SERVICE (Including Boxer Rebellion and Philippine Insurrection):

Prior to the Act of March 20, these pensions were:

Widow .....	\$30
Each child until 16 .....	6

These pensions were considerably reduced by the Act of March 20, 1933, but the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1935, reenacts all laws in effect on March 19, 1933 granting benefits to veterans of the Spanish-American War, including the Boxer Rebellion and the Philippine Insurrection. This Act however, restricts the amounts payable to 75 per cent of the prior rate, and provides that payments shall not be made to persons with sufficient income to pay a Federal income tax.

### THE ABOVE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE AT ANY TIME

Applications for pensions should always be made directly to the Director of Pensions, Veterans' Administration, Washington, D. C. The necessary blanks and all information required in connection with claims for pensions will be furnished by that office.

## JUNGLE WARFARE WEAPONS

### A fine article on a pertinent topic

■ The Marine Corps has long been proud of its two cardinal virtues, Flexibility and Mobility, and well it may as it is these two characteristics more than any others that enable it to efficiently accomplish its many odd jobs in peace time—and perhaps more important ones in time of war. It naturally follows that there is a constant effort on the part of the Marines to reduce the weight of their impediments without reducing their combat effectiveness. Excluding artillery, the Stokes Mortar is doubtless the hardest smashing weapon normally employed by Marines; and its H.E. shell, in addition to its effective area (equal to a light artillery shell), possesses a commanding crash which has a definite morale effect against irregulars. But it is heavy and time is necessary for its emplacement, to say nothing of the difficulty of ammunition supply, so patrol leaders reluctantly leave it behind when they start out looking for trouble.

The following is a description of a weapon closely related to the 3-inch mortar but firing a smaller projectile at an increased rate and having flexibility and mobility equal to the well known B.A.R.

Captain L. M. McBride, widely known in Chemical Warfare circles as an inventor, was called upon several years ago to develop a weapon suitable for laying smoke screens ahead of light tanks. The very successful result of his efforts was a 2-inch mortar along the lines of the Stokes. Later he removed the weapon from its tank mount and experimented with it as a hand weapon and it is now improved and wholly suitable as a light infantry weapon easily handled by one man. It is believed that this weapon will prove of special interest to Marine officers.

The weapon is quite simple as will be seen from Fig. 1. The barrel is turned from seamless steel tubing, tapered in sections to give a maximum of strength where required with a minimum of weight. The rear is closed by a threaded base cap carrying a fixed firing pin (this is the only spare part necessary). A perforated hand slide, mounted on the barrel, prevents recoil shock from being transmitted to the hand of the firer and protects the hand from heat in continued firing. A loading lip is provided at the muzzle to facilitate rapid centering of the projectile in loading. The weapon is carried with a sling. A light base plate is provided for firing in soft soil, but is not required at all in firm soil or when firing the lighter projectiles. The method of carrying the mortar and ammunition is shown in Fig. 1. The method of firing is shown in Fig. 2.



Figure 1



Figure 2



## WHAT THE MORTAR FIRES

(1) **COMBUSTION TYPE SHELL.** The Mortar Shell shown in Fig. 3 is an entirely new type of projectile construction developed by Captain McBride. Manufacturing and loading methods have been simplified to a minimum, thereby making possible an economical ammunition of this nature. The Shell is as free from complicating features as the Mortar itself. There is nothing to be done to this shell to prepare it for firing; all that is necessary is to drop it, bottom end down, into the Mortar. The propelling charge is fixed and self-contained in a small compartment in the base of the shell, primed, ready to fire. There are no mechanical devices, pins, springs, or parts to rust or hang up. The functioning of the shell upon impact is accomplished automatically, safely and surely by means of ignition from the propelling charge whereby the combustion mixture of Smoke, Tear Gas or other material is started and the smoke or fumes issue from the opening in the base for a period of from one to four minutes, depending upon the type of shell and method of loading. This shell does not burst on impact, therefore, no fragments. The small shell on the right in Fig. 3 also gives a view of the simple construction of the base. The shell filling, propelling charge, and primer are entirely water-proofed. These two standard sizes may be filled with a Screening or Toxic Smoke or Tear Gas.

(2) **BURSTING TYPE SHELL.** This type of shell, Fig. 4, is constructed in general on the same principle as that above described. The propelling charge is fixed, self-contained in the base, primed, ready to fire. The bursting of the shell is accomplished in either of two ways: (a) By an impact fuze of the "allway" type of small size, designed for safety and surety of action. This fuze is identical in principle to the "allway" percussion fuze used in Stokes Mortar ammunition, but is much smaller. In firing this shell it is necessary to first pull the fuze safety pin; however, it has certain advantages where an instantaneous burst upon impact is desired. Otherwise the method of firing is the same as described for the combustion type. (b) By a time fuze contained within the shell body and ignited by the propelling charge. The time of burning of the fuze element is predetermined for the maximum time of flight and is fixed, the shell bursting a few seconds after impact. The external appearance of a shell fitted with this type of fuze is identical with that of the combustion type shown in Fig. 5, and is fired in the same manner. This type of shell is standardized in one size only and is loaded with certain types of Smoke, Tear Gas in solid form, or Incendiaries. It is burst by a detonator or small powder charge, but produces few, if any, fragments. The bursting charge is only sufficient to open the shell and disperse the contents.

(3) **EXPLOSIVE TYPE SHELL.** This type of shell has a serrated cast-iron body. The propelling charge is fixed, self-contained in the base, primed, ready to fire. The shell is loaded with either High explosive, such as TNT or Tetryl, or with a Low Explosive such as E. C. Powder. The former gives a high degree of fragmentation and produces a severe shock, while the latter gives nearly equal fragmentation

but has less shocking power. The Low Explosive shell does not require a detonator or other sensitive initiator or booster and is, therefore, more safe to handle. Either type of fuze, time or percussion, as described above may be used with either the High or Low Explosive shell as desired. The percussion fuze is of a "bore-safe" type which insures against a premature explosion in the bore of the mortar. This shell is fired as described above and is standardized in one size only.

The volume and screening power of smoke that can be placed with the 2-inch Mortar is splendid. A cloud can be produced with only three 2¼ pound shells fired from the Mortar at a range of 500 yards.

This weapon has undergone extensive tests and a rate of fire of 35 rounds per minute has been found to be not excessive. From two to three times as much material can be fired three times as far and seven times as fast as the .30 caliber rifle grenade. The 2-inch Hand Mortar does not require specially trained men to handle it, although a reasonable amount of practice is desirable as with any other weapon. It can be taken anywhere a man can go with a rifle. There are no moving parts to jam or break; there is nothing to oil or clean, except an occasional wiping out of the Mortar's smooth bore. Dirt, mud, sand, or rust will not stop its functioning. There is nothing to install; no emplacement to prepare before going into action. Not only can it be immediately put into action but its fire or position can be instantly shifted to meet rapidly changing situations. It can be fired from behind complete cover and, due to its high angle of fall, it can be taken into positions inaccessible to other weapons and drop projectiles behind enemy protection.

At present this weapon is not being used by any branch of the Service, although many officers have shown an interest in it. The Infantry has no particular use for it at this time. It would seem that this weapon is ideally suited to Marine Corps needs, especially in bush wars, meeting the requirements of Mobility and Flexibility in every respect.

The following tables give weights and range zones:



Figure 3

## WEIGHTS IN POUND

Mortar		12½
Ammunition	1, 2, and	2¼
Ammunition carrier		2½
Base Plate		2½
Maximum load with 16 rounds		53½

## RANGE

Shell Weight	Range Zone	Minimum yds.	Maximum yds.
1 Lb.	Medium Range	25	250
	Long Range	75	500
	Extreme Range	100	750
2 Lb.	Medium Range	50	250
	Long Range	75	500
	Extreme Range	100	700
2¼ Lb.	Extreme Range Only	100	600

NOTE: The Propellant Charge for various types of shells is fixed in factory loading in order to give definite ranges. This is to provide a ready-to-fire shell for any purpose without the necessity of making preliminary determination and adjustments of powder charges in the field. It is to be kept in mind that the principal means of varying the range is by changing the elevation.

## CHEMICALS

■ Guerrilla warfare is a natural result of the extension of civilized influence into the more remote corners of the earth; and every country, whose national policies have led it into contact with savage or semi-civilized peoples, has found it necessary to develop some special means of combating local irregulars or else to abandon the particular project in question.

In 74 B. C., Licinius Crassus as praetor of Rome defeated the insurgent gladiators under Spartacus after other Roman generals had failed, but found the tribes of wild and mountainous Parthia a bit too clever for him in 53 B. C.

For a more nearly modern example, Steele (American Campaigns) says of General Braddock in the French and Indian War, "Braddock marched his command to Fort Cumberland where his troops, all told, numbered some 2,200." He had remarked to Benjamin Franklin, "I shall hardly need to stop more than three or four days at Fort Duquesne; then I shall march on to Niagara, and from there to Frontenac." He was a veteran British soldier and had hardly less contempt for provincial troops than he had for the Indian allies of the French. He paid little heed to the advice of Colonel Washington, who accompanied his expedition as aide-de-camp. With 1,373 picked men, he moved against Fort Duquesne. On crossing the Monongahela River, about ten miles from the fort, without a single scout to give warning, he fell into an ambush set for him by the French and Indians; and in the dense forests, his command was cut to pieces and routed.

"This happened on the 9th of July, 1755. Out of eighty-six British officers, sixty-three were killed or disabled, Braddock being mortally wounded; and only 459 of the rank and file came off unhurt. On the other

side, only sixteen white men, and about thirty-five Indians, were killed or wounded."

Henri Christophe was an African slave who figured prominently in the negro insurrection of 1801 against the French, at that time in possession of Haiti, and so took advantage of the island's wild terrain that by 1803 the French veterans of continental wars were compelled to evacuate Haiti once and for all. Here guerrilla warfare won Haiti its independence from France; and here, a century later, the Marines would encounter these same "bush" tactics.

The problem of small wars is quite old, is common to all countries whose influence extends beyond their own frontiers, and will probably continue to vex military commanders until the Dove of Peace heralds the Pacifists' Utopia. Those countries concerned have some component of their armed forces who specialize in this type of operation; Britain and the U. S. depend largely on their Marines (a type of "web-footed" soldier peculiar to those countries), France looks to her efficient Foreign Legion to pacify the tribes of northern Africa, and almost every regular army is confronted with this problem at one time or another. Since the War with Tripoli, American Marines have landed to protect U. S. lives and property on about 75 occasions and have engaged in combat with savage or semi-civilized peoples in about 60 skirmishes of various degrees. About half of the aforementioned landings have been in "banana wars" (Central America and the West Indies) and so have borne more or less directly on the Monroe Doctrine. If the Monroe Doctrine continues a cardinal point in our foreign policy, it is not difficult to foresee more "banana wars" and so we shall consider the Nicaraguan operations as typical in this discussion.

Granting that the small war is a permanent problem, it is the purpose of this discussion to show that chemical agents should be more extensively used in this type of operation.

Specific examples will best serve to illustrate the points in question. On 27 February, 1928, a pack train under the command of Lt. E. F. O'Day, USMC, left Yali, Nicaragua, for Estili, Nicaragua, at 8:15 a. m. The train consisted of one officer, 35 Marines, 1 Pharmacist's Mate (Medical Corps), 22 native "muleros" and 95 animals. Near a small town called Bromaderos, about half way between Yali and Condega, the column was ambushed by bandits. The column had just been closed up and was proceeding west entering the flat ground between two hill masses when it was fired upon simultaneously from front, rear and along its entire right flank. The firing commenced at about 1:30 p. m. and lasted until about 8:30 p. m. the same date when it subsided into intermittent haffassing fire throughout the night. Lt. O'Day estimates that the bandits employed a minimum of 4 machine guns and about 600 rifles. The bandits withheld fire until the marine column was within distances from them varying from 75 to 200 yards. The marines fell back to a ridge on the south side of the trail, leaving 3 dead where they had fallen on the first burst of fire. This position they maintained throughout the fight against two attacks in which the bandits advanced in skirmish lines using their machine guns as a base of fire. The bodies of the dead marines were mutilated with machetes as the skirmish lines passed them. Three marines were killed



in action on the 27th and two died the following day from wounds received; there were eight other wounded. One marine made a successful get-away at the beginning of the action and notified Captain W. K. MacNulty, USMC., whom he met near Daraili. Captain MacNulty arrived at about 2:30 a. m., 28 February, with a relief column of 85 marines and two officers in addition to himself. By 8:20 a. m., he had driven the bandits from their positions. He estimated that the bandits numbered about 200, many having left during the night. Of the bandit personnel, no casualties remained, although both officers estimated that they must have had a considerable number. Seven dead horses of the bandits were found on the field the next day. These are essentially the facts given by Captain MacNulty and Lt. O'Day in their official reports.

Bromaderos remained the worst disaster to befall the Marines in Nicaragua until New Year's Day, 1931. On that day the Marines at Ocotal, the headquarters of the Northern Area, sent out a patrol of 10 men with a sergeant in charge with the uninteresting mission of repairing a telephone line. The road lay through a "quiet" area, nothing exciting having happened there in many months; and as Nicaraguan trails go, it was a broad highway. So 10 men with a noncommissioned officer in charge were sufficiently strong; but the setting sun was to see a powerful combat patrol driving their animals beyond their endurance in a vain attempt to rescue their comrades on that same road. Leaving Ocotal, the nearest friendly troops were at Apali, about 15 miles as the crow flies and much more over mountain trails, so the wire was craftily cut about midway between. Travelling eastward over this trail, as you approach the Rio Achuapa, the road passes over a low saddle flanked by steep rugged knolls covered with scrubby underbrush; just before reaching this saddle, the road passes for several hundred yards over a flat and barren expanse which affords neither cover nor concealment. It does not immediately strike you as a likely ambush locality, but for many months following 1 January, 1931, the Catholic Guardia Nacional would make the Sign of the Cross when passing it. Just before reaching the saddle, the line patrol was fired upon from bandit positions on the two knolls. No cover being immediately available, the only alternative was to "flatten out" and return the fire. About two hours later, Lieutenant J. J. Tavern, USMC, arrived with a relief column to see the last remnants of the outlaws fade in all directions, leaving the marines where they had been initially "pinned to the ground," eight dead and two wounded. The dead had, as usual, been mutilated almost beyond recognition. Of the two wounded, one had been designated to make a get-away to return for help, but had been shot in the attempt; both wounded men were able to conceal themselves sufficiently to avoid discovery until the arrival of Lieutenant Tavern's column. An immediate search of the surrounding terrain revealed little beyond a considerable quantity of empty caliber .30 cartridges, bearing "F.A.-27" on their bases; a source of considerable perplexity to the marines. About a week later, the writer was present in San Juan de Telpaneca when the Guardia of that town questioned a prisoner who admitted having been in the Achuapa contact. He stated that the bandits were under the leadership of

Miguel Orteza and that he had present about 60 men armed with rifles and auto rifles, and that there were about 40 additional men armed only with machetes. He refused to give additional information of value, except that the fight lasted for a considerable length of time. The two wounded marines were unable to give additional information, having been unconscious most of the time.

These two contacts were chosen as typical of operations in Central America and a study of them shows certain characteristics common to most of them. In the first place, this guerrilla warfare usually takes place in the most difficult kind of terrain and the usual type of action is an ambush in which overwhelming numbers lay a trap at some terrain feature which will put the defender at the greatest disadvantage (and there are innumerable such localities). One who is ambushed may safely assume that his assailant outnumbered him about 10 to 1. The professional bandits roam the country and take what they want, and when there is anything "in the air" they can always count on their ranks being temporarily swelled by certain elements of the local population, either from necessity or choice. Living on the country, their mobility is great, and when threatened they scatter in all directions to reassemble at a predetermined rendezvous. Finding them individually, it is almost impossible to distinguish them from the "peaceful citizens." Their armament varies, but a large part of it is generally as powerful as ours and they frequently possess a considerable number of auto-rifles (Thompson Sub-Machine Guns being almost as popular here as in Chicago!) or light machine guns; whatever weapon they adopt will have great mobility. Improvised bombs and, less frequently, grenades will be found among their equipment. But the real "fly in the ointment" is their intelligence system, the "grapevine telegraph," and it is no exaggeration to say that there is no information of military value about you which they do not know or will soon find out. On the other hand, your information is either very meagre or misleading. Under these conditions, the initiative lies largely with the irregulars; if he does not wish to be located, finding him is very difficult indeed. To operate against him successfully, one must adopt his methods as nearly as possible and proceed against him with small mobile groups; a large column can accomplish very little. Knowing of a patrol in the field and having decided to destroy it, he will plan an ambush where he is most likely to succeed. Generally his ambush will have these features: be surrounded by high ground offering cover and concealment for his troops, but none for ours; it will offer a good means of escape in case his plan doesn't work out; frequently he will sight his machine gun to enfilade the trail at his chosen position. More likely than not he is planning a murder rather than a fight, and will melt away as mysteriously as he appeared if there is any doubt as to his fire superiority, only to pop up unexpectedly some where else. If he is successful, his tactics will lead to a complete and brutal annihilation.

In Nicaragua the Marine patrols were reduced in size to match his mobility and strengthened in fire power, by the addition of automatic weapons, to match his superior numbers. Bandit groups suspected or located within areas were attacked with parallel or converg-

ing columns. If the groups could not be definitely located, they could be kept on the move by active patrolling; but at the best, this is only a neutralizing expedient. Being of a nomadic nature, locating and destroying his temporary bases or driving him from an area is not a serious matter to him; in fact, it will probably "boomerang" to work a hardship on the law-abiding population of some other neighboring locality. *In operations of this kind, success may be looked for only when the irregulars or, more especially, their leaders are killed or captured.*

In view of these facts, it would seem that the solution of the problem lies in the more extensive use of chemical weapons in these small wars. Contact once having been established, it is not probable that the bandits would have any effective defense against chemical agents. Chemicals would permeate areas defiled from rifle fire, or where no targets were visible. Further, these areas would be neutralized over longer periods of time, thus increasing the time factor in ammunition allowance.

Granting tactical value of chemical weapons, two more phases of the problem immediately present themselves. The first is political; any suggested use of chemical agents usually results in a storm of popular protest on the grounds that they are inhumane, and there have been decided efforts to prohibit the use of such agents in warfare. "A treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan in the relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare was signed at Washington, D. C., on February 6, 1922. The Senate advised and consented to the ratification of this treaty on March 29, 1922. This treaty was to take effect on the deposit of all ratifications at Washington. The ratifications have not been deposited at Washington and the treaty is not in effect." (Soule and McCauley—"International Law.") On February 7, 1923, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua agreed to "consider that the use in warfare of asphyxiating gases, poisons, or similar substances, as well as analogous liquids, materials, or devices, is contrary to humanitarian principles, and to international law, and obligate themselves by the present convention not to use said substances in time of war." (Marine Corps Gazette—August 1933). In 1923, at the Fifth International Conference of American States, held at Santiago, Chile, the United States and all Central and South American countries, except Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, and Peru, agreed not to use poisonous gases in warfare. (Marine Corps Gazette—August 1933).

Granting that the use of chemicals is outlawed in the western hemisphere, guerrilla bands with which we are concerned can hardly be accorded the status of recognized belligerents, and they themselves certainly observe neither rules of land warfare nor humanitarian principles.

The remaining objection then is one of popular opinion based on human suffering. From that viewpoint, the following extract is quoted from an article by Major B. A. Brackenbury, C.W.S., USA, which appeared in "Chemical Warfare," March 1921:

"In the Meuse-Argonne, the longest and hardest fought battle the American troops participated in, the enemy used a relatively small amount of gas. He had

previously used his available supply against other sectors and had practically none on hand in the beginning to use against the Americans.

"In spite of these conditions, the Surgeon General in his annual report for 1920, shows that almost one man out of every three that entered the hospitals of the American Expeditionary Force as a battle casualty, was suffering from enemy gas.

"The Surgeon General's report shows that, including the Marines and attached naval personnel not included in his report but added herein, the total American wounded admitted to hospitals was 232,839, of which 15,482 died of their injuries. In addition, 35,699 are reported to have been killed on the field of battle. Thus the total deaths from all battle causes suffered by the American Expeditionary Force was 51,181.

"Including the Marines and attached naval personnel, the enemy gas caused 72,056 casualties of which 1,271 died. In other words, approximately one man out of every three that entered the A.E.F. hospitals on account of battle wounds was suffering from gas. However, of all those that had been gassed, less than 2 men out of each 100 died; while, on the other hand, out of 160,783 casualties from all other battle causes than gas, more than 9 per 100 died. (If the 35,699 who were killed on the battlefield are included, more than 25 in every 100 died.) Of those that were gassed, not including the Marines, 4 remained in hospitals December 31, 1919, and only 2,556 had been discharged on account of disability, while of those wounded from other causes than gas, not including Marines, 5,768 were being treated in hospitals December 31, 1919, and 20,588 had been discharged as unfit for military duty. Including those receiving treatment in hospitals December 31, 1919, there were over 10,000 suffering from loss of legs, arms, sight or other permanent injuries. . . . as far as is known, chemicals used against the American Army caused few if any deaths on the field of battle." (See Fig. 4.)

Whatever the popular reaction to the use of lethal gases, certainly the use of lacrimators and toxic smokes, whose effect is temporary, could not be contested on humanitarian grounds. Tear gas is a common weapon used by the police against our own people in civil disturbances. Why are unprincipled guerrillas entitled to gentler treatment? Finally, even old ladies' sewing circles would hardly object to the use of screening smoke as a protective measure.

The second question which arises is technical, "What chemicals will we use and how shall we project them?" Of the lethal gases, Phosgene is the most deadly, while Mustard Gas is rated highest in general casualty producing effects; due to its availability, cheapness, and ease of handling, the latter is also rated highest in general importance. Phosgene seeks low areas (a characteristic which makes it undesirable for use by patrols) and is nonpersistent; Mustard gas will neutralize areas anywhere from a day to a week, depending upon wind, temperature, and terrain. Of the lacrimators, CN (Chloracetophenone) is probably best known and is the most effective tear gas available at this time. This agent is at present obtainable in rifle and hand grenades easily carried by foot troops. Of the toxic smokes, DM (Adamsite) is the most important and an unprotected man would be intensely sick for several



hours after being subjected to it, but it is unlikely if fatalities would result from concentrations met in the field. DM is at present issued in no form to be used by lightly equipped troops, except in candles; it could, however, be manufactured in grenade form. Of the screening smokes, White Phosphorus is the most effective and, in addition to its screening qualities, it possesses considerable casualty and incendiary effect. It is available in grenade form.

Weapons best adapted to chemical projection by infantry are: the 3" trench mortar, rifle grenades, hand grenades, and candles. The 3" mortar was tried in Nicaragua with H.E. Shell, but fell into disuse because of its limited mobility; it did, however, remain a popular weapon for defense of outposts. Hand grenades and the V.B. explosive rifle grenades proved quite suitable and were extensively used throughout the campaign both by the Marines and the native Guardia Nacional. Candles were not used. Although they have the necessary mobility, their range is short and they depend upon a favorable wind for their effectiveness. Candles could be used for screening smokes, but grenades would be more desirable for reasons which will be discussed later. In addition to the above-mentioned weapons, there has been developed and tested by Captain L. M. McBride, C.W.S., a 2" hand-mortar weigh-

ing 12½ pounds which gives it sufficient mobility to be carried by a small patrol. This weapon has ranges from 25 to seven hundred yards, which is ample for all ambush situations, and fires all types of chemical projectiles now made in grenade and candle form, and also fragmentation projectiles. Any projectile may be furnished with either time or percussion fuze. The weights of the chemical shells are about twice those of corresponding chemical grenades and would, of course, neutralize correspondingly larger areas. It is the writer's experience that the Browning Automatic Rifle was probably the most popular weapon used by the Marines in Nicaragua on patrol duty. Its weight is 15½ pounds and a loaded magazine for it weighs about 1½ pounds. The 2" hand mortar weighs 12½ pounds and its projectiles weigh either 1 or 2½ pounds, so that its mobility with 6 or 8 rounds of ammunition is about equal to that of the auto rifle. In a patrol of from 15 to 30 men, which is about the size generally used, additional ammunition could be distributed among other members of the patrol without burdening them unduly, especially if mounted. A 2½ pound projectile loaded with DM or CN, fired from this weapon, would immediately neutralize an area about 35 yards in diameter. It would seem then that this weapon is admirably suited to jungle warfare.

## A.E.F. DEATHS + CASUALTIES




Figure 4

As to protection for our own troops, the present type of gas mask is suitable for use in tropical climates for a year after it has been removed from its air-tight container, which is considerably longer than most equipment lasts in the tropics, and is not too heavy to prohibit its use. It would hardly be advisable to take masks for the animals as one never knows where the "front" is in a bush war and, once the situation develops, there is no time to mask animals. Screening smoke and tear gas would not affect them, and casualties resulting from the use of a toxic smoke would simply have to be accepted. Unless the prospects were very promising, most patrol leaders would be reluctant to use a chemical agent that would permanently disable their animals, and for that reason lethal gases probably would not be used on mounted patrols, if at all.

Success in small wars may be expected when the irregulars are either killed or captured. Let us now consider the problem from this viewpoint. The Rio del Norte forms the south boundary of Nueva Castile, an area recently torn by revolution and marauding bands. The New Orleans Fruit Company is thrown into panic by an excited native who has just come down the river with the news that Diablo Lopez pillaged San Fernando last night and is headed for the stores of the U. S. fruit company. Lopez is reputed to have 150 well armed bandits, a remnant of the revolutionary army, and follows his piratical prototypes in believing that "dead men tell no tales." U. S. forces have been landed to protect American property and soon two marine columns are converging on him. Five miles up the San Fernando trail, Lieutenant Brown commanding a platoon of marines is startled to see his point knocked down by a machine gun close at hand in the underbrush. Instinctively his entire patrol has scattered from the trail and he finds himself in the midst of a thorn bush unable to think. Although he has been expecting this for some time, it comes as a distinct shock to him. This is Lieutenant Brown's first experience under fire and the impressions are strange to him. The first furious burst of fire having subsided, the patrol regains its balance and settles down to a musketry duel; Lieutenant Brown has collected his scattered wits and is trying to find out enough about his invisible enemy to make an intelligent plan. Subconsciously he feels that he is greatly blessed with "trail-wise" Sergeant Carroll and Corporal Jones, whom he can see encouraging their somewhat nervous units. A careless recruit stands up to get a better view and immediately draws a burst of fire from nowhere in particular, which changes his face to a bloody mass and he reels backward in an agonized spasm; another movement in the grass to his right brings a sharp crackling which covers him with a shower of dirt and pebbles. Someone tugs at Brown's boot and he looks to see his platoon sergeant, clothing in rags, but quite self-possessed.

"I tried to get around to the right with the rear guard, Lieutenant, but the shootin's too heavy on the ridge there."

"Yes I know, Riley, and Carroll's group seems to be covered too. I can't tell where the shooting is coming from exactly. Haven't seen a thing, but I think they must be in the brush on those two hills; sounds like

it. Now listen, Riley, I want you to set up that little mortar and throw as much DM smoke up on those hills as you can, and if we've guessed right, we can rush them. All right, go ahead."

A few moments later the other sergeant had joined his lieutenant and received his orders. Presently the first projectile from the mortar sailed high into the air, end over end, and was lost over the brow of a hill to the front. The second landed squarely on the crest and was followed quickly by several others distributed along the crest. Bandits on the second hill, scornful of the mild nature of the explosion cheered their leader. There was a distinct reduction of fire from the first hill and almost simultaneously the smoke began falling on the other. The firing, which had been so deadly until now, degenerated into a few scattered shots and the smoke clad slopes began to ring with excited shouts. The marines' fire quickened and chaos reigned on the high ground to their front. A whistle signal from the lieutenant and the pandemonium was made complete by the approach of demons with goggle eyes and snouts. Such bandits as were able ran terror-stricken in all directions, some into trees and fences, others head-long, blindly into the arms of their assailants. But most of them had completely lost interest in the fight and lay coughing and crying, resembling extreme cases of sea sickness and drunkenness. Four hours later the patrol returned with 48 prisoners, including Lopez. Known bandit casualties were 12 killed and 9 wounded. Marine casualties were 3 killed and 5 wounded. Such a contact is not beyond possibility and many such would soon accomplish the mission of the expeditionary force.

Old soldiers who have patrolled many rough and weary miles in pursuit of such elusive outlaws as Pancho Villa and Agustino "Caesar" Sandino, will hesitate to credit the possibility of emerging from an ambush, laid by "gooks," with 40 per cent of the irregulars killed or captured as has just been pictured, but if the chemicals in question have proven effective in civil disturbances and major warfare, are they not worth trying in bush wars?

Those who will oppose the use of such agents on conservative grounds will probably not object to the use of smoke, but may doubt its value. Smoke would find a very definite place here and is certainly the most practical of all chemical agents in these situations. The advantages of smoke over other agents are: that no protection is necessary; it does not depend on a favorable wind, as its purpose may be almost as effectively accomplished by smoking our position as the enemy's; and its ability to produce casualties makes it useful both as a weapon and a screening agent (true only of white phosphorus grenades, of course). Its disadvantages are: that when used as a screen it is purely a defensive measure, although it allows the user to gain the initiative; and its casualty producing effect is not nearly as great as that of a lethal or toxic gas (it does not immobilize). Recent experiments indicate that smoke would definitely overcome the enemy's fire superiority—the vital problem in a contact beginning with an ambush. The Chemical Warfare School published a pamphlet, 15 June, 1932, entitled "The Relation of Smoke to Fire Superiority," of which extracts follow:



"5. The following extracts are taken from an article written by Major General Robert H. Allen, Chief of Infantry, published in the Infantry Journal, January 1928:

"\*\*\*Recent tests have been made of the effect of smoke screens. First a unit fired with rifles and machine guns at a range inside of 1,000 yards without any smoke screen and made a certain number of hits: in other words, its fire effect had a certain efficiency which we will say is 100. Then a smoke screen was placed in front of the targets, and with the same unit firing, the fire effect was 25 as compared to 100 without smoke. Then the smoke was put down on the unit that was firing and the fire effect was 8 as compared with 100. If you blind the enemy by smoke—not screening our own troops, but by blinding the enemy—you have killed the effectiveness of his fire, and infantry can at once take up the advance.\*\*\*"

"6. a. This exercise (conducted at the Chemical Warfare School) from its inauguration up to include the firings of June 23, 1932, has shown the following results:

Number of classes firing—25	Number Firing	Rounds Fired	Hits Obtained	Percentage of hits
First Phase— (Without smoke).....	751	3535	1475	41.72
Second Phase— (Smoke on Targets)	751	3618	515	14.26
Third Phase— (Smoke on Firers)...	751	3629	124	3.42"

Under these conditions, a patrol which finds itself pinned down by enemy fire, if equipped with smoke rifle grenades, could so reduce the effectiveness of the ambushers' fire by smoking his position that it could extricate itself and continue the fight on a status more nearly to its liking. Even if it were impossible to smoke the enemy position, the patrol would probably be able to save itself by smoking its own, which could be easily done. It does not take a great stretch of imagination to believe that the little marine patrol that suffered 100 per cent casualties at Achuapa might have fared much better had it been equipped with white phosphorus rifle grenades, or even HC candles.

The offensive has been more stressed in this discussion than the defensive, as the defense of an outpost or bivouac seldom presents serious difficulties. In fact, the irregulars will not ordinarily make a determined attack on our forces in a defensive position unless they know our forces to be greatly inferior to theirs. They will more frequently make harassing attacks from safe distances. In the rare cases in which a bandit attack would be precipitated by the knowledge of our weakened condition, gas would prove itself invaluable to the defenders, and even greater success could be expected as the defensive system could be carefully planned in advance and heavier weapons could be used for chemical projection. Reluctance to attack our defensive positions, a common characteristic of the Central American guerrilla, cannot be expected of every other irregular with whom we may be called upon to deal. The Moros of the Philippines have given us abundant evidence of this, and in these cases when fanatical savages stop only when there is no strength left in their bodies, an agent which could positively incapacitate them would be a welcome staff to lean upon, indeed.

As a final factor influencing our decision, we find the increasing use of aircraft in small wars. In Nicaragua they were indispensable for supply, reconnaissance, and ground attacks, performing all three missions in a most commendable manner, their speed and radius of operation making them most valuable for this type of operation. On the occasions when bandit concentrations are located and attacked (as in the case of the air raid on Sandino's stronghold on Mt. Chipote in 1929), the aircraft squadrons attached to the expeditionary forces would be admirably adapted to the distribution of large quantities of chemical agents of any nature. Here the planes would be free from the technical objections encountered in the use of lethal gasses by ground patrols.

In conclusion, let it be emphasized that in small wars of this nature success may be expected when the irregulars are killed or captured, and only when the majority of them or their leaders have been so dealt with. To accomplish this end against an enemy who in combat always outnumbers, who generally selects the scene of operations, who makes his presence felt from ambush, who scatters in all directions carrying his casualties with astounding rapidity, and whose intelligence system is far superior to ours, some means must be found to offset his advantages. First, his fire superiority must be overcome; and second, he must be immobilized. Chemicals can accomplish both.

It is, therefore, proposed that serious consideration be given this subject; that experiments be conducted to determine what chemical equipment is best suited for the use of small patrols, with particular attention paid to toxic smoke, screening smoke, and lacrimators projected from the Two Inch Hand-Mortar.

## CATERPILLAR CLUB

(Continued from page 46)

- 2nd Lieut. William R. Ostertag, Quantico, Va., 20 February, 1930.
- 2nd Lieut. C. Rob. Neale, San Diego, California, 21 October, 1930.
- 2nd Lieut. Joel B. Nott, New Bern, N. C., 21 November, 1931.
- Private Frank V. Schultz, Long Beach, California, 18 December, 1932.
- Pvt. 1cl. Prescott H. Newman, Pensacola, Fla., 16 June, 1933.

<sup>1</sup> Shot down in action in France.

<sup>2</sup> Drowned in Potomac River after making free parachute jump.

<sup>3</sup> Killed by bandits after a forced landing in Nicaragua.

<sup>4</sup> Drowned off Virginia Beach, Virginia, after making a free parachute jump.

## WING SHOOTING THE GROUND STRAFERS

(Continued from page 61)

mobile weapon; it is capable of highly varied employment; it is not relatively expensive considering its essential qualities. To a great extent its efficient use depends upon the skill of the individual. It is submitted, therefore, that with reasonable training the rifleman may defend himself effectively with this weapon against air attacks in the future, as well as to use it for all the purposes to which it has been put in the past.

## CAN A MARINE VOTE?

### A fine piece of General information

■ As I was making an informal inspection some time ago I ran head on into a heated argument. Smith was pointedly informing Jones that Marines could not vote, which Jones failed to accept even with reservations.

"Marines are federal property," Smith was saying, "and they aren't allowed to vote. I'm from California, and I'm sure that I can't vote when I'm at home."

"I'll bet I can vote in Texas," Jones replied. "And just because I never have is no sign that I'm not allowed to. I didn't quit being an American citizen when I enlisted."

And so the time-honored debate was on again.

Just at that moment the first sergeant came up. Smith and Jones simultaneously appointed him judge, put their cases before him. Old Brown listened like a Dutch uncle, then proceeded to outline the suffrage law as he knew it.

"Certainly you don't lose your vote by joining the Marines," he explained. "If you get back home for the elections, you can walk right up and register. And if you are doing duty at some other place, you write for an absentee ballot, and get to vote by mail. At least that's the way it is up in New Hampshire."

I was as much in the dark about the voting qualifications of Marines as were the two privates, but I was not ready to accept the first sergeant's decision as final. Right then and there I decided that I would seek out the truth of the matter.

That night I burned the midnight Mazda working up a questionnaire, mailing a copy of it to each state. Slowly, in the stamped, self-addressed envelope furnished, the replies came trickling back home to me. Several of the states objected to answering my queries on technical grounds. I wrote again, won definite replies. When most of the questionnaires were returned, I began to sort and analyze them. I was rather astounded at the result. Smith, Jones, and Brown had all been wrong. Smith can vote in his state, even by absentee ballot, while Jones is not allowed to vote in his state under any consideration. Brown was only conditionally correct, in that his absentee ballot is permitted only for presidential electors. And so it goes.

To be qualified to vote, I learned, three general conditions must be satisfied:

- (1) Residence in the state, county, and district for periods prior to election date as required by the state law.
- (2) Citizen of the United States, native or naturalized.
- (3) Over twenty-one years of age.

The period of residence required in the state varies from two years, as in South Carolina and Louisiana, to as little as three months, as in Maine. A majority of the states demand one year's residence.

Every state names certain classes of persons whom it excludes from any right to the elective franchise. Some exclude only a few such classes. Arizona, for example, draws the line on aliens, prisoners while doing their term, and those guilty of fighting a duel. Some group a great variety of classes under the forbidding rule. Texas, unlike any other state, classes soldiers, Marines, and seamen with idiots, lunatics, paupers, and convicts in denying them the right to vote. Under this constitutional provision of Texas, not even her native sons retain their voting privilege while serving in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps.\*

#### RESIDENCE

There seems to be no simple rule by which to determine one's place of residence, but three basic tests seem to be reasonably well established:

- (1) A person must have a residence somewhere
- (2) A residence once established continues until a new one is established.
- (3) A person can have only one residence for suffrage purposes at a time.

The question of residence is a question of fact, and in most states the following common law rules apply in determining residence:

- (1) That place must be considered the residence of a person in which his habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.
- (2) Both the intention to acquire a new residence and the fact of removal concur to establish a new residence, and neither avails without the other.
- (3) Residence is neither gained in the new state nor lost in the old state by a temporary stay without the intention of making the new state his home.
- (4) Residence is neither gained nor lost by reason of presence or absence from a place while employed in the service of the United States.

Even an orphaned minor who enlists in the Marine Corps must be considered to have a residence at the place of his last established domicile, unless and until he actually and intentionally removes his permanent home to another place. If it were held otherwise, a free, natural-born citizen, when he comes of age, might be deprived of his elective franchise altogether by reason of his semi-permanent, almost transient, status in the service of his government.

The provision that residence is neither gained nor lost by reason of the presence or absence from a place while employed in the service of the United States "is aimed at the participation of an unconcerned body of men in the control through the ballot box of municipal affairs in whose further conduct they have no interest, and from the mismanagement of which by the officers

\*NOTE: An amendment adopted 8 Nov., 1932, allows reserves and retired men and officers to vote, but active duty men are still prohibited.

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their ballots might elect, they sustain no injury. Its effect is not to disqualify such persons from gaining or losing a residence, but renders the fact of sojourn or absence impotent as evidence either to create or destroy it; in other words, presence or absence has primarily no effect upon the political status of such person. The question in each case is still as it was before the adoption of this provision . . . , one of domicile or residence, to be decided upon all the circumstances of the case."<sup>1</sup> If a Marine had a right to vote in New York State, being a citizen thereof, his assignment to the Navy Yard in Brooklyn would not change it. Nor would his buddy from California now serving in the same Navy Yard acquire any voting privilege on account of his station of duty.

It is well settled that a permanent abode is necessary to constitute residence. The federal courts have ruled that "such residence must have at least a permanency beyond that involved in a temporary purpose, and an inhabitancy which is necessarily subordinate to an authority which at any moment may terminate it, and move the person to another part of the national domain."<sup>2</sup>

This same rule applies with equal force to others in a temporary status. A patient in a hospital does not acquire a new residence by his stay at the hospital.<sup>3</sup> Inmates of almshouses or other public institutions who have not the intention of staying there permanently do not gain or lose their voting privilege. Students at college fall under the same classification. On this subject the Supreme Court of Illinois<sup>4</sup> laid down this rule:

"Some students are by the legal test laid down voters at the place where they are attending college, but they are comparatively small in number. . . . To hold that all such students were legal voters at the place of the college would be doing violence to the legal requirements to constitute one a legal voter, and would have a very large influence in giving students the power to control local elections and local government questions where large educational institutions are located. The fact that a student does not expect to return home to live after he finished school is not a very important one, for most persons attending universities and colleges expect, when they graduate, to enter some kind of business for themselves."

The latter part of this ruling would also apply to a Marine serving at a post from which he expected to be discharged, and whose intention it is to make the precinct in which the post is located his home. Because of the Marine's availability to transfer at any time, and the possibility of altering his intention prior to discharge, any voting privilege granted in such a case would do the resident civilian voters an injustice.

The same rule as to students applies to the government academies. A resident of Maryland appointed as a midshipman to the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis can vote when he becomes twenty-one, but a non-resident of Maryland acquires no vote by residence there. So also with the cadets at the Military Academy at West Point, N. Y.

## JURISDICTION

In order to vote in a state, the residence required must naturally be within the jurisdiction of that state. This brings up the question of the status of a federal area for voting purposes, a question which the courts of several of the states have been called upon to decide. The Constitution of the United States<sup>5</sup> provides that Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. Once ceded, these places are in the same political status as the District of Columbia, and the laws of the State no longer operate in such places. Exclusive legislation implies exclusive jurisdiction, unless the act of cession expressly provides otherwise. A condition or reservation for the service of civil or criminal process does not affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government over such territory. In general, therefore, persons residing within federal areas do not acquire the civil and political privileges, nor subject themselves to the civil duties and obligations of inhabitants of the precincts within which the federal area is located.

In one of the leading cases<sup>6</sup> on this subject, decided in 1897, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a residence in a federal military reservation will not give one a right to vote at a State election held in the county where the reservation is located. In this opinion by a unanimous court, Judge Story was quoted<sup>7</sup> as saying:

"The inhabitants of those places cease to be inhabitants of the state, and can no longer exercise any civil or political rights under the laws of the state."

The opinion continued:

"The doctrine resting upon and sustained by an unruffled current of authority seems to be that all political powers and jurisdiction over a military reservation, not expressly retained by a state, are surrendered absolutely to the general government by a voluntary transfer of lands for the exclusive use of the army and navy; and consequently a person residing thereon acquires none of the constitutional qualifications of an elector."

In considering whether the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation, the Supreme Court of the United States adhered<sup>8</sup> to this doctrine.

Whenever the resident of a federal area is in a temporary status, the requirement of a permanent abode is not satisfied thereby, and there seems little question but that no voting privilege can be gained during the tenure of that status. But where the resident takes up

<sup>1</sup>*In Re Cunningham*, 91 N. Y. S. 974.

<sup>2</sup>*Ex parte White*, 228 Fed. 88, 93.

<sup>3</sup>*Election Law*, 9 Phila. 497.

<sup>4</sup>*Anderson v. Pifer*, 315 Ill. 164. (Eureka College).

<sup>5</sup>1st Article; 8th Section.

<sup>6</sup>*McMahon v. Polk*, 18 S. D. 296.

<sup>7</sup>*Commentaries on the Constitution*, section 1227.

<sup>8</sup>*Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe*, 114 U. S. 525.

a permanent abode in a federal area, there is a serious conflict of opinion as to his right of suffrage. The question came before the Supreme Court of Ohio<sup>9</sup> as to the effect of a proviso in the act of that State, ceding the federal government lands for a National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent the inmates of the Asylum from exercising the right of suffrage of all township, county, and State elections in the township in which the Asylum is located. The court adhered to the doctrine set forth above, and held "that the inmates of such asylum resident within the territory, being such exclusive jurisdiction, were not residents of the State so as to entitle them to vote, within the meaning of the Constitution, which conferred the elective franchise upon its residents alone." To the same effect are the decisions of Idaho,<sup>10</sup> New York,<sup>11</sup> Michigan,<sup>12</sup> and Tennessee,<sup>13</sup> which hold that a resident of

a soldiers' home who intended to make it his permanent home could *not* vote therefrom, although conceding that the inmate could vote from the residence which he had before entering the home.

The leading case holding a contrary view to the decisions just noted was decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas.<sup>14</sup> This court held that a member of the Western Branch of the National Home for Disabled Soldiers is not deprived of his right to acquire a residence there for voting purposes.

<sup>9</sup>*Sinks v. Reese*, 19 Ohio St. 306.

<sup>10</sup>*Powell v. Spackman*, 7 Idaho. 692.

<sup>11</sup>*In Re Matter of Smith*, 89 N. Y. S. 1006.

<sup>12</sup>*Wolcott v. Holcomb*, 97 Mich. 361.

<sup>13</sup>*State v. Willett*, 117 Tenn. 334.

<sup>14</sup>*Cory v. Spencer*, vol. 63 L. R. A., page 275.

#### SUFFRAGE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS STATES

State	Residence Required (mos.)			Literacy	Qualifications Other Than Citizenship			Special
	State	County	Precinct		Property	Poll tax		
Alabama	24	12	3	Read and write.	Yes	Yes		Employed
Arizona	12	1	1	Read and write.	.....	.....		.....
Arkansas	12	6	1	.....	.....	Yes		.....
California	12	3	1	Write name; read Constitution.	.....	.....		.....
Colorado	12	3	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Connecticut	12	.....	6	Read Constitution.	.....	.....		Morality
Delaware	12	3	1	Write name; read Constitution.	.....	.....		.....
Florida	12	6	1	Write name; read Constitution.	.....	Yes		.....
Georgia	12	6	.....	Read and write.	.....	.....		.....
Idaho	6	1	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Illinois	12	3	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Indiana	6	2	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Iowa	6	2	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Kansas	6	1	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Kentucky	12	6	2	.....	.....	.....		.....
Louisiana	24	12	3	Read, write and understand Constitution.	.....	.....		.....
Maine	3	.....	.....	Write name; read Constitution.	.....	.....		.....
Maryland	12	6	.....	Read.	.....	.....		.....
Massachusetts	12	6	6	Write name; read Constitution.	.....	.....		.....
Michigan	6	2/3	2/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Minnesota	6	1	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Mississippi	24	12	12	Read or explain Constitution.	.....	Yes		.....
Missouri	12	2	2	.....	.....	.....		.....
Montana	12	1	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Nebraska	6	1/3	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Nevada	6	1	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
New Hampshire	6	6	6	Write one line; read Constitution	.....	.....		all taxes paid
New Jersey	12	5	.....	.....	.....	.....		.....
New Mexico	12	3	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
New York	12	4	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
North Carolina	12	4	4	Read and write.	.....	.....		.....
North Dakota	12	3	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Ohio	12	1	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Oklahoma	12	6	1	Read and write.	.....	.....		.....
Oregon	6	.....	.....	Read and write.	Yes	.....		.....
Pennsylvania	12	.....	2	.....	.....	.....		Tax paid
Rhode Island	24	.....	6	.....	.....	.....		.....
South Carolina	24	12	4	Read and write.	Yes	.....		.....
South Dakota	12	3	1	.....	.....	.....		.....
Tennessee	12	6	.....	Able to mark ballot.	.....	Yes		.....
Texas	12	6	6	.....	.....	Yes		Soldiers, Marines & seamen prohibited
Utah	12	4	2	.....	.....	.....		.....
Vermont	12	3	3	.....	.....	.....		Take oath of freeman
Virginia	12	6	.....	Read & understand Constitution	.....	Yes		.....
Washington	12	3	1	Read and write.	.....	.....		.....
West Virginia	12	2	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Wisconsin	12	1/3	1/3	.....	.....	.....		.....
Wyoming	12	2	1/3	Read Constitution.	.....	.....		.....



## ABSENTEE VOTING

Most of our states have provided for the voting of those unavoidably absent from their polling places in what are known as absent voter laws. These laws have allowed Marines and others in the federal service to exercise their right of suffrage where before they found themselves practically disenfranchised in the service of their government.

Registration is a prerequisite of voting in practically every state now, but where the absent voter is allowed a ballot, he is also allowed to register by the same method. He must, however, make application to the registrar of his county or election district for the blank forms required. These forms are completed and returned to the registrar together with poll tax, if required, and upon receipt of these the registrar forwards the absentee ballot. This ballot is executed according to the printed instructions accompanying it, and must be put into the mails between the dates specified in the instructions.

A few states, like Indiana and Maryland, have made no provision for absentee voting. The use of the absentee ballot by those in the military and naval services is reserved by New Jersey and Pennsylvania for

war time only; while New Hampshire, as we have seen, permits the absentee ballot to be used only for presidential electors.

## CONCLUSIONS

From a consideration of the laws of the various states and the decisions of their courts of last resort, we may reasonably draw these conclusions:

(1) A Marine is not deprived of his right to vote by reason of his being in the service.<sup>15</sup>

(2) The domicile of a Marine generally remains unchanged by his being stationed in line of duty at a particular place, even for years; and he generally does not acquire a new residence in consequence of being stationed on duty away from his domicile of citizenship.<sup>16</sup>

(3) A Marine otherwise qualified may therefore vote from the place of his permanent home, but not from a federal area where he is stationed for duty.

(4) If the state in which the Marine has his fixed habitation has provided for absentee voting, he has the right to vote by absentee ballot.

<sup>15</sup>Texas excepted.

<sup>16</sup>19 C. J. 418.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**MANUAL FOR LANDING OPERATIONS.** The tentative issue of this long and much needed text covering this very important phase of our mission made its appearance last week. The Manual opens with a chapter covering a general discussion of landing operations, which gives a clear cut summary of the obligations of the Marine Corps in the prosecution of landing operations, with their many and sundry problems, stressing the assistance which will be required from naval forces afloat.

The second chapter is on general considerations governing the selection of landing areas, followed by an explanation of the ship-to-shore movement, including prints of landing diagrams, boat diagrams and debarkation schedules. The subject of shore line combat is next explained. Then the employment of naval supporting groups is dealt with at length, accompanied by graphs, tables and diagrams.

The role played by aviation is precisely presented with all its contingent phases. The part played by field artillery, including anti-aircraft artillery, is explained in the ensuing section. Communications, with all its functions is gone into next, accompanied by detailed plates depicting the various plans and radio frequencies. Then combat intelligence occupies the attention—with a general mission explanation. Next we find treated the employment of chemical agents, including a summary of the agents with identification, workings and ammunition requirements. The contribution charged against the engineers in the general plan is then handled, followed by the same explanation covering tanks.

Chapter 3 starts with the general considerations governing the defense of advanced bases, especially in regard to effect of size, form and relief of land forms

on the defense of bases. Now comes the treatise on the organization and disposition of the sectors and sector defense. The chapter continues with an explanation of the character of protection used in troop anti-aircraft defense. Then follows the explanation of distant reconnaissance, alert and final defense phases. The part played by field artillery followed by the employment of naval forces afloat, anti-aircraft artillery in base defense and the employment of chemical agents and smoke are all explained. Intelligence is the next topic treated under the headings of distant reconnaissance, alert phase and final phase. The sources of information are handled likewise. The methods of communications in the defense of a base are next dealt with, accompanied by several plates on line route maps, circuit diagrams and charts on the distribution of radio frequencies.

Chapter 4 takes up the topic of staff principles and functions, touching definitely on responsibility, authority, functions cooperation and classification; with staff charts covering the general relations of all staff sections.

Chapter 5 deals entirely with characteristics—boat spaces for basic items of material, boat space requirements of organizations, personnel and equipment up to and including a battalion of marine infantry, with special emphasis on the loading of small boats of personnel preliminary to landing.

It embarks upon a definite stand on logistics and administrative arrangements. The topic of transport loadings of a popular and available type of vessel is covered in detail.

Chapter 6 deals with plans and orders. Sample forms of the estimate of the situation, plans, orders and annexes are shown in all their relations.

Chapter 7 is devoted entirely to training of troops, the methods employed, schedules to be followed, duration of the various training periods with special emphasis on participation in the attack and defense of landing operations.

The usual table of contents and index appear. The Manual will be in the form of a loose-leaf pamphlet, and for the present is marked CONFIDENTIAL—in view of certain data it contains. It will contain around 200 pages of text, plates, diagrams and tables.

**SMOKE ON THE HORIZON**, by Vice-Admiral C. V. Usborne, C.B., C.M.C., R.N., (Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, 18/-net), is a carefully prepared, extensive report and narrative on the Mediterranean operations during the World War. It shows how Supreme War Councils are sometimes inclined to overlook important contributing campaigns until almost too late to derive any benefit from them. Its contents run to thirteen chapters, every one of which is a lesson. It is especially interesting as a text book for the Naval War College and the Marine Corps Schools.

The chapters on "The Battle of the Narrows," "The Battle of the Outer Forts," and the "River Clyde" are the closest of all to our F.M.F. mission. The Admiral's bibliography is the best in England. The main idea propounded is to place before students of war who seek to enlarge their own potentiality for leadership incidents which will afford them help and broaden experience by presenting examples on which they can well mould their professional selves. This account does not pretend to be a complete one of the naval operations in the Mediterranean—it is far otherwise, and many instances of great interest have perforce been omitted, leaving ample room for other pens. The Admiral is very warm in his praise for the navies of England's allies, and has placed adequate praise on every occasion due.

The maps and photographs are especially interesting, and to us marines the book is especially instructive because it shows occasions on which marines were used as

guards for landing of bluejackets' demolition parties in the clean-up destruction of several forts. It also shows the several kinds of duties that the Royal Marines are required to perform. It is a frank discussion of the mistakes made in the Mediterranean naval campaign, and I would say that our studies in connection with the duties of our F.M.F. (Fleet Marine Force) might well include the chapters of the text above mentioned.

## STREET FIGHTING

(Continued from page 43)

based on the squad, one squad for a narrow street, two or more squads in line for wider ones. Numbers 1 and 2 (riflemen) of front rank will form leading wave. Numbers 1 and 2 (riflemen) of rear rank will form second wave and cover their file leaders at about two paces distance. Other men in squad should follow at several paces distance at the sides of the street watching buildings on the other side of the street. Unit leaders of sections or larger in center of street or unit or where they can best control same. Assistant automatic riflemen should follow their automatic riflemen. Assistant squad leader when squad is acting alone, on opposite side of street to automatic rifleman and act as rear man of squad. If two or more squads are in line automatic riflemen and assistants should be on the same side of the street their squads are. In the preceding, each squad would cover a front of about five paces. As a variation Number 3 front rank could take post in front wave covered by Number 4 rear rank in second wave giving the squad a frontage of seven and a half paces. Fronts could be doubled by having men in second wave take post in front wave to the right of their file leaders but it is not recommended when men are available for a second wave, as fire might have to be opened to protect a casualty in the single wave formation who would have been protected by his rear rank man in a two wave formation.

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